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

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Volume 110 • Number 4 • Winter 1995–96

CONTENTS

China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire
NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER 501

Presidential Manipulation of Polls and Public Opinion: The Nixon Administration and the Pollsters
LAWRENCE R. JACOBS
ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO 519

The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era
EYTAN GILBOA 539

Prescriptions for a New National Democracy
MICHAEL LIND 563

Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of Irish Americans
DAVID CARROLL COCHRAN 587

The Maastricht Treaty As High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration
MICHAEL J. BAUN 605

Colin Powell's *American Journey* and the Eisenhower Precedent: A Review Essay
FRED I. GREENSTEIN 625

Book Reviews 631

Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received 671

Correspondence 672

Title Page and Index to Volume 110 673

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK REVIEWS

Weissman, Stephen R., **A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy** — H. Bradford Westerfield — 631

Fisher, Louis, **Presidential War Power** — Gordon Silverstein — 632

Sinclair, Barbara, **Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era** — Joseph Cooper — 633

Klinkner, Philip A., **The Losing Parties: Out-Party National Committees, 1956–1993** — John F. Bibby — 634

Mueller, John, **Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics** — Stephen M. Walt — 636

Kolko, Gabriel, **Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914** — Charles Tilly — 637

Walcott, Charles E. and Karen M. Hult, **Governing the White House: From Hoover Through LBJ** — James P. Pfiffner — 638

Lavrakas, Paul J., Michael W. Traugott, and Peter V. Miller, eds., **Presidential Polls and the News Media** — John J. Smee — 640

Gray, Colin S., **The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power** — Edward Rhodes — 640

Woodward, Susan L., **Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War** — Raju G. C. Thomas — 642

Gingrich, Newt, **To Renew America** — Richard M. Pious — 643

Ratner, Steven R., **The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War** — Paul F. Diehl — 645

Hofrenning, Daniel J. B., **In Washington But Not Of It: The Prophetic Politics of Religious Lobbyists** — Kenneth Wald — 646

Gause, F. Gregory III, **Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States** — Gwenn Okruhlik — 647

Salamon, Lester M., **Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State** — Ralph da Costa Nunez — 648

Hughes, John C., **The Federal Courts, Politics, and the Rule of Law** — Daniel B. Rodriguez — 649

Weiner, Myron, **The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and Human Rights** — Yossi Shain — 651

Fiorino, Daniel J., **Making Environmental Policy** — Steven Cohen — 652

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Torres, Andres, **Between Melting Pot and Mosaic: African Americans and Puerto Ricans in the New York Political Economy** JOHN MOLLENKOPF 653

Hoffman, Stanley, **The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964–1994** DESMOND DINAN 654

Mooney, Patrick H. and Theo J. Majka, **Farmers' and Farm Workers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture** WILLIAM P. BROWNE 655

Van Rooyen, Johann, **Hard Right: The New White Power in South Africa** RICHARD L. SKLAR 656

Katz, Michael B., **Improving Poor People: The Welfare State, the "Underclass," and Urban Schools as History** JEFFREY R. HENIG 658

Peterson, Paul E., **The Price of Federalism** TIMOTHY J. CONLAN 659

Fuller, Graham E. and Ian O. Lesser, **A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West** MARTIN W. SAMPSON III 660

Mayers, David, **The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy** DAVID S. FOGLESONG 661

Rubin, Barnett R., **The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, State Formation and Collapse in the International System** SAID AMIR ARJOMAND 662

McMahon, Christopher, **Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management** JACK H. KNOTT 664

Murphy, Craig N., **International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850** MITCHELL BERNARD 665

Aslund, Anders, **How Russia Became a Market Economy** RANDALL STONE 666

Weko, Thomas J., **The Politicizing Presidency: The White House Personnel Office, 1948–1994** BERT A. ROCKMAN 667

Hardin, Russell, **One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict** LEWIS COSER 668

Keohane, Robert and Elinor Ostrom, eds., **Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains** JOHN CONYBEARE 669

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER analyzes the role of Sino-Soviet conflict and Chinese internal reform in contributing to the collapse of the Soviet empire. She concludes that China provided a spur to Soviet overextension, an impetus to change, and a warning against repression.

LAWRENCE R. JACOBS and ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO investigate President Nixon's relationship with the public opinion pollsters, Louis Harris and George Gallup. On the basis of their examination of previously unopened archives, Jacobs and Shapiro argue that the pollsters' behavior during Nixon's presidency violated professional standards of conduct and that today's pollsters should avoid close relations with elective politicians.

EYTAN GILBOA traces the evolution of the U.S. military confrontation with Manuel Noriega and explains the reasons behind the decision to invade Panama in 1989. He argues that serious mistakes were made in dealing not only with Noriega but also with such dictators as Iraq's Saddam Hussein and the Serbian leaders Radovan Karadzić and Slobodan Milošević, and draws general lessons for American military intervention after the cold war.

MICHAEL LIND offers prescriptions for developing a new American creed of national democracy. Lind defines national democracy as a synthesis that could counteract the trend toward the fissuring of the United States along class, ethnic, and racial lines.

DAVID CARROLL COCHRAN examines the remarkable stability that characterizes American democratic politics given the nation's history of ethnic pluralism. He draws on the case of Irish Americans to explore the cultural, economic, and political sources of this stability.

MICHAEL J. BAUN scrutinizes the high politics diplomacy of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. He argues that although the treaty had roots in pre-1989 economic and institutional developments, it was essentially a response by the European Community and its member states to the end of the cold war and German unification.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN points out the striking parallels between the careers and later political circumstances of Colin Powell and Dwight Eisenhower. In 1948 Eisenhower removed himself from consideration as a possible presidential candidate, but in 1952 he accepted the Republican nomination and went on to become president.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER

On 15 May 1989, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in Beijing to normalize relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This was to have been the crowning achievement of Deng Xiaoping's career—a reflection of his accomplishments in geopolitics and domestic reform. Having brought prosperity to the countryside, a degree of modernization to the cities, and heightened international standing to the nation, he looked forward to celebrating Moscow's capitulation on the so-called three obstacles: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the northern border—a capitulation that made Sino-Soviet rapprochement possible and that Gorbachev's journey to Beijing aptly symbolized. For China, the cold war epoch was ending; the years of external threat were over.

But waiting for the Soviet leader in Tiananmen Square were thousands of protesters urging democracy and moral reformation upon China's government. They appealed to Gorbachev for help, they humiliated Deng in his hour of triumph, and finally they were crushed by the tanks of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). China stepped back from the future that would soon embrace Russia and Eastern Europe, shunning participation in the liberating events that swept most of the rest of the communist world in 1989. Ironically, after having contributed over the years modestly but continually to Soviet difficulties and after having instituted reforms that revealed the road to possible salvation for communism in Europe, in June 1989 the Chinese demonstrated how not to deal with the forces unleashed by reform.

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER is professor of history at Georgetown University and in the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Her most recent books are *Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945–1992; Uncertain Friendships*; and the co-edited volume to which she also contributed, *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*. She is currently a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C.

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To understand China's role in the collapse of the Soviet empire requires consideration of three factors: the Chinese security threat, the economic challenge, and the Tiananmen model of political repression. In none of these areas could the China factor be considered primary. U.S. military spending under Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan fueled Soviet determination to invest in a multiocean navy and to expand ICBM capabilities. Similarly, in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, experimentation with reform antedated China's innovations. Finally, neither impulses toward brutality nor resistance to it needed to be learned from the Chinese. Nevertheless, in the complex environment that produced the collapse of the Soviet empire, the problems and challenges posed by the People's Republic ought not to be ignored if a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of these events is to be reached.

The Geopolitical Dimension

The Chinese menace to Soviet security and Moscow's intimidation of Beijing were both the longest standing and clearest problems between the two states. Their lengthy common border and Soviet fear of a two-front war made it virtually inevitable. When the United States and China began normalization in the early 1970s, apprehensions among the men in the Kremlin mounted.

Concern among Soviet leaders stretched back to the earliest days of the Chinese civil war. They preferred a weak dependent neighbor to a strong one with its own agenda, and they entertained an underlying racial fear of the volatile barbarian hordes in the east—a fear that had characterized Russian regimes long before the advent of communism. Joseph Stalin opposed Mao Zedong's effort to unify China; his successors sought joint military facilities and tried to punish Mao for ideological innovation. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Soviet anxiety rose in response to China's instability and fanaticism.[1]

The Sino-Soviet split, which became public in the 1960s, made clear not only that monolithic communism was an illusion but that bipolarity was an inadequate organizing principle for the international system. The Chinese decision to seek support against the Soviet menace from their erstwhile enemies in Washington confirmed that the cold war was no longer a struggle between communism and capitalism. U.S.–China rapprochement forced Moscow to take defense of its Asian border seriously at the same time as Washington, although augmenting its military prowess, could stop worrying about an Asian threat. The need to devote ever larger portions of Soviet gross national product (GNP) to weapons procurement intensified economic weakness. For Moscow, deterioration of living

[1] Murray D. Zinoman, "Soviet Security Policy Toward China: The Limits of Change," *Pacific Regional Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 59–60, 62; Seweryn Bialer, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: The Soviet Dimension" in Donald Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 109; O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945–1970* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 291–322.

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standards, of infrastructure, and even of life expectancy necessitated a turn toward reform and abandonment of the cold war. Thus the Sino–Soviet split had implications for the global balance of power that ranged far beyond the substance of disagreements between Moscow and Beijing.

Precipitating China's decision to seek rapprochement with the United States was its fear of a Soviet invasion. In the mid-1960s troop concentrations escalated along the Sino–Soviet boundary. Tensions heightened in 1968, when Leonid Brezhnev used force to smash Czechoslovakia's Prague Spring, claiming Moscow had the right, indeed the obligation, to intervene in communist countries to restore order and preserve socialism. Chinese leaders saw Soviet intrusion as "fascist . . . banditry" and feared their border clashes would lead to war.[2] European reports that Moscow contemplated strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities stimulated alarm.[3] U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers estimated during the Nixon administration that the Russians could seize a large portion of the north including Beijing.[4] To China's relief, in spite of past hostility, the United States proved unwilling to tolerate Soviet aggression against the PRC.

Moscow sharply denounced the anti-Soviet thrust of the Sino–American accord reached in Shanghai in February 1972.[5] Leonid Brezhnev had himself been looking to negotiations with Washington to reduce burgeoning military expenditures and secure trade in foodstuffs and technology. Even after Shanghai, he believed that if the United States understood that it had the option of dealing with Russia instead of China, the Soviet Union "would remain the United States' primary and preferred adversary-partner."[6] The United States capitalized on Soviet anxiety to get a summit and a strategic arms limitation treaty in 1972, despite escalation of the Vietnam War. In June 1973, Brezhnev warned Richard Nixon not to negotiate a U.S.–China military accord, and in June 1974 he offered the president an alliance against the PRC.[7]

[2] Thomas M. Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle*, Rand R-1902-NA, 1977, 115–118; Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangle," *Foreign Policy* 23 (Summer 1976): 3–23; Thomas Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," *American Political Science Review* 66 (December 1972): 1175–1202; Borisov and Koloskov, *Soviet–Chinese Relations*, 219–25, 239–42, 322–28.

[3] Bernard Gwertzman, "A Chinese Youth Writes to Soviet," *New York Times*, 28 August 1969; Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Doubts Soviet Will Bomb China," *New York Times*, 29 August 1969; Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 164–66; Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, Rand R-2943-AF, August 1982, 29–48.

[4] Benjamin Welles, "Rogers Terms Czechoslovakia 'Grim Reminder,'" *New York Times*, 21 August 1969; Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia" in Zagoria, *Soviet Policy*, 272.

[5] Georgi Arbatov, *The System* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 180–82; Chi Su, "U.S.–China Relations: Soviet Views and Policies," *Asian Survey*, 23 (May 1983): 560–61; Seweryn Bialer, "The Soviet Union and the West: Security and Foreign Policy" in Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 473.

[6] Robert Legvold, "The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Foreign Policy" in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, ed., *Russia at the Crossroads* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 160.

[7] William Hyland, *Mortal Rivals* (New York: Random House, 1987), 11, 60, 63–64; Richard Nixon, *RN* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 1030; John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), 188–89.

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Moscow, however, lost the competition for Washington's favor. Not only did Nixon rebuff a possible alliance, Washington began to contemplate military cooperation with China. Americans hoped to force ever greater military expenditures on the Soviets, create deployment problems for the Red Army, constrain Soviet expansion, and preclude Sino-Soviet reconciliation.[8]

Rapprochement worked. Moscow felt constrained further to increase border deployments, which had climbed from fifteen divisions in 1965 to forty-four in 1972 and to fifty in 1982, complemented by one quarter of the Soviet air force. As much as one-seventh of all Soviet military resources fueled the Far East expansion.

Brezhnev's initial decision to invest heavily in conventional as well as nuclear capabilities had come in 1965, before Sino-American cooperation. It constituted a return to a tradition that saw more as better, but also reflected maneuvering to assure military support against rivals such as Alexi Kosygin and Nikolai Podgornyy, as well as to respond to the growing U.S. commitment in Vietnam.[9] Most urgent, however, was offsetting the breakdown in efforts at reconciliation with the Chinese. Vigorous frontier defense characteristic of a belief in "asymmetrical security" necessitated overawing Chinese forces.[10] Moscow also launched the ill-fated and costly Baikal-Amur railway project to expedite development of the Soviet Far East—an effort that need not have involved an entirely new rail line well north of the frontier had officials not wanted to protect it from Beijing.

With rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, Soviet leaders faced the specter of American forces joined with those of Japan and China. This led them dramatically to increase deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles; modernize the Pacific fleet; and upgrade troops, communications, and fortifications. In 1978 Moscow created an independent theater command in the region confirming the permanency of its expensive new defense posture. Georgi A. Arbatov, director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute warned that if China were "to become some sort of military ally to the West . . . there is no place for detente."[11] Analysts have argued persuasively that fear of Chinese-American collusion in Afghanistan contributed to, although it did not determine, the Soviet decision to invade that

[8] Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "From Nixon to Reagan: China's Changing Role in American Strategy" in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Resurgent?* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 256-63.

[9] Bialer, "The Soviet Union" in Bialer and Mandelbaum, *Gorbachev's Russia*, 461-62.

[10] Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 38-41, 80-81, 94; Rajan Menon, *Soviet Power and the Third World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 99.

[11] Avigdor Haselkorn, "Impact of Sino-Japanese Treaty on the Soviet Security Strategy," *Asian Survey* 19 (June 1979): 561, 565; Jonathan Pollack, "China and the Global Strategic Balance" in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 164; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, *War and Peace* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 14.

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country in 1979, beginning a war which would further drain the USSR as well as bury détente.[12]

Here then was the fulfillment of the classic Russian military nightmare—the possibility of a two front war—made particularly frightful by American and Japanese willingness to arm the Chinese hordes.[13] And not only would Moscow have to expand and diversify military capabilities, the United States would be able to focus its attention on Europe leaving Asia to China. In 1970 the Nixon administration made public its reconfiguration of strategic plans, eliminating budgets for fighting simultaneously in Europe and Asia. The Soviets plaintively warned the unwitting Americans that China would try "to cause a clash between the U.S. and the USSR, in order to dominate the world after a nuclear conflict which . . . would reduce America and Europe to ashes while sparing . . . millions of Chinese."[14]

The growth in Soviet military power during the 1970s did not promote national security. Paradoxically, it brought together a powerful coalition of forces against an isolated Soviet government whose military achievements, while substantial, cloaked precipitous economic decline. Added burdens from war in Afghanistan, commitments to Cuba and Vietnam as well as a resurgent arms race with the United States made Soviet overextension debilitating. Instead of reflecting genuine preeminence, militarization on the Soviet model seemed to Deng Xiaoping to conflict with modernization and prosperity. As he remarked to German ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, "one of the reasons why the Soviet economy suffers from paralysis is that the Russians spend too much money on the military."[15]

By 1982 Moscow had recognized that its policies had created a hazardous anti-Soviet alignment. Assumptions that it could sustain détente with the United States while projecting power into the Third World had proven wildly inaccurate. Moscow's conviction that survival dictated an offensive posture proved incompatible with Washington's view of détente as superseding competition. With 10–15 percent of GNP going to the military, Soviet leaders found they still could not intimidate the United States, Japan, or China.[16] In March 1982, therefore, Brezhnev

[12] Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), 921–22, esp. n99.

[13] Marshal N. Ogarkov, *Kommunist*, July 1981, Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS) 79074 PREX 7.21/11:981, 25 September 1981, 90; A. Gromyko, *Kommunist*, January 1981, JPRS 78106 PREX 7.13:78106, 18 May 1981, 16.

[14] Garrett and Glaser, *War and Peace*, 28; Philip Taubman, "U.S. and China Forging Closer Ties," *New York Times*, 8 December 1980, Serge Schmemann, "Russian Scorns Chinese as 'Agents' of U.S.," 19 June 1981, and Bernard Nositer, "Brzezinski Praises White House," 2 July 1981.

[15] Thomas Bernstein, "Domestic Politics" in Steven Goldstein, ed., *China Briefing, 1984* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 9; Samuel S. Kim, "China and the Third World: In Search of a Peace and Development Line" in Kim, ed., *China and the World* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 169; Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Estimates of the U.S.–Soviet Balance of Power," Paper #33, 1988, 28, Wilson Center, Washington, DC.

[16] Alexander Nagorny, Sergei Tsyplakov, and Usman Usmanov, "The PRC: The First Decade of the Policy of Reforms," *International Affairs* 1 (January 1989): 29; Alexei G. Arbatov, "Arms Limitation

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took the major step of accepting the legitimacy of Chinese socialism, which removed a major ideological barrier to reconciliation.[17] Subsequent low-level exchanges in science, education, culture, and trade stabilized contacts.[18]

Then under Mikhail Gorbachev the pace accelerated. His "new political thinking" recognized that the correlation of forces was no longer working to Moscow's advantage and that the new situation favored economic cooperation over military coercion. To cut military budgets and reassign funds to the domestic sphere, Gorbachev sought to end the cold war, improve relations with the United States, and minimize threats of nuclear war. At the same time, if costs were to be reduced and security enhanced, it appeared imperative to eliminate regional conflicts.[19] Thus, according to Soviet analyst Alexander Lukin, "an improvement in relations with China was indispensable to the success of Gorbachev's policy."[20] Among other initiatives, Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok in July 1986 suggested concessions on two of the three obstacles to Sino-Soviet reconciliation: reduction of forces along the border and withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Military concerns on the Soviet Asian border produced a profound alteration in Moscow's view of its place in the world and the possible fruits of its foreign policy. Beginning with the Sino-Soviet rift, China had been perceived as a threat, complicating defense planning and escalating defense spending. Reconciliation with the United States rendered China still more dangerous. But the policy that equipped Soviet Asia for war alienated people in the Pacific area, isolated Moscow, and strengthened PRC-U.S.-Japanese ties. The Soviet Union found itself less, not more secure. The time had come to rethink its strategic posture.

Chinese Economic Reform

If the border problem with China gave impetus to the reconfiguration of Moscow's security structure, the economic challenge arising from the East also had a role in hastening change in the Soviet empire. China embarked upon serious economic

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and the Situation in the Asian-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions," *Asian Surgery* 24 (November 1984): 1110.

[17] M. S. Ukraintsev [M. S. Kapitsa], "USSR's Cooperation with Asian Socialist Countries, Kampuchea," *Far Eastern Affairs* 1 (January-March 1986), JPRS-UFE-003, 18 June 1986; Chi Su, "Soviet China-Watchers' Influence on Soviet China Policy," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 2 (December 1983): 44; Kenneth Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s*, Rand R-2342-NA, 1978.

[18] Carol Hamrin, *China and the Challenge of the Future* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 93 and 84-90; John W. Garver, "The 'New Type' of Sino-Soviet Relations," *Asian Survey* 29 (December 1989): 1137.

[19] Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, "Gorbachev, the New Thinking of Soviet Foreign-Security Policy and the Military: Recent Trends and Implications" and Kimura Hiroshi, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' and the Asian-Pacific Region" in Peter Juviler and Kimura, eds., *Gorbachev's Reforms* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1988), 115-47, 149; Stephen M. Meyer, "Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *Asian Survey* 13 (Fall 1988): 128, 142.

[20] Alexander Lukin, "The Initial Soviet Reaction to the Events in China in 1989 and the Prospects for Sino-Soviet Relations," *China Quarterly* 125 (March 1991): 120.

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reform in 1978. Facilitated in part by the increased confidence following from Sino–American rapprochement, the new order altered the domestic economy and expanded commercial ties with the West. In subsequent years, it revolutionized agricultural production and raised the level of rural prosperity significantly. Although industrial changes came more slowly, the production of consumer goods increased markedly and the living standards in cities also improved. These advances sometimes inspired and generally encouraged reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where the existing system increasingly appeared unworkable and the leadership incompetent. Particularly China's ability to attract foreign investment embodied lessons for capital- and technology-starved governments.

Enthusiasm for reform along Chinese lines did not develop rapidly. The Soviets disparaged Deng Xiaoping's early efforts, denouncing the new policies as an irresponsible flight from socialism. Commentaries suggested that the Soviets assumed and hoped that China's efforts would fail.[21] Identifying them as a threat, O. B. Rakhmanin of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Liaison Department, among the most influential and hard-line of the long-term China-watchers, charged that the changes aimed at strengthening Beijing's anti-Soviet policy.[22] Many Soviet leaders could not imagine that Moscow could learn from a backward state whose previous economic innovations, such as the Great Leap Forward, had been so catastrophic. Others resisted anything that might improve Sino–Soviet relations. "One becomes accustomed to a quarrel," Soviet economist Lev Deliusin observed. "One can make a profit out of it, and that's why some people were interested not in resolving differences, but in rousing them to new heights."[23] To the extent that Beijing's program received serious attention, the focus invariably seemed to be its shortcomings or inequities. Commentators stressed corruption, inflation, inequality, and the deterioration of public works.[24] Those interested in Soviet applications felt constrained to silence or to air ideas surreptitiously in obscure publications. Ideological curbs finally eased with the 1982 deaths of Leonid Brezhnev and party ideological purist Mikhail Suslov.[25]

Beginning with the accession of Yuri Andropov, discussions of Chinese reforms became more objective and informative. Andropov asserted that Moscow must "take the fraternal countries' experience into account."[26] Even deputy foreign

[21] Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's China-watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China," *China Quarterly* 94 (June 1983): 236–37.

[22] Chi Su, "Soviet China-Watchers," 42–43.

[23] Lev Petrovich Deliusin, "The People's Republic of China: The Domestic Policy Influence on Foreign Policy Activities" (paper delivered at Conference on Chinese and East Asian Implications for American Policy, 1991), 8.

[24] Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York: Norton, 1987), 200–201.

[25] Rozman, *The Chinese Debate*, 370; Gilbert Rozman, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Socialism in China and the Soviet Union" in Rozman, et al., ed., *Dismantling Communism* (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 40; Gilbert Rozman, *A Mirror for Socialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 43–44.

[26] Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo*, 256 n18.

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minister M.S. Kapitsa, ordinarily an inflexible critic of the Chinese, saw fit to call attention to important developments in the PRC in 1982. Missions to China by Aleksandr Bovin, an influential columnist for *Izvestiya*, in 1983, and by Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Arkhipov, in 1984, appear to have encouraged the leadership to study China. By mid-1985 the Institute of the Far East, a research group closely tied to the Foreign Ministry, began a dispassionate monthly feature in its journal on economic reforms in China. And also during 1985, the Central Committee of the CPSU established its own office to evaluate the Chinese reform program.[27]

Economic change, however, stalled under Andropov. The government proved unable to galvanize the population, eliminate corruption, or increase either industrial or agricultural output, and seemed equally unable to acknowledge that the system required fundamental transformation. In contrast to either China or East Europe, entrenched interests and traditions maintained a tight grip on the institutions that governed economic performance and the imagination of a public which would have to respond to new departures. The roots of such immobility in a centuries-old authoritarian Russian political culture that emphasized hierarchy, deference, and loyalty made the preservation of communist centralism far more logical than innovation.[28] Not only were Andropov's own mildly liberal inclinations thwarted, but his regime actually sought to restore ideological conformity among the intelligentsia.

By the time Mikhail Gorbachev took control in March 1985, the impossibility of just muddling through had become painfully apparent. The impetus to reform came from a combination of dire domestic circumstances, the thorough discrediting of the Stalinist growth model, the exhaustion stemming from war in Afghanistan, and the emergence of a generation of leaders receptive to a policy of *perestroika* or restructuring.[29]

As Gorbachev's government moved toward reform, it began to look more carefully both at domestic precursors, especially Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), and at what had begun elsewhere, particularly in Hungary and China. Significant public discussion of the Chinese experience awaited Gorbachev's February 1986 call at the CPSU's 27th Congress, which he then reiterated in his important Vladivostok speech in July.[30]

[27] Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945–1990* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 291 n30, 292 n53.

[28] Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture" in Seweryn Bialer, ed. *Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 19; Konstantin V. Pleshakov and Dimitry V. Furman, "China and the Soviet Union: Common and Specific Features of their Sociopolitical and Ideological Development," *Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* 12 (December 1989): JPRS-UWE-90-004, 2 April 1990.

[29] Charles Gati, *The Bloc That Failed* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 107–08; Shigeki Hakamada and Gilbert Rozman, "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity" in Rozman, *Dismantling*, 160.

[30] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Sources of Change in Soviet History: State, Society, and the Entrepreneurial Tradition" in Bialer and Mandelbaum, *Gorbachev's Russia*, 52–53; Martin Malia, *The Soviet*

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Soviet economists looking for ways to invigorate a stagnant economy began to see in "China our main foreign reform laboratory." No longer criticizing the Chinese program as heresy, they recognized that what had been happening in China could be "vitally important for us." As Evgenii Konovalov, head of the China department at the Far East Institute, asserted, "we now look at their reforms as if it were our personal business."[31] And Arbatov, who along with running the U.S.A./Canada Institute served as a Central Committee member and government spokesman, observed that since "we were becoming increasingly interested in the problem of reform . . . successful reforms in China . . . made that country's agenda a factor in our internal politics."[32]

According to the *Wall Street Journal* a "broad spectrum of Soviet China-watchers are saying openly that the economic path taken by the Chinese plays a role—in fact a central role—in determining the policies of Mr. Gorbachev as he strives to stir his own nation from its economic torpor."[33] Indeed, Alexander Lukin subsequently indicted Soviet officials and scholars for purveying "one-sided positive" information in the late 1980s so as to "give the Soviet government that extra push needed for the adoption of similar measures."[34] Economists at many of the major research institutes vied for the opportunity to travel to China. In July 1987, even former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, noted for his long standing indifference to Asia, attested to Moscow's interest in China's modernization program.[35]

Opinion remained divided as to the relevance of Chinese reforms for the Soviet Union. Some Soviet analysts contended that China had little to teach the Soviet Union's more advanced industrial economy. Contrasts in political environment and the strength of bureaucratic structures also seemed to interfere with applying lessons. Whereas the Soviet leadership appeared prepared to grant more extensive political freedoms, it had to contend with a bureaucratic caste that at eighteen million was much larger, had been in existence far longer, and had not been destabilized as had the comparable group of administrators in China during the Cultural Revolution. China also benefited from the largesse of the overseas Chinese community and the entrepreneurial haven of Hong Kong for which no Soviet parallels existed. Furthermore, critics insisted that Deng's will-

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Tragedy (New York: Free Press, 1994), 456; Stephen M. Young, "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Balancing the New and the Old," *Asian Survey* 28 (March 1988): 323.

[31] Mark D'Anastasio, "Soviets Now Hail China as a Source of Ideas for Reviving Socialism," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 1987.

[32] Arbatov, *The System*, 103.

[33] D'Anastasio, "Soviets Now Hail China," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 1987. On influence of institute analysts, see Chi Su, "Soviet China-Watchers," 25–49; John J. Stephan, "Asia in the Soviet Conception" in Zagoria, *Soviet Policy*, 30–31.

[34] Lukin, "The Initial Soviet Reaction," 124.

[35] Author's interview with Vladilen Vorontsov, editor-in-chief *Far Eastern Affairs*, Washington, DC, February 1991; "For the Further Development of Soviet-PRC Relations," *Pravda*, 15 July 1987, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Sov-International Affairs-China, 15 July 1987, B1.

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ingness to slash military budgets and demobilize a million soldiers could not be copied by Moscow with its defense commitments. At bottom, historian Martin Malia argues "Stalin had been a 'success,' in . . . creating a mammoth industrial plant and building a superpower; Mao had been a failure. . . . Gorbachev thus had to liquidate much of what his country regarded as its glory; Deng only had to overcome policies that most in his country wanted to be rid of."[36]

Those attracted to the Chinese reform experiment emphasized the extraordinary transformation of the agricultural sector and the lessons to be learned from Deng's daring decision to eliminate collectivization. Leonid Abalkin, director of the Institute of Economics and a close aide to Gorbachev, averred a "special interest" in "the fast and successful development of agriculture through broad application of the family-responsibility system."[37] Tat'iana Zaslavskaia, an economic sociologist, publicized the efficacy of Chinese rural reforms for land management and crop selection in the official government and party organs *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*.[38] Fedor Burlatsky similarly praised the responsibility system's ability to double production. Editor of the popular weekly *Literaturnaia gazeta* and TV personality as well as adviser to Andropov and Gorbachev, Burlatsky stressed to his large audience decentralized management of enterprises, privatization, and attraction of foreign capital and technology. In *Novyi mir* as early as 1982 Burlatsky used Chinese reforms "as a blueprint for changes in the Soviet economy." His readiness to consider Chinese reform as instructive, having once been a harsh critic of China, rendered his views even more influential.[39]

Food shortages and distribution problems undermined some of the resistance to experimentation in the Soviet Union. Chinese experts on rural change including Minister of Agriculture He Kang and members of Zhao Ziyang's structural readjustment think tank received invitations to lecture in the USSR.[40] In 1987 Academician Oleg Bogomolov of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System traveled to China to examine reform policies. Upon his return, he pressed the Central Committee to adopt elements of the Chinese approach.[41] In private

[36] Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy*, 454.

[37] D'Anastasio, "Soviets Now Hail China," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 1987, 8; Michael Kaser, "Soviet Restructuring in Relationship to the Chinese Reform," in Stanislaw Gomulka, Yong-Chool Ha, and Cae-One Kim, eds., *Economic Reforms in the Socialist World* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), 100.

[38] *Pravda*, 25 October 1984, and *Izvestiya*, 1 June 1985; E. A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1988), 276.

[39] Fedor Burlatsky, "Interregnum, or a Chronicle of the Times of Deng Xiaoping," *Novyi mir* 4 (April 1982), JPRS 80807, PREX 7.21/5:1250, 13 May 1982, USSR Report, 57–83; and "Conversations About Economic Reforms in China," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 11 June 1986, 14, FBIS III, USSR-International Affairs-China, 18 June 1986; B1–9; Rolf H. W. Theen, "Reform: Perspectives, Problems and Prospects" in Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., *The Gorbachev Generation* (New York: Paragon, 1989), 256; Shimotomai Nobuo, "The Reform Movement: Power, Ideology, and Intellectuals" in Juviler and Kimura, *Gorbachev's Reforms*, 73.

[40] Hamrin, *Challenge of the Future*, 34–35, 231, 234.

[41] Ronald D. Asmus, J. F. Brown, and Keith Crane, *Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe*, Rand R-3903-USDP, 1991, 6n10; *International Affairs* 10 (October 1988): 39.

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consultations with Gorbachev, he stressed the usefulness of China's experience to the USSR.

Gorbachev, however, proved exceedingly cautious. Bogomolov found that despite his early specialization in agriculture or perhaps because of his familiarity with peasant abilities and attitudes, Gorbachev approached rural experimentation warily. He considered Russia's agricultural lobby more formidable than anything faced by Chinese reformers.[42] Given that Soviet agriculture, in striking contrast to China's, based production on large-scale mechanization, conservatives argued that a return to family farms would be uneconomical. Whereas Chinese peasants in overwhelming numbers welcomed the responsibilities of independent production, the Soviets clung desperately to guaranteed rations, assigned tasks, security, and predictability.[43] Moreover, farming in the USSR involved only 20 percent of the population as a result of Stalin's successful urbanization, so that even were public pressure to grow in the countryside in favor of change, it would not constitute the spur to reform that it had in China.[44] Nor, indeed, would rural prosperity give a vast proportion of the populace a stake in change as it had done among the Chinese.

Gorbachev's hesitation may also have been fostered by developments during the Brezhnev years. Confronted by production shortfalls, Brezhnev invested heavily in agriculture but refused to introduce reform. In the Politburo, Gennadiy Voronov called for the return of decision making to small teams and payment according to output. But Brezhnev followed his harshly conservative aide V. A. Golikov, who upheld collectivization and warned against sacrificing tight political command.[45]

Gorbachev, like Brezhnev, instinctively sought greater centralization, launching *perestroika* with efforts to reinforce inefficient existing structures, in contrast to China where the key to progress had been intensifying decentralization inherent in the economy. Gorbachev, however, worried about loss of control and regionalism. Given political opposition and the absence of a natural rural constituency, he preferred piecemeal efforts such as modest land leasing programs inspired

[42] Oleg Bogomolov interview with the author, 21 March 1991; Bogomolov, "The World of Socialism on the Road of Restructuring," *Kommunist* 64 (November 1987), JPRS-UKO-88-003, 2 February 1988, 61–68; Anders Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989), 100, 179–80; Jerry F. Hough, "Changes in Soviet Elite Composition" in Bialer and Gustafson, *Crossroads*, 43; Robert F. Miller, "The Soviet Economy: Problems and Solutions in the Gorbachev View" in R. F. Miller, J. H. Miller, and T. H. Rigby, eds., *Gorbachev at the Helm* (New York: Croom Helm, 1986), 125; Tsuneaki Sato, "Economic Reforms in China in Light of Soviet and Eastern European Experiences" in Kinya Niiseki, ed., *The Soviet Union in Transition* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 91.

[43] Margaret Shapiro, "Hard Times on the Farm," *Washington Post*, 20 February 1994.

[44] Padma Desai, *Perestroika in Perspective* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 36–37, 105; Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge*, 190–200.

[45] Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo*, 239–40 n24.

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by Lenin's NEP as well as by China.[46] He asserted his "intention to see to it that . . . the entire agrarian sector, takes this path," but in 1987 complained of the inadequate spread of the contract system.[47] Soviet reform would, instead, come in the industrial sector.

Special economic zones and joint ventures similarly generated guarded enthusiasm. Soviet writers feared possible aggravation of regional and ethnic disparities. Some economists and officials who visited PRC zones rejected them as akin to nineteenth-century treaty port concessions. Furthermore, they questioned whether large-scale foreign investment and technology transfer would be facilitated. Nevertheless, China's burgeoning economy, especially the abundance of consumer goods, promoted positive reviews. The Soviet journal *Far Eastern Affairs* heralded Moscow's decision to try the joint-venture concept in the summer of 1986. Burlatsky in *Literaturnaia gazeta* suggested more serious examination of the special zone model. And Ivan Ivanov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, confirmed efforts to adopt both models.[48] As Konovalov noted, "Our officials are being much more selective. . . . Still, we can't help admire what they have done in China."[49]

Chinese reform also encouraged East Europeans, from whom the Chinese in turn learned about modifications of socialism. Similar exchanges had occurred in the 1950s when Bulgaria, for instance, adopted an ill-fated great leap forward strategy at the behest of domestic planners nicknamed "the Chinese."[50] Contacts between Beijing and Eastern Europe resumed in the 1970s after a fallow period following the shattering of the communist bloc. Having "no reason to vilify the PRC other than . . . to manifest solidarity with the Kremlin," they now saw China as a counterweight to Soviet pressure.[51]

[46] Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects" in Bialer and Mandelbaum, *Gorbachev's Russia*, 294; Nicholas Lardy, "China: Sustaining Development" and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "The Connection Between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes" in Rozman, ed., *Dismantling*, 78–79, 220–23.

[47] Herbert J. Ellison, "Perestroika and the New Economic Policy (1921–1928): The Uses of History" in Mel Gurtov, ed., *The Transformation of Socialism* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 30; Kaser, "Soviet Restructuring," 100.

[48] Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle*, 141, 183; V. Portyakov and S. Stepanov, "China's Special Economic Zones," *Far Eastern Affairs* 2 (1986), cited in Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge*, 216; Fedor Burlatsky, "International Panorama," 4 May 1986, FBIS III, USSR-International Affairs-China, 15 May 1986, B1–3; Fedor Burlatsky, *Literaturnaia gazeta* 24 (June 1986): 14; J. Richard Walsh, "Developing Socialism in the Soviet Union and China" in Charles Bukowski and Walsh, eds., *Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Socialist Community* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 52.

[49] D'Anastasio, "Soviets Now Hail China," *Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 1987, 8.

[50] J. F. Brown, *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 321.

[51] Vladimir Sobell, "The Reconciliation Between China and Eastern Europe," *Washington Quarterly* 10 (Spring 1987): 100; Charles Gati, "The Soviet Stake in Eastern Europe" in Bialer and Gustafson, *Crossroads*, 183–84; David A. Andelman, "China's Balkan Strategy," *International Security* 4 (Winter 1979/1980): 60–79.

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The reestablishment of links made it possible for analysts to explore parallel reform programs. The Chinese initially focused on Yugoslavia, then briefly on Romania, and finally with more intensity on Hungary. There, beginning in 1968, Janos Kadar's New Economic Mechanism had institutionalized market socialism, allowing small-scale cooperative production and a degree of independence in setting prices. Growing Hungarian industrial output, foreign trade, and general prosperity attracted PRC attention. A review of the 1977–1981 period by analyst Nina Halpern suggested that "no serious study of East European reforms appeared until after the decision to carry out reforms in China." But thereafter strategies for implementation were borrowed.[52] A 1984 delegation of Chinese economists visiting Hungary concluded that although local practices could not be "indiscriminately copied" given the differences in context, culture, and scale, useful lessons could be learned. The work of Hungarian Janos Kornai on enterprise reform, for one, became widely disseminated, and as early as 1981 Polish economist O. Sik helped to persuade Beijing to establish a Price Research Center under the State Council. Negative examples also proved important, as when the director of the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Dong Fureng, rejected the idea of worker ownership because of discouraging developments in Yugoslavia.[53]

During the mid-1980s, Eastern European leaders and economists made numerous trips to China to discuss agricultural reform and special economic zones. Polish political scientist Jerzy Wiatr saw Chinese influence as one of the three main catalysts for reform alongside economic crisis and Moscow's support for change. Innovations in joint venture legislation in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia drew on Chinese models and trade burgeoned.[54]

The result of these interactions proved mixed. Some Eastern Europeans came to conclude that China was simply too alien to imitate. Others celebrated elements of Chinese reforms. While the East Germans focused on the socialist nature of China's plans, the Hungarians emphasized mutual commitment to market mechanisms. Chinese eclecticism in taking ideas from various East European economic models invited incompatibility and incoherence.

There may also have been political penalties. Hungarian party leader Karoly Grosz and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang echoed each others' words in calls for thoroughgoing change. "It was," British analyst Gerald Segal observed:

[52] Nina P. Halpern, "Learning from Abroad: Chinese Views of the East European Economic Experience, January 1977–June 1981," *Modern China* 11 (January 1985): 103.

[53] Robert C. Hsu, *Economic Theories in China, 1979–1988* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23–24, 74, 87–88.

[54] Ming Chen, "Sino-East European Relations" in Hao Yufan and Huan Guocang, eds., *The Chinese View of the World* (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 269; FBIS-EEU-89-080, BULGARIA, 27 April 1989, 13; Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Economic and Political Reforms in Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis" in Gomulka et al., *Economic Reforms*, 123; Marcin Sar, "The Evolution of Centripetal Fraternalism: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *Annals of the American Academy* (September 1985): 103.

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> this kind of mutually reinforcing dialogue . . . as well as specific visits and borrowings, which Chinese hard-liners probably had in mind when they criticized Zhao Ziyang's school after June 1989 for being over-influenced by an Eastern Europe already suborned by the West. It was also the basis for some East European intellectuals' feelings of regret, almost guilt, after June 1989 about having urged on China ideas of reform which proved to be too advanced.[55]

Perestroika in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe benefited from the impetus given by China to the reformist atmosphere in the socialist world, even when the particular details of Deng's achievements appeared irrelevant. Gorbachev may have moved ahead in political reform more vigorously than economic reform. He experimented with industrial innovation more often than agricultural, because of his more formidable problems in building a constituency and overcoming Russia's communist legacy. But China's bold program, which so clearly demonstrated the advantages of change and modernization, served as a useful stimulus.[56] Moreover, China provided a handy vehicle for relatively risk-free criticism of the Soviet system for those who might otherwise have been constrained to remain silent. As a State Department analyst observed, "if China hadn't existed they would have had to invent it."[57]

TIANANMEN

In 1989 China made its final contribution to shaping the way in which the Soviet empire collapsed, the destruction of the Chinese democracy movement at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The event proved inspirational to the people and inhibiting for political leaders confronting their own surge toward democracy.

The roots of the crisis at Tiananmen could be found in the reform program launched by Deng and his allies in 1978. By eliminating the commune system, attacking class discrimination, permitting urbanization, absorbing foreign technology, and condoning a consumer culture, the government transformed society. It did not provide for comparable political change but did encourage a degree of intellectual independence.

Deng understood that to emancipate China from Cultural Revolution disillusionment, radical Maoism would have to be repudiated. He urged his people instead to "seek truth from facts." In 1980 he initiated a modest effort to overcome bureaucratism, to revitalize low-level elections and People's Congresses, and to make the press more responsive to the public.[58] Students were encouraged to

[55] Gerald Segal, "Foreign Economic Policy" in Segal, et al., *Openness and Foreign Policy Reform in Communist States* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 33–36.

[56] Letter from Lev Petrovich Deliusin to author, March 1991.

[57] Author's interview with Wayne Limberg, State Department Intelligence and Research Staff, Winter 1991; Rozman, "Moscow's China-watchers," 238.

[58] Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Rozman, "Stages," 42.

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study abroad until upward of 40,000 could be found in the United States alone. Scholars began to examine long taboo issues in Chinese history.

Glasnost or openness in China, however, stopped short of even the limited political diversity and freedoms of expression given Soviet citizens. China's leaders condemned calls for pluralism and democracy as "spiritual pollution" from the West. In 1978–1979, in 1983–1984, and again in 1986–1987, writers and protesters were silenced or arrested and sentenced to prison terms.

The dissatisfaction underlying the 1989 demonstrations could not be so easily eliminated. Popular anger over inflation, job insecurity, and corruption exacerbated frustration with the lack of political rights. When on 15 April former General Secretary of the CCP Hu Yaobang suddenly died, students seized the opportunity to celebrate the liberal policies for which he had allegedly been purged in 1987. The criticism of surviving leaders could not be missed. Their response, disparaging the students as hoodlums, fed the protest.

Demonstrations and even the May hunger strike might have passed quietly, but for the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev. News media from around the world converged on Beijing to mark this historic reconciliation. What the television cameras actually broadcast were pictures of a tent city in the main square and popular demands for political change to accompany economic reorganization. They recorded intellectuals, journalists, workers, party cadres, and even soldiers joining the recurrent marches. To many observers from abroad, but more significantly to many Chinese, the throngs in the streets impeding army efforts to enforce martial law were reminiscent of and consciously patterned upon demonstrators who used "people's power" to oust Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 in the Philippines.

The message had resonance in Eastern Europe. During the 1980s, economic and political liberalization had advanced, however haltingly, in Hungary and Poland. This had been encouraged by Gorbachev, hoping to reinvigorate the socialist world by integrating the Soviet bloc into a "common European home." But Gorbachev proved naive in thinking that reforms could be gradual as severe economic decline provoked widespread dissatisfaction. In the midst of growing agitation in Eastern Europe, protests in Beijing proved inspirational. Young people staged a "solidarity strike" at the PRC Embassy in Hungary "to show that from Beijing, via Warsaw to Budapest, the same processes are taking place." The East German opposition asserted later that "it was the recent democracy movement in China that provoked our determination and action against Stalinism."[59]

International attention helped to sustain the Chinese movement and magnified pressures upon government leaders. So too did its increasingly national scope and the involvement of workers. But by the end of May, exhausted and disappointed demonstrators began to scatter. A small group mounted one final gesture, erecting

[59] FBIS-EEU-89-101, 26 May 1989, 24; FBIS-CHI-89-237, International Affairs, 12 December 1989, 6-7; FBIS-EEU-89-107, 6 June 1989, 10-11; FBIS-EEU-89-108, 7 June 1989, 57.

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a Goddess of Democracy opposite Tiananmen. It was too much. On the night of 3–4 June, leaders ordered the PLA to clear the square. In the ensuing melee, several hundred unarmed people died amid frightened soldiers and burning tanks. The Beijing Spring ended in blood and chaos.

Outside of China, the repression of Tiananmen engendered dismay. The toppling of regimes in Eastern Europe that defined the remaining months of 1989 started ironically with elections on 4 June that brought Solidarity to power in Poland.[60] Among those seeking to overturn Soviet-imposed political systems, images of the Chinese people seeking freedom and facing ruthless repression evoked empathy for the victims and fear and loathing for the brutal communist leadership.[61]

In Moscow, too, observers were aghast. Reformers and China specialists at the Academy of Sciences looked on in horror and declared that the crackdown was evidence of a lesser degree of social development.[62] Demonstrators throughout Moscow condemned Beijing's leaders. At the first Congress of People's Deputies, Andrei Sakharov urged that the USSR recall its ambassador. Gorbachev took a more cautious line, voicing concern about the bloodshed but not censuring the perpetrators. Still he worried that events in China might undermine *perestroika* and *glasnost* and counseled greater flexibility throughout the communist bloc.[63]

Violence had ended the Prague Spring in 1968, martial law engulfed Poland in 1981, and some advocated using force to quell dissent in 1989. The Czech newspaper *Rude Pravo* declared official support for aggrieved Beijing leaders who had shown exemplary patience.[64] In East Germany, Egon Krenz, deputy State Council chairman, stressed that students in China had been puppets of a counterrevolutionary faction. The authorities in Beijing had had no choice; suppression had been justified. And even as protestors insisted that a "Tiananmen solution" would not work in Germany, Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Worker's Party and chairman of the GDR State Council, applauded Deng's tactics.[65]

[60] Sharon Wolchik, "Central and Eastern Europe in Transition" in Young C. Kim and Gaston Sigur, eds., *Asia and the Decline of Communism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1992), 53–56.

[61] Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 2.

[62] The author was in Moscow during the Tiananmen massacre. See also Pleshakov and Furman, "China and the Soviet Union," 48.

[63] FBIS-SOV-89-141, International Affairs, 25 July 1989, 9; Lukin, "The Initial Soviet Reaction," 121–25; Garver, "The 'New Type,'" 1147–48.

[64] J. F. Brown, *Surge to Freedom* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 282; "Demonstrations in Krakow," *Trybuna Ludu*, 8 June 1989, FBIS-EEU-89-111, POLAND, 12 June 1989, 12; FBIS-EEU-89-109, 8 June 1989, 22.

[65] FBIS-EEU-89-110, GDR, 9 June 1989, 32; FBIS-EEU-89-112, GDR, 13 June 1989, 28; FBIS-EEU-89-120, GDR, 23 June 1989, 37; FBIS-EEU-89-122, GDR, 27 June 1989, 32–33; FBIS-CHI-89-235, International Affairs, 8 December 1989, 9; FBIS-CHI-89-237, International Affairs, 12 December 1989, 7; Brown, *Surge*, 282; Norman M. Naimark, "'Ich will hier raus': Emigration and the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic," in Banac, *Eastern Europe*, 82.

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In fact, Honecker intended to apply the Chinese model in Leipzig on 9 October 1989. During the tense days of early October, a CCP delegation headed by Yao Yilin, vice premier and Poliburo standing committee member, appeared in East Germany to mark the state's fortieth anniversary. Not only was he quick to draw parallels with Tiananmen, Yao assured Honecker of "support" for using similar policies to protect the GDR. In the end, Honecker reconsidered, fearing that soldiers and police in Leipzig would refuse to shoot, but his threats to follow China's example contributed to the subsequent fall of the regime.[66]

In Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu did use Chinese methods. But unlike the PLA, whose commanders Deng had rallied to his side, Ceausescu's troops joined the protest. According to the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug, word of Ceausescu's execution prompted China's leadership to put their security forces on alert lest the swiftly flowing currents of change carry them away too.[67]

Gorbachev's flexibility in contrast to Chinese rigidity reflected his sober calculations of power relations. Gorbachev recognized that by attempting total control over its allies, Moscow had driven China into bitter opposition. So too, in the mid-1980s in Eastern Europe, he saw the USSR confronted with an explosive situation, which if left untended could overwhelm ties with Moscow and create a chain of hostile governments. Gorbachev chose, instead, to acknowledge socialist pluralism, renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine, promote glasnost and perestroika, and finally acquiesce in destruction of the Berlin Wall and the Warsaw Pact.

Paradoxically, Beijing saw Gorbachev as responsible for the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe and condemned his reforms as a betrayal of socialism. Although China sustained state-to-state relations that promised economic benefits, Chinese leaders considered Gorbachev a counterrevolutionary. Moreover, Soviets who were determined to fight liberalization turned to the Chinese for support "trying to use 'the China card' to persuade their boss to discontinue *perestroika* and to put the Soviet house in order."[68] Only when a more radical Boris Yeltsin emerged as a contender for power did Beijing reevaluate Gorbachev and deem him a fit leader once again, although with reservations that would become apparent during the August 1991 coup in Moscow. Although officially not interfering, Beijing quietly cheered on the plotters, condemning them only later for having been faint-hearted rather than for trying to overthrow Gorbachev.[69]

[66] John W. Garver, "China, German Reunification, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 6 (Winter/Spring 1994): 161–63; Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993), 111–13; Naimark, "'Ich will hier raus,'" 90–91.

[67] Claudia Rosett, "The Powderkeg that is China," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 December 1989.

[68] John W. Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993): 3–5; Gerald Segal, "China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey* 32 (September 1992): 848–68.

[69] Gao Di, Talk on 30 August 1991, *China Quarterly* 130 (June 1992): 487.

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The End of the Cold War and Soviet Collapse

Given the uncertain benefits for China of the new world order, it is ironic that China's role in ending the cold war and bringing about the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism was an important, if indirect, one. The perceived strategic threat China posed to Soviet security, especially when coupled with U.S. power, encouraged military expenditures that helped to cripple the economy. The Soviets were compelled to realize eventually that they did not have the resources to fight all the forces arrayed against them. Instead, they moved to diminish cold war confrontation and regional instability.

China's economic reforms also expedited movement toward a new order. The bold changes of the early Deng era, if partial, nevertheless provided inspiration for Soviets and East Europeans. Deng made it possible for reformers to criticize problems and recommend policies while pretending to discuss Beijing's choices.

Finally, the Chinese democracy movement helped to create an environment in which the citizens of other communist countries dared to aspire to a new political order. That the Chinese themselves succumbed to a brutally repressive regime did not stem the tide elsewhere. Indeed, the cost in blood of the Tiananmen massacre made clear to observers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that violent solutions must not be widely applied.

China, having served as one of the catalysts in shaping a different international system, abruptly retreated fearing an uncharted future. As its response to the collapse of communism in Europe and the Soviet Union made clear, China's leaders and much of its citizenry preferred to combine economic advances with political stability. But the ambivalence with which the Chinese themselves view their role in expediting change – economic and political – in the communist world should not prevent less passionately committed observers from examining the China factor in the collapse of the Soviet empire.*

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Presidential Manipulation of Polls and Public Opinion: The Nixon Administration and the Pollsters

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Do opinion polls lead to political responsiveness or to manipulation of public opinion? Political observers have long debated whether public opinion surveys facilitate or undermine representative government. George Gallup argued in the 1940s that polls are a tool for deciphering public sentiment and enabling policy makers to respond to what their constituents want.[1] By contrast, Walter Lippmann and others have contended that through the mass media elites manufacture the public attitudes they desire and that polls are merely a tool in this process of manipulating public opinion.[2]

Although policy makers' use of polls has profound implications for democratic government, there has been relatively little investigation of how politicians actually use polls and interact with pollsters.[3] As part of our research on modern

[1] George Gallup and Saul Rae, *The Pulse of Democracy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940).

[2] Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion,* (New York: Macmillan, 1922); Walter Lippman, *The Phantom Public* (New York: Macmillan, 1925); Walter Lippman, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (New York: New American Library, 1956); Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Susan Herbst, *Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[3] For research on politicians' connection to polls, see the following: Lawrence Jacobs, *The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of American and British Health Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Lawrence Jacobs, "The Recoil Effect: Public Opinion and Policy Making in

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presidents' use of polling, we have conducted interviews, examined archival materials, and collected other evidence regarding the rather remarkable activities of the Nixon administration. We have examined Richard Nixon's use of private polls elsewhere. Here we examine the Nixon administration and the public pollsters—Louis Harris and the Gallup organization.[4]

Our research and that of others reveal that the Nixon administration pursued Harris and the Gallup organization in order to manipulate poll results and public opinion.[5] Ironically, Gallup's optimistic expectation that opinion surveys would only serve to boost government responsiveness is undermined by Nixon's relations with at least two polling organization, including Gallup's.

Nixon's Pursuit of the Pollsters

In the 1970s, Harris and Gallup were the giants of the polling industry. Because of their prominence, they attracted Nixon's interest and became prime candidates

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the United States and Britain," *Comparative Politics* 24 (January 1992): 199–217; Lawrence Jacobs, "Institutions and Culture: Health Policy and Public Opinion in the U.S. and Britain," *World Politics* 44 (January 1992): 179–209; Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994): 527–40; Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Studying Substantive Democracy: Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policymaking," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27 (March 1994): 9–16; Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59 (Summer 1995): 163–195; Robert Hilderbrand, *People and Power: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1987–1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Robert Eisinger, "Pollster and Public Relations Advisor: Hadley Cantril and the Birth of Presidential Polling," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of Public Opinion Research, 1994); Robert Eisinger, "Presidential Polling: The 1950s and Beyond" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994); Andrew Katz, "Using Public Opinion in Foreign Policy Formulation: The Nixon Administration and the Pursuit of Peace with Honor in Vietnam (paper presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago); Michael Wheeler, *Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: The Manipulation of Public Opinion in America* (New York: Liveright, 1976).

[4] Jacobs and Shapiro, "Rise of Presidential Polling." Louis Harris and Associates is no longer affiliated with Harris himself, who runs a separate operation. The Harris and Gallup firms are organized differently today from the way they were in Nixon's administration.

[5] Pollsters include those who produce results for the mass media and those who conduct private research, usually for pay. Unlike private pollsters, who may be hired for decidedly partisan functions, the public pollsters are expected to be politically independent and neutral. Our focus here is on the public pollsters. For a discussion of the president's private polling operations, see the following: Jacobs and Shapiro, "Rise of Presidential Polling" and "Issues"; Jacobs, "Recoil Effect," *Health of Nations, A Social Interpretation of Institutional Change: Public Opinion and Policy Making in the Enactment of the British National Health Service Act of 1946 and the American Medicare Act of 1965* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1990). For additional discussion of Nixon's ties to public pollsters, see Wheeler, *Lies*; and Katz, "Using Public Opinion." Additional archival records on Nixon's relations with the public pollsters have not been released because of legal action by the former president's estate.

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for attack and manipulation by the administration. According to the diaries of top aide H.R. Haldeman, Nixon believed that Harris and Gallup poll results "directly affect our ability to govern, because of their influence on Congressmen, foreign leaders, etc."[6] Harry Dent, a top Nixon strategist, recalled being "amazed at how much the people at the top hang on to public opinion polling." The reason was "part ego, but the greater part was to build up their authority and their power in Washington."[7]

It was Nixon's operating assumption that political intrigue drove Harris's and Gallup's reports. Reacting to one set of disappointing Gallup figures, the president warned his aides that "somebody is probably putting some influence on Gallup" and that it was important to "find out who it is."[8] Indeed, Nixon used his elaborate private polling operation to "keep the published polls honest."[9] The White House's suspicion and vindictiveness toward polling was typified by Haldeman's reaction to a series of unfavorable California surveys in June 1972; he called for an "all-out attack on the Field Poll in California" with the aim of "totally destroy[ing] [its] credibility" and ordered aides to "whack" ABC for one of its polls.[10]

Archival records suggest that the White House pursued a systematic strategy for inducing the cooperation of Harris and Gallup. The president's interest in their results was deliberately emphasized in order to flatter the pollsters and to make their cooperation—as Nixon's appointments secretary, Dwight Chapin, recalled—an "ego thing."[11] The White House also played on the pollsters' sense of patriotism, equating cooperation with national duty. Indeed, both Louis Harris and senior Gallup officials told us that they cooperated with every president who approached them, including Bill Clinton, because they considered it a "public service for the country." As George Gallup, Jr explained, "you can't just say, 'get lost' when the White House calls."[12]

Although the Nixon White House occasionally tried to pressure Gallup by calling newspapers to "squelch" a poll,[13] it generally found the organization politically sympathetic to Republicans. Instead, Nixon and his top assistants reserved their strong-arm tactics for Harris in 1969 and 1970; in 1971 they turned to more

[6] H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House*, CD-Rom (Santa Monica, CA: Sony, 1992), 1/19/71 entry.

[7] Interview of Harry Dent by Lawrence Jacobs, 9/9/94.

[8] *Haldeman Diaries*, 1/17/71. Another illustration of Nixon alerting his aides to "watch for distortion of poll data" is contained in *Haldeman Diaries*, 8/20/72.

[9] *Haldeman Diaries*, 1/19/71 entry. Nixon's use of his private polls to monitor and attempt to influence the public pollsters are contained in the following: HRH, (Haldeman) Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Nixon, 9/22/69; PPF, Box 3, Memo to Haldeman from Nixon, 1/14/71. All the archival material cited in this article come from the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration and is located in College Park, Maryland. See Jacobs and Shapiro, "Rise of Presidential Polling" for discussion of Nixon's private polling operation.

[10] Colson, Box 99, Telephone Memo to Colson from Haldeman, 6/7/72.

[11] Interview with Dwight Chapin by Lawrence Jacobs, 9/9/94.

[12] Interview with George Gallup, Jr. by Lawrence Jacobs, 9/20/94.

[13] CF PR 15, Box 53, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 5/4/70.

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positive inducements. Harris was especially distrusted because of his ties to the Democratic party and John Kennedy. (Harris was Kennedy's political consultant and pollster during the 1960 presidential campaign and his term in office.)[14] As Dent recalled, "it was a reality in the White House that Gallup was considered a friend and Harris a foe" who worked for "the other side."[15]

Archival evidence confirms that in late 1969 the White House seized on the fact that "Dan Lufkin, one of our friends . . . has [a] controlling interest in the Harris poll." Harry Dent recruited Peter Flanigan to "get the message across to [Lufkin] to turn [the Harris polling firm] . . . around"; Flanigan reported back that Lufkin "assures me" that he will "keep him honest."[16]

The White House also tried to publicly challenge Harris. In June 1970, Haldeman instructed a senior White House aide, Charles Colson (of later Watergate renown), to use the pretext of inaccurate polling in a recent British election to launch a congressional "investigation of pollsters" in the United States. Colson was specifically directed to "zero in on . . . Lou Harris' polling organization" and to make the project a "top priority"—one that was "well-publicized" but not "identified" with the White House.[17] Dwight Chapin, who originated the idea, recently conceded that this was "obviously wrong." In fact, White House aides ran an ongoing program (as White House Communications Director Herb Klein boasted in one memo) to "knoc[k] Lou Harris . . . on every occasion possible—public and private."[18]

The White House also used government business in its attempt to influence Harris. According to Haldeman's diaries, Nixon set out in 1969 to "zing" Harris and to "stop use of Harris for departmental polls."[19] But by 1971, the White House shifted its strategy and began using government business as an inducement to Harris.[20] As Lufkin had recommended to a sympathetic Flanigan during Nixon's first year in office, "making sure that Republicans get a fair shake [will be easier] if Harris would occasionally get a Republican contract."[21]

In June 1971, Colson launched a search for the "control point" over government opinion surveying "in case it becomes useful to increase the Harris share of government polling and research."[22] During subsequent months, the White House commissioned Harris to conduct a survey for its Domestic Council Office and communicated with him regularly to design the study. In October 1971,

[14] Jacobs and Shapiro, "Issues"; Jacobs, *Health of Nations*, "Recoil Effect," and *Social Interpretation*.

[15] Dent interview.

[16] CF PR15, Box 53, Memo to Dent from Peter Flanigan, 12/19/69; HRH, Box 135, Memo to President from Dent, 1/28/70.

[17] CF PR15, Box 53, Memo to Colson from Haldeman, 6/22/70; CF PR15, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 6/22/70.

[18] HRH, Box 350, Memo to Haldeman from Klein, 12/4/70.

[19] Haldeman Diaries, 8/8/69 and 10/2/69.

[20] PPF, Box 4, Memo to John Ehrlichman from Nixon, 12/28/72.

[21] CF PR15, Box 53, Memo to Dent from Flanigan, 12/19/69.

[22] HRH, Box 334, Memo to Lawrence Higby from Gordon C. Strachan, 6/28/71.

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Harris completed the survey, which provided politically useful data on the public's mood, its major issues of concern, and its preferences toward a range of controversial policy issues from race and crime to welfare reform and revenue sharing, and its rating of Nixon's handling of pressing national problems.[23]

Harris received $39,000 in government funds for doing the poll—$135,000 in 1995 dollars.[24] In addition, the pollster reveled in being at the heart of power. At several points, he bubbled over that the "project has become something of a labor of love for me personally"—one that he felt "deeply involved [in]."[25]

Harris defends his survey as in "no way, shape, or form resembling political polls." It was "perfectly legitimate," because the president had requested it and he had "deliberately set the price low in order not to make any profit from it." Harris claims that he worked for the government and "never worked for Richard Nixon's political operation."[26]

Harris's defense rests on the implausible assumption that Richard Nixon could be separated into two distinct actors—one the government's president and the other a politician who was intent on reelection and on promoting partisan issues that he and other Republicans supported. The fact is that Harris was paid for the Domestic Council survey by a White House that was committed to a political or ideological viewpoint. Conducting this survey for the White House while claiming to report unbiased results for the public represented—in words of former Gallup executive John Davies—"conflict of interest at it's highest level."[27]

The White House used more than survey business to improve its relations with Harris. Colson lined Nixon up to call the pollster as "part of our continuing effort to cultivate Harris" and suggested that inviting Harris for the next social function at the White House was a "real must."[28] Colson also pressed General Alexander Haig (who was at the time an aide to National Security Council Adviser Henry Kissinger) to satisfy Harris' request for a reception at the American Embassy in the Soviet Union, because it "would be a very good stroke from our standpoint."[29] Here, Harris challenges Colson's account, noting that his trip to the Soviet Union was unrelated to polling, unrelated to Colson, and had been worked out with Kissinger and Haig to cover an important matter of foreign

[23] HRH, Box 355, "A Study of the Issues of Concern to the American People," conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, 10/71.

[24] CF PR15, Memo to Haldeman from Strachan, 4/11/72.

[25] HRH, Box 355, Memo to Ehrlichman from Haldeman relaying president's suggestions, 8/12/71; Colson, Box 69, Letter to Harper from Harris, 7/29/71; HRH, Box 355, Memo to Haldeman from Cliff Miller and Strachan, 8/2/71; HRH, Box 355, Memo to Haldeman from Miller and Strachan, 8/27/71.

[26] Interview with Harris by Lawrence Jacobs, 9/23/94 and 9/6/95; statement to Lawrence Jacobs by Louis Harris, 9/21/94 (subsequently referred to as Harris statement).

[27] Interview with John Davies by Lawrence Jacobs, 9/21/94.

[28] Colson, Box 69, "Telephone Call Recommendation," handwritten note that "call made at 10:27 AM today, July 31"; Memo from Colson to George Bell, 6/23/71 in Bruce Oudes, ed., *From the President* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

[29] HRH, Box 335, Memo to Haig from Colson, 8/4/71.

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policy. Haig dismissed as "cockamamie" the suggestion that the White House would turn to a Democratic pollster to serve as an emissary with the Soviets. Moreover, Harris's claim that Colson played no role in his trip is contradicted by a letter from the pollster to Colson emphasizing that he felt "deeply indebted to you for having notified the Embassy in Moscow of our visit to the Soviet Union."[30]

Nixon's determined pursuit of Harris and Gallup resulted in an ongoing secret relationship. Charles Colson was assigned responsibility for the Harris portfolio; Dwight Chapin and, to a less degree, Don Rumsfeld, director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, established ties with two of the Gallup organization's senior officials—John Davies and George Gallup Jr.

While the pollsters may have genuinely considered their cooperation a "public service," Nixon clearly treated it as a political service. He and his aides aimed for the best of both worlds: to influence Harris's and Gallup's operations and press reports through back-channel contacts while using the pollsters' mantle of impartiality to the White House's political advantage.

Although the White House failed to control either pollster in the way it hoped, Nixon and his aides reaped three advantages from their contacts with Harris and Gallup: the White House received advance information, affected the preparation of survey questions, and influenced the pollsters' results. Working the White House's contacts to secure information on the pollsters' future plans was especially valued by Nixon. Dent recalled that "whoever had the hot polling data had power" and a ticket to "stop the president from whatever he was doing" to brief him.[31]

To satisfy the demands of Nixon and Haldeman, Chapin and Colson provided a steady flow of information about what questions the Harris and Gallup would ask and what results they would publish a week or more down the road.[32] For instance, in November 1969 Chapin reported to Haldeman the questions that Gallup would be mailing out to its interviewers. He alerted his boss that the survey would probe the public's reactions to the moratoriums that opponents of the Vietnam War were planning; he added parenthetically that "I was told that if the Moratoriums are peaceful in nature, they probably will disregard use of this question."[33]

[30] Harris interview, 9/23/94 and 9/6/95. Six months prior to Colson's memo about Harris's trip to the Soviet Union, Haig reported to Colson that he and Kissinger met with Harris and requested that he "pass on to us any intelligence he picked up on the Soviets." Haig wrote that Harris left the meeting "confident he was performing an important mission." Reflecting back on his relations with Harris, Haig suggested in a recent interview that Harris had an exaggerated sense of his journey's importance. Interview with Alexander Haig by Lawrence Jacobs, 9/26/94; Oudes, *From the President*; Colson, Box 69, Letter to Colson from Harris, 9/28/71.

[31] Dent interview.

[32] Evidence that Nixon regularly received advance information about Gallup and Harris's plans are contained in the following entries in *Haldeman Diaries*: 10/31/69; 11/22/69; 4/6/70; 7/23/70; 1/17/71; 2/26/71.

[33] HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 11/10/69. A similar episode is reported in the following: HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 12/5/69. Attorney General John

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The White House's contacts also provided a continual stream of information well in advance of publication regarding the president's popularity and his standing in trial heats with potential presidential rivals.[34] In October 1969, Chapin reported Gallup's "summary data on a Vietnam questionnaire which has been in the field" and which might offer "some important information . . . which will help the Administration 'get off the hook' in regard to Vietnam." Chapin's contact emphasized that George Gallup, Sr. "feels this poll could do a great service to the Government . . . [and] asked Mr. Davies to contact me to arrange an appointment."[35] In a recent interview, Davies "vehemently denounced" Chapin's memo as a "crock" because it "suggests that we stood ready to help the administration." The intent of Gallup Sr.—his son explained in an interview—was to help the country by "finding a plan to get out of Vietnam that would win the support of both Democrats and Republicans and end the mess."[36] While it is not possible reconcile these two competing accounts, Chapin's report nonetheless created the clear impression (and expectation) among the president's senior aides that Gallup was a "friend" who would help the White House.

Harris also kept the White House abreast of forthcoming results, meeting with Nixon himself on several occasions to report his analysis.[37] Even in the heat of the 1972 general election, Harris relayed his latest numbers to the White House, prompting Colson to report confidently that "Harris is going to pose no real shift."[38] The pollster's communications with the White House got to the point

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Mitchell branded the demonstration as not peaceful in the *New York Times* report and Gallup asked a moratorium question. "250,000 Protestors Stage Peaceful Rally in Washington; Militants Stir Clashes Later," *New York Times*, 17 November 1969; George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll, Volume 3: 1959–71* (New York: Random House, 1972). 1224–1225.

[34] Evidence that the White House received polls before publication are contained in the following: HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 9/26/69; HRH, Box 134, List forthcoming Gallup results, 10/2/69; HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 12/9/69; HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 1/14/70; HRH, Box 350, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 3/17/70; HRH, Box 350, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 4/28/70; CF PR15, Box 53, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 5/4/70; CF PR 15, Box 53, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 7/22/70; HRH, Box 135, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 8/19/70; Chapin, Box 22, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 11/23/70; HRH, Box 350, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 4/9/71; HRH, Box 410, Memo to Haldeman from Colson, 9/3/71; HRH, Box 411, 53, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 9/6/71; HRH, Box 410, Memo from Colson, 9/30/71; HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 10/10/69; Colson, Box 69, Memo to Haldeman from Colson, 2/17/72; HRH, Box 135, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 8/4/71. Additional evidence is contained in the Nixon archives in the following boxes: HRH, Box 134; and Chapin, Box 22. Finally, the following memo discussing the entire operation for processing advance polling information: HRH, Box 334, Memo to Lawrence Higby, Bruce Kehrlie, Pat McKee, Kathy Bachman, Lynrae McClintock, and Diana Gwin, from Strachan, 6/14/71.

[35] PR 15, Box 53, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 10/8/69.

[36] Davies interview; Gallup interview.

[37] *Haldeman Diaries*, Appointment Log indicates that Harris met with the President on 10/13/71 and 7/31/72.

[38] Haldeman Diaries, 9/22/72. Evidence of Harris's contacts with the White House during the 1972 campaign are contained in the following: Colson, Box 102, Transcription of telephone conversation between Colson and Robert Teeter, 10/6/72 and 10/19/72; Nixon personally met with Harris on July 31, 1972 (*Haldeman Diaries*, Appointment Log).

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that Harris personally sent his results to the White House ten days before their publication and asked Colson in a handwritten note to "let me know what you think."[39]

In interviews, both Harris and the Gallup executives readily acknowledge and strenuously defend the practice of sharing data before publication. They argue that because their results during Nixon's era were sent to newspaper editors up to ten days before publication, the data were not "hot breaking news" but were available to be freely shared in advance of their public release on the agreement they they not be published before a stipulated date. Pre-releasing data to the White House amounted, the pollsters argue, to little more than routine "fact finding and fact-sharing." Indeed, Harris and Gallup's data sharing with the Nixon White House was not a new practice; they provided advance information to Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, as well as subsequent presidents.[40]

Information is power—a precious commodity in Washington, especially for a White House that faced Congress controlled by the opposition's political party. Nixon and his aides used advanced results not simply for information purposes as the pollsters perhaps naively assumed but as a political resource or weapon to be taken advantage of.

When tipped off by his early warning system of forthcoming positive results, Nixon pressed his aides to "merchandise" and "exploit" the polls by developing "game plans" that would boost his political standing.[41] In several diary entries during July 1970, Haldeman noted that the president "wants to build up [the] next Gallup poll for a major ride, letters and calls ahead, [and] a major column by [Patrick] Buchanan about remarkable survival with press opposition."[42] Chapin and Dent recalled that "with a poll coming out, we would get ready to sell the good numbers." "The benefit of getting the advance tip was to get your troops pooped" and lined up to "hype" favorable results in a way that would bolster the positive image of the president and his policies.[43]

Another way to capitalize on advance information was to plan administration events with an eye toward influencing surveys as they were being conducted. This is illustrated by the White House's decision on whether to release U.S. Army Lt. William L. Calley from the stockade after he was convicted of committing atrocities in the Vietnamese village of My Lai. According to Haldeman's diaries, Nixon "felt strongly that we had to move on our next step today . . . so that we'd . . . affect the Gallup poll being taken over this weekend."[44]

[39] Colson, Box 1, Memo to Colson from Harris, 3/2/72.

[40] Jacobs, "Recoil Effect" and *Social Interpretation*; Bruce E. Altschuler, "Lyndon Johnson and the Public Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Fall 1986): 285–299; Wheeler, *Lies*; Eisinger, "Pollster" and "Presidential Polling."

[41] Chapin, Box 22, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 11/23/70; *Haldeman Diaries*, 6/3/70.

[42] *Haldeman Diaries*, 7/24/70 and 7/28/70.

[43] Interviews with Dent and Chapin.

[44] *Haldeman Diaries*, 4/2/71 entry.

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Nixon's efforts to cash in on advanced results reveal the danger in providing advanced information to the White House, even if it is also distributed to others. The problem is that President Nixon's capability to use the pollsters' tips could not be matched. The president is uniquely equipped to use a large staff to widely distribute favorable poll results or to make a national decision with the intent of boosting his popularity rating in a forthcoming poll.

The second advantage that the Nixon White House reaped from its close contacts with pollsters involved placing favorable survey questions. Nixon persistently prodded his aides to "plan[t] questions with [Gallup]" and to "get the best polls . . . with loaded questions, using Gallup, Harris, and [Albert] Sindlinger."[45] Chapin recalled "really pumping ideas to Gallup." In November 1969, for example, Chapin asked Haldeman to "look over [a set of] . . . questions which I am going to submit to Gallup."[46] Similarly, Colson reported to Haldeman in September 1971 that a recent Harris "poll was planned . . . to make certain points which Harris and I discussed before."[47] Harris dismissed this and other memos by Colson, however, as "obviously typical of staff members who wanted to convince their superiors that they had me in hand."[48]

To evaluate the claims of White House aides that they influenced Harris's and Gallup's questions, we compared the White House's suggestions" with Harris and Gallup's actual questions in their annual compendiums of polls and news releases. The evidence confirms the White House's success in important instances.

On 3 November 1969, President Nixon gave what Chapin characterized as his "most major speech on Vietnam"; its aim was to mobilize Americans behind the administration's Vietnam strategy. As part of the White House's planning, aides "suggested" questions to Gallup officials who "indicated that they would use [several of them] . . . for sure."[49] In a recent interview, Chapin explained that the White House was confident that it would "capture public opinion for twenty four hours" and "work to the benefit of the president." The television networks ran Nixon's nationally televised speech without a rebuttal, and Gallup conducted a quick one-day survey. Chapin calculated that by providing questions to Gallup he could use the pollster to capture the public's surge of support for the president's position. The purpose was openly political—to "validate what the President said" and to "isolate the Vietnam protestors from the silent majority."[50]

[45] HRH, Box 403, Memo to Haldeman from Nixon, 12/30/69; *Haldeman Diaries*, 2/7/73.

[46] HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 11/18/69.

[47] Colson, Box 69, Memo to Haldeman from Colson, 9/24/71.

[48] Harris statement.

[49] Chapin, Box 22, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin re "Gallup Telephone Poll—The President's Speech," 11/3/69. White House preparations to plant questions with Gallup are discussed in the following memo: HRH, Box 125, Memo from Butterfield to Harry Dent, Peter Flanigan, Jim Keogh, Henry Kissinger, Herb Klein, Jeb Magruder, Lyn Nofziger, William Safire, Charles West, Jim Allison, and Dick Garbett, regarding "November 3rd Game Plan," 10/28/69.

[50] Chapin interview.

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Indeed, Nixon promoted his controversial policy by emphasizing Gallup's favorable poll in a subsequent interview with Barbara Walters.[51]

Judging by Gallup's own compilation of polls and a *New York Times* article, the organization's questions closely paralleled the White House's suggestion. Former Gallup executive, John Davies, conceded in a recent interview that he could imagine using many of the White House's questions. Although the Gallup organization could have selected a variety of question wordings and topics, it chose to follow the White House's lead and focus on the president's plan and on the impact of "moratoriums and public demonstrations" on the attainment of peace. The last question, which Davis found "fair," could be taken as biased toward the administration's line, because it reiterated Nixon's own linkage between domestic dissent and peace.[52] The evidence of administration officials' communications with Gallup and the recent acknowledgments of Davies and Gallup, Jr. indicate that the firm was not forthright with reporters in November 1969, when it denied that the White House wrote its questions. The organization's prescience had apparently raised reporters' suspicions at the time.[53]

A main objective of Nixon's aides was to influence what topics Harris and Gallup focused on. For instance, the White House suggested to Gallup in late

[51] *The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon 1969* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 913.

[52] The White House suggested five questions to Gallup. Gallup's press release and compendium do not provide exact question wordings. Neither the Gallup Organization, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, nor the National Opinion Research Center had copies of the Gallup Survey questionnaire. Because the original Gallup questionnaire is unavailable, we compared the White House proposals with the words used by Gallup in its press release. Our assumption was that Gallup's press release would—as is the normal practice—closely follow the actual question wordings in writing up its results. Here are three comparisons of White House suggestions with Gallup's write-ups: The White House proposed that Gallup ask: "In light of the President's speech, do you think *moratoriums and public demonstrations are helpful or harmful to the attainment of peace*?" Gallup reported the following based on its study: "By a 6-to-1 ratio the persons contacted agree with President Nixon that *moratoriums and public demonstrations are harmful to the attainment of peace* in Vietnam . . . ." In addition, the White House suggested that Gallup ask the question, "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with *his program for troop withdrawal* as set forth in his speech?" Gallup reported, "Eight in every 10 (77 percent) of those contacted express satisfaction with *President Nixon's program for troop withdrawal*, 13 percent express dissatisfaction, while another 10 percent are undecided." The White House also suggested asking, "Do you think *his proposals will bring about a settlement of the Vietnam War*—or not?" Gallup reported that "About half the people interviewed (49 percent) think *President Nixon's proposals are likely to bring about a settlement of the war,* but 25 percent think they are not likely to do so, and another 26 percent are undecided." This comparison suggests that the subjects and words of the White House questions appear in the Gallup description of its results. (We have italicized the sections where the White House suggestions overlap with Gallup's report.) Finally, the Gallup questions were not asked during the preceding or following year. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll, 1959–1971,* 2222; Gallup Special Release, Report No. 54, December 1969.

[53] Chapin reported to Haldeman shortly after Gallup's surveys that reporters from the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* and *Newsday* queried Gallup over whether the pollster ran White House suggestions in formulating its question. According to Davies, Davies "responded that they are in touch quite frequently with the White House on a general basis; however, the White House did not write the questions." HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 11/10/69.

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1969 that it ask respondents about the media's impartiality.[54] (Gallup, Jr told us that he did not consider the questions "too hot" or "loaded.") Gallup's compilation of polls and the *New York Times* story on the survey indicate that the pollster did not run the planted question, but he did run a question about media fairness—a topic not addressed since 1945.[55]

Gallup officials stoutly defend their use of White House questions, noting—as Gallup Jr explained—that they "welcome suggestions from anybody." "The fact," he continued, "that the White House gave questions to us doesn't mean we were hired hands. These are just ideas, suggestions . . . that we used because we thought that they were obvious questions that should be done." Referring to the survey on Nixon's Vietnam speech, Gallup found no problem with using the White House's suggestions. The Gallup organization asked many questions in its surveys, and the White House's tips were useful for conducting its business of tracking hot breaking news.[56]

The problem is that the White House's ideas were not innocent but were driven by political ambition and elaborate strategies. It did matter if the White House was the source of a question. When Gallup ran White House questions on Nixon's Vietnam policy or his attack on the media, the White House was using the pollster to score political points and to set the terms of public discussion. Few, if any, Americans could propel poll findings on the media or Vietnam into the national spotlight with the effectiveness of the White House. In other words, taking questions from all sides gives an advantage to Nixon and presidents in general, because only they can insure that their suggestions will become the subject of sustained national attention.

The third benefit that the White House sought from its contacts with Harris and Gallup involved influencing the reporting of survey results. Archival records and a review of Harris's own published results suggest that the White House had some influence on the pollster's decisions regarding which results not to publish. During Nixon's reelection drive, Colson reported that advance survey results in a three-way race were Nixon 42 percent, Edmund Muskie 42 percent, and George Wallace 11 percent; a pairing of just Nixon and Muskie pushed the Democrat ahead 48-45. As Colson explained, Harris's trial heats found that the "Wallace vote . . . takes 2 away from Muskie for every one he takes away from us." Referring to the data on the two way race, Colson assured Haldeman in January 1972 that "Harris will not publish this information. He gives it to us for our guidance but agreed with me that it would be better not printed."[57]

Harris denies Colson's account and insists that he did publish all the data. But, the pollster's own published materials contradict his claim that he fully

[54] HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 11/18/69.

[55] Gallup interview; Gallup, *Gallup Poll, 1959–1971*, 2231-2. In March 1970, Chapin reports that a trial heat poll involving Nixon, Humphrey and Wallace was "done at our suggestion." HRH, Box 350, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 3/17/70.

[56] Gallup and Davies interviews.

[57] HRH, Box 410, Memo to Haldeman from Colson, 1/11/72.

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published his findings. His compilation of polls reports both the two- and three-way pairings that Colson reports—confirming the factual basis of Colson's memo to Haldeman.[58] But Harris's press release at the time failed to report the critical results on the two-way split.[59] The obvious effect of withholding the two-way pairing was to obscure the fact that Wallace drained support from Muskie and thereby bolstered Nixon's position.

Another way the White House influenced the reporting of results involved spin control; half the battle was shaping how the polls were reported. In September 1971, Colson wrote Haldeman that an upcoming Harris column was based on a poll that was "planned" with the pollster to "establish . . . that the President does not need a 50 percent positive [approval] rating to be reelected." Colson explained that the White House's interest in this finding is that "any subsequent polls . . . show[ing] us below 50 percent will have less political significance." The point of Colson's memo was to report to Haldeman that a pre-publication draft of Harris's column was "more negative in tone than I had expected." Indeed, Haldeman was apparently startled by Harris's draft and asked Colson with alarm, "[Expletive], did you read that Harris poll?" Harris categorically rejects the account presented in Colson's memo that he would have designed a poll to reflect White House concerns; he attributes Colson's memo to the aide's drive to impress his superiors.

Harris's account is flatly contradicted by three pieces of evidence: Harris's original pre-publication draft of his column, which is archived in the Nixon records; a transcript of Colson's telephone conversation with Harris to review the pollster's pre-publication draft of his column; and Harris' column that was published in the *Chicago Tribune*. The evdence suggests that Harris altered his interpretation of his poll to coincide with Colson's suggestions and Nixon's political interests.

According to the transcript, Colson complained to Harris that the opening paragraph of the pre-publication version implied that "there's no way [Nixon] can get over 50 percent of the vote" and invited damaging headlines like "Nixon can't achieve 50 percent." Rather than rebuffing Colson, Harris responded, "I'm sorry that the lead was tinkered with" and agreed that it would create the false impression that Nixon needed 50 percent of the vote to win the 1972 race. Harris responded to Colson's concerns by proposing to call the "*Chicago Tribune* right away" and "[p]ut a kill on the first paragraph and pick up the second" which would avoid the damaging the headlines feared by the White House. A comparison of the transcript, the pre-publication version of Harris's column, and Harris's column published in the *Chicago Tribune* indicates that the pollster dropped the

[58] Louis Harris, *The Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion, 1972: A Compendium of Current American Attitudes* (New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., 1976), 81–83.

[59] The Harris Survey, For Release, Monday, 17 January 1972, "Muskie Pulls Up Even with Nixon," by Louis Harris, obtained from the National Opinion Research Center, Paul Sheatsley Library, University of Chicago.

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second sentence in the pre-publication draft which Colson had targeted: Harris opted for Colson's preferred spin—that it was possible to be reelected with less than 50 percent of the vote. In short, the evidence indicates clear White House influence on Harris's survey design and write-up.[60]

In another case of White House spin control, Colson reported in January 1972 that Nixon's popularity rating had fallen a bit but assured Haldeman that "Harris will not feature this in a column but will bury it in statistics in a column relating to something else."[61] Harris's subsequent press release ran Nixon's popularity rating at the end of a twelve-paragraph story entitled, "India-Pakistan Hurts Nixon." By contrast, a statistically meaningless two point popularity jump in November 1971 was trumpeted. The *Washington Post* followed Harris's lead and failed to draw attention to the decline in Nixon's ratings; The *Chicago Tribune* dropped the end of Harris's press release and, therefore, did not publish Nixon's eroding support.[62]

Perhaps the most fundamental issue in reading polling results is whether we can trust the numbers that are published. Evidence suggests that the White House successfully influenced the actual poll results. In November 1971, Colson reported to Haldeman that Harris agreed to alter his numbers. According to several memos, Harris conducted two polls in late October and early November, with the first survey producing a 56-43 popularity rating and the second a 49-48 split. Colson explained that "Harris will probably average the two figures coming out somewhere around 52 approve and 45 disapprove.[63] In a subsequent memo, he explained that "We suffered a precipitous decline in between the two polls and rather than show us up one week and down the next, Harris, at my suggestion, combined the poll data.[64]

Harris, however, dismisses Colson's account, noting that the standard methodology for two surveys that are only four days apart was to "average the result of the two and publish that" rather than publish them as two separate polls. He defends his decision to average the results as a "perfectly normal thing to do," because the differences between the surveys were simply a "sampling artifact."

[60] Colson, Box 69, Memo to Haldeman from Colson regarding "Attached Harris Poll," 9/24/71; Colson, Box 69, "Harris Public Opinion Analysis, For Release: September 30th, 1971," by Louis Harris; Harris interview and statement; Colson, Box 69, *"Conversation with Lou Harris, September 27, 1971"*; *Chicago Tribune*, "Presidential Sweepstake to Be Battle for Plurality," 9/30/71.

[61] HRH, Box 410, Memo to Haldeman from Colson, 1/11/72.

[62] The Harris Survey, For Release, 27 January 1972, "India-Pakistan Hurts Nixon," by Louis Harris, obtained from the National Opinion Research Center, Paul Sheatsley Library, University of Chicago; The Harris Survey, For Release, 24 January 1972, "Loyalties Divided on India-Pakistan Conflict," by Louis Harris, Archived in the National Opinion Research Center; *Chicago Tribune* "Nixon Loses Points in Indo-Pakistan Affair," 24 January 1972; *Washington Post*, "Nixon Gets Negative Marks on India-Pakistan Crisis Role," 24 January 1972.

[63] HRH, Box 410, Memo to Haldeman from Higby, 11/17/71.

[64] HRH, Box 410, Memo to Haldeman from Colson, 1/11/72.

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"When I write a piece," he explained to us, "I'm professional and write it as it is. . . . This is what the data says, and you say it."[65]

Independent evidence, however, does not support Harris's account. Contrary to Harris's recent defense, Harris's own yearbook considered the two surveys as separate and published the 56-43 split for October and the 49-48 numbers for November.[66] The figures in Harris's yearbook also corroborate—once again—both the results in Colson's memo and the fact that Harris was discussing his results with the White House well before their publication. Harris's column in the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Washington Post* ran the averaged number of 53 percent and indicated that it was produced from a single survey. The effect of averaging was to obscure the downward trend in Nixon's popularity from 56 to 49 percent. Not surprisingly, both newspapers headlined their stories by highlighting the president's favorable "gains" rather than his recent slippage.[67]

Chapin's reports also seem to indicate White House influence on Gallup's polls. In July 1970, Chapin alerted Haldeman that Gallup executive Davies had informed him that the organization's preliminary figures on Nixon's next popularity rating were hovering around 61 percent. When pressed by Chapin if it could drop to 59 percent, Davies was reported to have replied that "No, I won't let that happen."[68] Gallup published the 61 percent figure. While the difference between 61 percent and 59 percent is statistically trivial, it had symbolic importance. Indeed, the *New York Times* headlined the "increases" in Nixon's popularity.[69]

Davies told us that this statement was "preposterous" because of Gallup's system of checks. Chapin stands by his memo. Although the final 61 percent figure may be the result of coincidence or good estimation, the appearance is that White House interference influenced Gallup's reporting. Moreover, it remains undisputed that Harris and Gallup regularly and secretly communicated with the White House about their results before the public had a chance to see them.

Standards for Evaluating Gallup and Harris

The standards for judging the behavior of the pollsters during Nixon's time as well as in our own have been specified by professional organizations as well as the founder of the Gallup organization, Dr. George Gallup, Sr. The American Association for Public Opinion Research—the leading professional organization of survey researchers—stipulates two relevant standards in its code. The first

[65] Interviews with Harris, 9/23/94 and 9/6/95.

[66] Louis Harris, *The Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion, 1971: A Compendium of Current American Attitudes* (New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., 1976), 3.

[67] *Chicago Tribune*, "Nixon Gains Public Trust in Foreign Policy Moves," 29 November 1971; *Washington Post*, "Nixon's Rating Now is 53% Favorable," 29 November 1971.

[68] CF PR15, Box 53, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 7/22/70.

[69] Gallup Opinion Index, August 1970, Report No. 62, Princeton, NJ; *New York Times*, "Nixon Popularity Increases in Poll," 30 July 1970.

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principle is that pollsters should "exercise due care . . . to assure the reliability and validity of results . . . . We shall not knowingly make interpretations of research results, nor shall we tacitly permit interpretations that are inconsistent with the data available." The second standard stipulates that opinion researchers should make available in their reports "essential information about how the research was conducted [including] . . . method, location, and dates of data collection."[70]

In addition, Dr. Gallup insisted on a more general standard to safeguard the credibility of published polls: pollsters should unmistakably distance themselves from politicians. The job of the detached "scorekeeper" should be left to "persons and organizations that have no connection with parties or candidates, [and] that obtain their financial support from groups or sources that are not committed to any single political or ideological viewpoint.[71] Louis Harris and the Gallup organization as well as contemporary polling firms have all joined the choir for clean polling. When Louis Harris began to publish polling results in 1963, he publicly promised—after helping Kennedy win the presidency—to stop conducting surveys for political candidates in order to insure his impartiality.

In our view, Gallup's and Harris's relationship with Nixon violated these standards. Harris's decision in the fall of 1971 to average his results for publication was not consistent with the standard of full disclosure and of avoiding misleading interpretations; it obscured the downward trend in Nixon's popularity.

The release of information prior to publication and the use of White House questions created an ongoing, secret relationship that departed from Dr. Gallup's admonition to maintain distance from politicians. Nixon's efforts to capitalize on pre-publication results reveal the danger in providing advance information to the White House, even if it is also distributed to others.

Finally, Louis Harris's decision to conduct a poll for the White House's Domestic Council conflicted with his position as a pollster purporting to offer impartial analysis and certainly contradicted Dr. Gallup's demand that public pollsters not take any financial support from sources with a decided viewpoint.

Looking back on his contacts with the Nixon White House, Gallup's Davies insisted that, "If we thought what we were doing was helping the president, the conversations would have ceased." But, of course, the White House's activities were driven by the imperative of helping the president. And, White House aides were not above misleading Gallup, falsely assuring Davies at the time that "we

[70] American Association for Public Opinion Research, "Code of Professional Ethics and Practices," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 24 (Fall 1960): 529–30; American Association for Public Opinion Research, "Code of Professional Ethics and Practices" in Paul Sheatsley and Warren Mitofsky, eds., *A Meeting Place: The History of the American Association for Public Opinion Research* (U.S.: American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1992). Evidence that opinion researchers operated under clear standards during Nixon's presidency is discussed in Albert Gollin, "AAPOR and the Media" in ibid.

[71] George Gallup, *The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Opinion Press, 1972), 188–89.

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did not use [his information] in any way or release it ahead of time."[72] After reviewing records from the Nixon archives, Davies conceded that Nixon's use of Gallup's data "certainly wasn't something that we had any idea of" and, indeed, the polling organization's relationship with the White House was "naive" and "wrong."[73]

In contrast, Louis Harris defends his behavior and insists that Nixon's efforts to "coopt me were not successful."[74] From the perspective of the Nixon administration, however, White House aides considered themselves successful—as Colson put it—in "cultivating" the pollster. By 1974, the White House reversed its initial appraisal of Harris as an enemy and now considered him—according to Nixon's last chief of staff, Alexander Haig—"friendly and helpful."[75] Even as the Watergate scandal hit, White House aides continued to report that Harris promised that "we could chat before [his next polls] got set in concrete."[76]

What We Should Learn from Nixon's Efforts at Manipulation

The Lesson for Researchers

Studying the Nixon administration's relations with Gallup and Harris offers three lessons. First, it offers a warning to archival researchers regarding the importance of corroborating accounts offered by White House aides. Supporting evidence is necessary, because ambition can produce overstatements, spurious claims, and inaccuracies; events and decisions unknown to the aides may reverse or undermine their accounts. For instance, at least one of Colson's reports to Haldeman that Harris would not publish a set of results was partly contradicted by independent evidence.[77]

The Lesson for Pollsters

Nixon's pursuit of Gallup and Harris has clear and important implications for today's pollsters and consumers of survey results. Today's polls are probably not

[72] HRH, Box 134, Memo to Haldeman from Chapin, 9/25/69.

[73] Davies interview.

[74] Harris statement, 9/21/94.

[75] Haig interview.

[76] CF PR 15, Memo to Ken Cole from W. Richard Howard, 2/22/73 (marked "Administratively Confidential/ Eyes Only").

[77] Colson reported to Haldeman in April 1971 that Harris would not publish results that indicated that Nixon's popularity rating had sunk to 46–53 split. But, both *Washington Post* and *Chicago Tribune* (5/13/71) published Harris's columns with the 46–53 split. It was only after, however, new data became available that Harris ran the 46–53 split; the new set of data showed a 47–50 split, which was heralded as an improvement. HRH, Box 410, Memo to Strachan from Higby, 4/26/71 (Haldeman's handwritten notes attached). *Washington Post*, "President's Job Rating Rises," 13 May 1971; *Chicago Tribune, "President Gain in Popularity,"* 13 May, 1971.

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as susceptible to direct political manipulation as they were in Richard Nixon's day. The major reason is the proliferation of polling organizations and polls—a development that ironically has been criticized for fueling the country's infatuation with public opinion as measured in such surveys.

Two decades ago, the number of major polling organizations was quite limited. Today, Harris and Gallup have been joined by literally dozens of polling organizations, with such media giants as the *New York Times*, CBS News, the *Los Angeles Times*, ABC, the *Washington Post*, NBC, the *Wall Street Journal, Time, Newsweek,* CNN, *U.S. News and World Report* conducting separate or joint surveys. The sheer number of polls has created a competitive dynamic that has led the different polling firms to keep an eye on each other and thereby regulate themselves. Indeed, the proliferation of media polling was motivated by a drive to break the monopoly that Harris and Gallup once held and to offer more independent sources of survey data.[78]

Gallup's reporting of the 1992 election provides an instructive example of today's competitive dynamics. As the campaign headed into the home stretch, Gallup altered the screen it was using to determine likely voters in the presidential election. The result was that its polls found Bush closing in on the frontrunner, Bill Clinton. The Gallup results were immediately scrutinized by a number of other pollsters, who failed to pick up the Bush surge. The criticism of Gallup was embarrassing and potentially harmful to its commercial research business.

In another recent controversy over poll results, the Gallup organization helped to resolve a debate over responses to a survey question about the occurrence of the holocaust asked by the Roper organization for the American Jewish Committee. The Roper poll reported that a sizeable percentage of the public—over one fifth—thought the holocaust might not have occurred. Gallup took the lead in identifying a confusing double negative in the wording of the survey question as the cause of the Roper result. The following question was asked: "Does it seem possible or does it seem impossible to you that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never happened?"[79]

Despite this monitoring of today's polling, the disturbing story that has emerged from the Nixon archives forces us to wonder about what influences politicians or other interested parties exert on today's poll questions and results. Gallup and Louis Harris personally continue to share data before publication with presidents and other reputable individuals as part of their open door policy.[80] Although one of President Clinton's pollsters, Stan Greenberg, denies any knowledge of Nixon-like meddling with polling, he has ongoing contacts with pollsters.

[78] Albert Gollin, "Exploiting the Liaison Between Polling and the Press," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44 (Winter 1980): 445–461; Thomas Mann and Gary Orren, eds., *Media Polls in American Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992).

[79] For an excellent review of the holocaust controversy, see Tom W. Smith, "Review: The Holocaust Denial Controversy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59 (Summer 1995): 269–95.

[80] Gallup interview; Harris statement.

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He regularly communicates with media pollsters at such places as CNN or CBS about their surveys in order to "urge them to rethink their question wording in terms of future polls."[81]

Public pollsters' close contacts with the White House raise three problems. First, providing advance information or conducting informal discussions behind the scenes with the White House represents an enormous advantage for presidents. The fact is that polling data are rarely neutral. They invariably provide political ammunition for one side, and the White House has unparalleled capabilities to maximize the firepower of privileged access and advance information. Moreover, the rationale for communicating with the White House—that presidents rely on published polling for informational purposes—is less tenable now that presidential administrations conduct their own private surveys.[82]

Second, polling, like other services, rests on the public's faith and confidence in the outcomes. The appearance or suspicion of secret contacts between the White House and pollsters threaten the reputations of pollsters for fairness and objectivity. Indeed, Gallup officials' concern with protecting the firm's reputation led them to keep their contacts with the Nixon White House secret. According to Gallup Jr., his father was generally "reluctant to go to the White House, with any administration, because he was afraid that this would be misinterpreted" and that "people would read into these contacts."[83] Gallup officials met with Nixon aides in Washington at a hotel because of their concern to avoid damaging their image of objectivity.[84]

In short, the lesson for today is that public pollsters' close contacts with presidents create an unmistakable appearance—even if White House pressure is successfully resisted—that contradicts pollsters' declarations of impartiality and nonpartisanship.

Third, there is significant potential for political tampering with the polling process and the reporting of results. The White House continues to wield potentially powerful resouces—whether involving strong arm tactics or appeals to patriotism—and both pollsters and the journalists who report survey results exercise vast discretion in deciding about the wording of questions and the reporting of results. How should the media report a presidential candidate who finishes second in a primary race 8 points behind the front runner? Is it a loss or a surprisingly strong showing? Are such interpretations and the failure to publish other relevant polls the result of political interference or unbiased professional judgement?

The lesson of the Nixon administration's activities for today's pollsters and the interpreters of their results in the media is that the White House and other

[81] Interview with Stanley Greenberg by Lawrence Jacobs, 26 January 1995.
[82] Jacobs and Shapiro, "Rise of Presidential Polling."
[83] Gallup interview.
[84] Chapin interview.

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political organizations must be kept at a distance if the polls and the media are to be accepted as trusted scorekeepers.

The Lesson for American Democracy

Nixon's pursuit of Harris and Gallup provides strong support for the fears of Lippmann and others about the potential to shape public opinion and use polls as a tool for political manipulation. Nevertheless, the research that we and others have conducted on public opinion and policy making suggests recasting the debate between Lippmann's concerns about manipulation and Gallup's promotion of polls as a tool for heightening political responsiveness. It is not the case that policy makers' relationship with the mass public simply involves either shaping or responding to public opinion. Rather, responsiveness and direction often coexist; they are not mutually exclusive alternatives.

Government officials who are intent on shaping public opinion have come to appreciate over time that the public cannot be molded like clay but must be approached on terms that reflect public preferences. For instance, research on the United States and Britain suggests that government officials' concerns with shaping mass sentiment have in fact led them to become more sensitive to public attitudes.[85] Over time, policy makers have realized that affecting public opinion requires focusing on policies and presentations that enjoy public backing: sensitivity to public sentiment has enabled (rather than prevented) the exercise of strong direction of public opinion.

Conversely, responsiveness to public opinion also requires leadership. For example, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson responded to broad public support for the principle of expanding the elderly's access to health care by providing leadership in formulating a government program and drawing on the visibility of their office to mobilize public support behind their proposals for establishing Medicare.[86] Indeed, we stumbled upon the Nixon administration's ties to pollsters while we were researching similar processes during the Nixon presidency.

In studying the workings of American democracy, mass opinion cannot be studied in isolation from elite politics, because the public does not evaluate or pressure passive political actors from some distant, outside vantage point. Rather, presidents, other political actors, and the media help construct public beliefs, attitudes, and preferences.[87]

Leadership and education can play a useful role in a mass democracy when they provide the public with the most accurate available information and allow

[85] Jacobs, "Recoil Effect" and *Social Interpretation*.

[86] Jacobs and Shapiro, "Issues"; Jacobs, "Institutions and Culture" and *Health of Nations*.

[87] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rationale Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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individuals to form opinions that serve their interests. Leadership in the service of democratic deliberation fosters the country's permanent interests and appeals to durable majority sentiment.

Responsible leadership slips into manipulation when officeholders use the mass media to feed misinformation to the public. Manipulative leadership appeals to momentary popular emotions and is motivated by the drive to augment personal power. Nixon's relations with Harris and Gallup illustrate this model of manipulative leadership: he sought to influence the pollsters in order to distort information about public opinion and inflate artificially his personal political influence.*

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The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era

EYTAN GILBOA

The 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama was the first American use of force since 1945 that was unrelated to the cold war. It was also the first large-scale use of American troops abroad since Vietnam and the most violent event in Panamanian history. It ended with the unusual capture of Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's head of state, who was then brought to the United States and tried for criminal drug operations. Despite the end of the cold war, dictators such as Noriega, Saddam Hussein, and Serbian leaders Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadzić will continue to exist and to challenge the international order. How should the United States, the only remaining superpower, deal with these kinds of authoritarian leaders? What lessons can we learn from the Noriega challenge and the means employed by the United States to handle him?

Noriega was a corrupt dictator heading an efficient narcomilitaristic regime in Panama. He was involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and the ruthless oppression of his people. He also systematically violated the American–Panamanian Canal treaties and harassed U.S. forces and institutions in Panama. But were all these violations sufficient to justify a massive military intervention to remove Noriega from power? In the last forty years, the United States intervened in Latin American countries but always in connection with perceived communist threats and the cold war. Noriega was not a communist and did not plan to move Panama into the Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, he played a key role in American efforts to contain the spread of

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communism in Central America. Historically, Panama was strategically important to the United States because of the Panama Canal. By the mid-1980s, however, the canal had lost much of its strategic value.[1] In 1978 President Jimmy Carter recognized this change and negotiated an agreement to transfer control of the canal to Panama by the end of the century.[2]

Why then, in the absence of cold war considerations, did the United States consider a relatively insignificant dictator a major challenge whose removal from power required full-scale military intervention? To answer this question, one must examine a combination of factors: escalation in the conflict, domestic priorities including the war on drugs, George Bush's leadership difficulties, and America's new global responsibilities as the sole remaining superpower.

The Noriega problem began in 1985 as an internal Panamanian affair. Between 1985 and the 1989 U.S. invasion, it went through a series of five minicrises. A turning point occurred in February 1988, when the United States declared drugs to be the major threat to American society at the same time that Noriega was indicted in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering. Following the indictments, the United States sought to remove Noriega from power. The Reagan and Bush administrations hoped for and preferred a Panamanian solution, like a coup d'etat, an election that would end Noriega's rule, or a popular uprising of the kind that removed from power dictators such as Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines.

The two administrations used overt and covert operations to help start popular uprisings and coups and also assisted the opposition in the 1989 Panamanian elections. None of these efforts were successful, and the United States decided to use other measures to remove Noriega such as negotiations, economic and diplomatic sanctions, and military threats. These measures also failed, mainly due to underestimation of Noriega's ability to survive, bureaucratic infighting, mixed messages, congressional–White House feuds, operational restrictions, and incompetent American implementation of policies and plans. The failure of these measures strengthened Noriega's position in Panama, as he defiantly withstood superpower pressure. Thus, as his political position became stronger, it became more important to the United States to remove him from power.

Throughout the confrontation, Noriega felt immune to American reprisals or punishment. One author claimed that "the United States sent clear signals, which if evaluated correctly, could have provided warning [to Noriega] of a U.S. attack."[3] But even hours before the actual attack, Noriega did not believe the

[1] David Parker, "The Panama Canal Is No Longer Crucial to U.S. Security," *Armed Forces Journal* 125 (December 1987): 54–60.

[2] Walter LaFeber, *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Michael J. Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986).

[3] Susan Horwitz, "Indications and Warning Factors" in Bruce Watson and Peter Tsouras, eds. *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 49.

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United States would use force to capture him.[4] His failure was not only the result of faulty evaluation. The evidence presented in this article shows that over a long period of time, the United States sent him mixed and confusing signals. Thus, a tougher and more unified U.S. policy that was clearly articulated and communicated from the beginning could have obviated the need for the Panama invasion.

The Early U.S. Messages

Noriega had been an intelligence officer under General Omar Torrijos before he became the commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF).[5] He had been a corrupt official involved with illegal smuggling of drugs and arms.[6] Yet he was considered a close ally of various American governmental agencies. He cooperated with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), had allies in the Department of Defense (DOD), and was on and off the CIA payroll as early as 1971.[7] In addition, he was a source of intelligence for and a channel of communication between the United States and Fidel Castro. Most importantly, however, during the civil war in Nicaragua, he provided access and assistance to the contra campaign against the Sandinistas.

Despite his involvement with drugs, at least until his indictment in 1988, Noriega was considered by the United States both as an asset and a liability. When he committed crimes and abused his power, Washington looked the other way. In 1979, for example, senior officials in the Carter administration blocked federal prosecutors from bringing drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling indictments against Noriega, because they preferred to continue receiving the intelligence information he was providing them. Following the conclusion of the canal treaties, they did not want to upset the political situation in Panama.[8] With the United States continually ignoring his abuses, Noriega may have been encouraged to continue or even increase his drug-related activities.

Washington also looked the other way during the 1984 elections in Panama. In May 1984, Panama held its first free elections in sixteen years. The official vote count showed Noriega's hand-picked candidate, Nicolas Barletta, winning

[4] Margaret Scranton, *The Noriega Years* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 202.

[5] Noriega created the PDF in 1983 by merging the National Guard, the police, and the immigration forces.

[6] R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sanchez, *In the Time of the Tyrants, Panama 1968–1990* (New York: Norton, 1990).

[7] George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1052; Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega* (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1990), 83; Kevin Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 14; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 13–14.

[8] Linda Robinson, *Intervention or Neglect: The United States and Central America Beyond the 1980s* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), 111; and Jim McGee and Bob Woodward, "Noriega Arms Indictment Stalled in '80," *Washington Post*, 20 March 1988.

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by 1,713 votes. But rumors of fraud appeared on election day and persisted in subsequent days. Eventually it became clear that the PDF had doctored the election results in order to produce a victory for Noriega's candidate.[9]

The fraudulent May 1984 elections set back the chances for democracy in Panama and demonstrated Noriega's ability to undermine the political process. They might have also served as a warning to the United States about Noriega. But instead of viewing Noriega's manipulations as a threat to democracy in Panama, Washington chose to ignore them. Barletta was well known in Washington and had good connections with several senior officials. He had studied economics at the University of Chicago when Secretary of State George Shultz was a professor there, was a former vice president of the World Bank and ex-director of the Department of Economic Affairs at the Organization of American States (OAS). Shultz legitimized the elections by attending Barletta's inauguration as president of Panama.

Finally, American actions in an undercover drug operation sent Noriega a message that his involvement in drug trafficking would be overlooked if he assisted the United States in the battle against the Sandinistas. In 1984, the DEA conducted a major undercover operation in Colombia designed to arrest and convict druglords, including Pablo Escobar.[10] In June, Barry Seal, a DEA agent, took a rare picture of Escobar and Sandinista officers loading cocaine into an airplane. A few weeks later Oliver North, on the staff of the U.S. National Security Council, leaked the photo to American newspapers, hoping that the evidence on links between the drug cartel and the Sandinistas would encourage Congress to vote in favor of aid to the contras. The disclosure of the photo ruined the covert operation and the chance to indict Escobar and his allies. Noriega thus understood that the United States cared more about fighting the contras than about waging war against drugs.

Thus, during the first two years of Noriega's rule, the United States ignored his criminal activities and abuses of the political process in Panama. The U.S. messages may have shaped a belief system that encouraged Noriega to continue the same policies and may have distorted his ability to correctly interpret further U.S. reactions to his behavior. This phenomenon was clearly visible in five American–Panamanian crises.

Crisis 1: The Murder of Hugo Spadafora

Dr. Hugo Spadafora was a physician but also a romantic revolutionary, a guerrilla fighter, and a political activist. He first confronted Noriega and accused him of illegal activities when both were serving in General Torrijos's government. In September 1985, Spadafora announced that he would expose Noriega's involve-

[9] Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 75–77; Buckley, *Panama: the Whole Story*, 74.
[10] Details about the operation appeared in Buckley, *Panama: the Whole Story*, 59–60.

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ment in drug trafficking and arms smuggling.[11] But before he could reveal his evidence, he was captured, severely tortured, and murdered in a manner intended to send a message to Noriega's opponents. His body was found decapitated, a punishment reserved for traitors.[12]

The brutal murder of Spadafora created a crisis in Panama. The media, the Spadafora family, and leaders of the opposition demanded an immediate investigation and punishment of the murderers. Noriega and the PDF were the obvious prime suspects, but they had the power to block any attempt to discover the truth about the murder. President Barletta condemned the murder and insisted on investigating the case, but Noriega forced him to resign. Elliot Abrams, the new assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, encouraged Barletta to stand firm.[13] Despite his effort, Barletta announced his resignation and was replaced by Vice President Eric Delvalle.

Spadafora's murder and Barletta's dismissal concerned the State Department, but Abrams thought that a tough American message would modify Noriega's behavior. Therefore, U.S. embassy officials visited the offices of *La Prensa*, the local newspaper that had implicated Noriega and the PDF in the murder, and received members of the Spadafora family. The U.S. ambassador in Panama, Everett Briggs, also declared in a public speech that true democracy requires supremacy of civilian authority over the military.[14] Later, in a highly symbolic measure, the Department of State diverted $14 million in aid from Panama to Guatemala, where a new civilian president had just taken office.[15]

At the same time, however, the CIA and the DEA continued to view Noriega as a vital asset and sent him the opposite message. CIA Director William Casey summoned Noriega, still on the CIA payroll, to a meeting on 1 November 1985 in the CIA headquarters. The State Department expected Casey, whom Noriega highly respected, to warn him. Casey, however, did not raise any of the disturbing questions about the Spadafora murder and the forced resignation of Barletta, and even assured Noriega that the Reagan administration would continue to support him.[16] The DEA also continued to send Noriega thank-you letters for his cooperation in drug enforcement efforts.[17]

A few weeks later, the White House and the State Department attempted to correct the positive messages the CIA and the DEA had delivered to Noriega. In mid-December, new National Security Adviser, Admiral John Poindexter, Elliot Abrams, and other U.S. officials met Noriega in Panama. Poindexter criticized Noriega for his illegal activities and "PDF brutality," a coded reference to the murder of Spadafora. Noriega denied all the charges, however. Poindexter

[11] Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 126–142.
[12] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 27.
[13] Ibid., 34.
[14] Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 89–91.
[15] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 46.
[16] Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 169–170.
[17] David N. Miller, "Panama and U.S. Policy," *Global Affairs* 4 (Summer 1989): 139.

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did not press him any further and chose not to warn him.[18] Noriega manipulated the meeting, and the State Department plan to send him a tough message did not materialize.

Bureaucratic infighting, mainly among the State Department, CIA, and DEA, produced a mixed message. This allowed Noriega to conclude that his status in Washington was well protected. He believed that he had only a few opponents in the State Department who did not realize the valuable contributions he had made to U.S. interests and that his friends in the CIA and DOD would defend and protect him against these opponents.

Crisis 2: The Herrera Confessions

According to an internal secret plan signed after the death of Torrijos, Noriega was supposed to retire in 1987, when his deputy, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, was supposed to replace him as PDF commander. However on 5 June 1987, Noriega announced that he would remain PDF commander for another five years and assigned Diaz Herrera to an unattractive diplomatic position, leaving him bitter and frustrated. The next day Diaz Herrera retaliated against Noriega by publicly revealing details about Noriega's crimes.[19] He accused him of orchestrating the murder of Spadafora and rigging the 1984 elections. He even blamed Noriega for the death of Torrijos in a 1981 mysterious plane crash, claiming that Noriega had placed a bomb in his plane.

Herrera's charges inspired massive protests against the government. On 8 June 1987, nearly 100,000 people, close to a fourth of the population of Panama City, demonstrated against Noriega. The opposition formed a new coalition and demanded the immediate resignation of Noriega and other individuals named by Diaz Herrera. Demonstrations and strikes continued for several weeks in both cities and rural areas. Noriega responded by charging Diaz Herrera with treason and by cracking down hard on the demonstrators, destroying and damaging property belonging to political opponents and shutting down the media.

On 26 June 1987, the U.S. Senate approved a nonbinding resolution by an overwhelming vote of 84 to 2 (S. Res. 239) calling upon Noriega and his principal officers to step down pending a "public accounting" of Herrera's charges. Noriega struck back by sending government workers to demonstrate near the American Embassy. The demonstration turned into a riot, with workers throwing rocks,

[18] Seymour Hersh, "Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money," *New York Times*, 12 June 1986; Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 46. According to one source, at this meeting Poindexter may have tried to convince Noriega to train the contras in Panama. This could explain Poindexter's reluctance to deliver Noriega a tougher message. John Weeks and Andrew Zimbalist, "The Failure of Intervention in Panama: Humiliation in the Backyard," *Third World Quarterly* 11 (January 1989): 14.

[19] John Dinges, *Our Man in Panama, The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega* (New York: Random House, 1991), 265; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 107–108; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 212.

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smashing windows, and overturning and damaging employees' cars. This incident reminded Shultz of the 1979 Iranian attack on the American Embassy in Teheran, and it led him to tell Arthur Davis, the U.S. ambassador in Panama: "If that's the kind of relationship they [Noriega and the PDF] want, that's the kind of relationship they'll get."[20] Shultz quickly clarified what he meant by a new kind of relationship. The State Department suspended military aid to Panama, the DOD reduced military contacts between the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the PDF, and, most importantly, the CIA removed Noriega from its payroll. The real U.S. goal, however, was to remove Noriega from power either by negotiating his resignation or by encouraging a PDF coup against him.

In a speech given to the World Affairs Council in Washington on 30 June 1987, Elliot Abrams called on the PDF leaders to "remove their institution from politics, end any appearance of corruption, and modernize their forces to carry out their large and important military tasks." Abrams's aides explained to reporters beforehand that "corruption" referred to Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and that the rest of the statement was intended to encourage the PDF to remove Noriega from its ranks.[21] On 2 July the *Washington Post* reported on the speech with the explanations and clarifications of the code terms and the intended messages.

Between August and December 1987, the United States also used three negotiating channels to present Noriega with several plans and deals for his resignation. The first channel involved Jose Blandon, the Panamian consul general in New York, who was a close associate of Noriega. The second channel was initiated by Noriega, who invited retired Admiral Daniel J. Murphy to meet with him in Panama in August and November 1987. Finally, on 30 December 1987, Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs, met with Noriega in Panama.

The first channel produced the Blandon Plan, which called for the retirement of Noriega and his inner circle of PDF officers by April 1988 at the latest, the establishment of a transition regime under President Delvalle that would rule the state until the May 1989 elections, an independent media, and the resumption of U.S. aid.[22] The circumstances behind the Murphy mission are still in dispute. Prior to his retirement in 1985, Murphy held important governmental positions including chief of staff to Vice President George Bush. It is not yet clear whether this was a private mission or another unofficial channel for communications and negotations.[23] In any case, Noriega acted as if Murphy represented the official American position. Murphy repeated the Blandon terms but revised one critical component—the time-table. Murphy told Noriega he had until the May 1989 elections to resign. Noriega concluded that the American timetable was not as

[20] Cited in Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 223. Also see Miller, "Panama and U.S. Policy," 140.
[21] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 90.
[22] Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 118–119.
[23] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 106–108.

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tough as Blandon had originally presented. On 21 December 1987, Noriega rejected the Blandon Plan and a few weeks later fired Blandon.[24] Blandon then accused Murphy of undermining his plan by giving Noriega extra time to depart.

On 30 December 1987, Armitage went to Panama to send Noriega a "tough" message and to tell him that all the branches of the Reagan administration had adopted a unified position seeking his departure. Armitage may have offered Noriega an incentive to resign, such as agreeing to stop the investigation into his drug trafficking activities.[25] It is not clear, however, whether Armitage carried out this mission. The press briefings in Washington on the meeting conveyed a tough American stand, but according to one source, "Armitage never asked Noriega to leave."[26] Even if he did, the message became blurred when Noriega and Armitage appeared before PDF officers laughing and drinking Old Parr scotch together.[27]

Why did all these negotiating channels between the United States and Noriega fail to resolve the crisis? The main problem was that there were too many different channels transmitting too many confusing messages, causing Noriega to believe there was a split in the Reagan administration over his removal. He may also have thought that as the U.S. terms got better for him, time was on his side. He may have rejected deals offered to him, hoping at every point in time that a new deal would provide him with more concessions and better conditions. However, it is also probable that he only wanted to confuse and frustrate the United States and never had any intention of negotiating a settlement. The United States should have taken such motivation into consideration and should have used more aggressive bargaining techniques to uncover Noriega's real intentions.

Crisis 3: The Florida Indictments

The next major crisis in the continuing saga erupted in February 1988, when Noriega was indicted by two federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa.[28] The Miami indictment included twelve counts of racketeering, drug trafficking, and money laundering. More specifically, it accused Noriega of assisting the Colombian Medellin cartel in transporting more than two tons of cocaine to the United States via Panama in return for a payment of about $4.5 million. He was also accused of allowing the cartel to build a cocaine processing plant in Panama and of providing shelter for drug traffickers. The Tampa grand jury charged Noriega on three counts of assisting American-based operatives to smuggle 1.4 million

[24] See "Panamanian Chief Dismisses Aide Seeking Political Deal," *New York Times*, 19 January 1988.

[25] Robinson, *Intervention or Neglect*, 114; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 126–127.

[26] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 112.

[27] Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 288; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 233.

[28] See Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. for Links to Illegal Drugs," *New York Times*, 6 February 1988.

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pounds of marijuana into the United States in return for a payment of more than $1 million.

The indictments exposed a major breakdown in Reagan's foreign policy making. Clearly, indicting any foreign leader, especially indicting the leader of a close ally for drug trafficking, should have been carried out in close consultation with the White House and the State Department. The Justice Department, however, acted as if this was a domestic case. Despite the obvious significance of the indictments, Reagan and Shultz learned about them only after the fact.[29] It was clear that the indictments would create an entirely new situation in the Noriega continuing crisis, but the administration was surprised and unprepared to deal with this situation.

The public disclosure of Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking was an embarrassment for the United States. It became clear that U.S. officials had tolerated these activities at a time when antidrug sentiment was at an all time high.[30] Because public concern about drugs was so prominent, "the [U.S.] Government could not afford to be seen as coddling a dictator-druglord after its own courts called for his prosecution."[31]

The indictments created a new crisis in Panama. After days of hesitating, President Delvalle finally fired Noriega on 25 February 1988 and appointed Colonel Marcos Justines as the new PDF commander. But the attempt to dismiss Noriega failed. Immediately after he was fired, Noriega restricted Delvalle to his home, cut his telephone lines, closed the independent print and electronic media, and ordered the PDF to disperse demonstrators. Justines remained loyal to Noriega and refused to assume the commander position. Under Noriega's instructions, the National Assembly voted to oust Delvalle and replace him with the education minister.

The United States had hoped a popular uprising would support Delvalle over Noriega, but one never developed. The administration denounced the ouster of Delvalle, recognized him as Panama's legitimate leader, and brought him to the United States. But this was not enough; the Reagan administration had to devise alternative means to remove Noriega. Throughout 1988 the Reagan administration encouraged a PDF coup, offered Noriega deals in return for his resignation, imposed sanctions on Panama, authorized covert actions against him, dispatched additional forces to the U.S. bases in Panama, and debated a military intervention to capture Noriega.

On 16 March 1988, Panamanian Chief of Police, Colonel Leonidas Macias, organized a coup against Noriega. The coup failed, however, either because of bad planning or because some coup participants double-crossed their leaders and

[29] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1052; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 250.

[30] In July 1988, 27 percent of the respondents to a Gallup poll named drugs as the most important problem facing the country – greater than the percentage of respondents who cited all economic problems combined (24 percent).

[31] Linda Robinson, "Dwindling Options in Panama," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (Winter 1989–1990): 192.

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informed Noriega of the plot. Despite this outcome, the Reagan administration continued to encourage the PDF to topple Noriega. On 22 March 1988, the White House issued the following statement: "The United States favors the integrity of the PDF as a professional military institution, and we look forward to the PDF playing an important and constructive role under a civilian regime."[32] In this statement, the United States distinguished again between the PDF and Noriega, promising to preserve the PDF if it removed Noriega and obeyed civilian authority.

Because of Macias's failure, it was unlikely that another PDF coup would be attempted in the near future. Since other means had been unsuccessful in persuading Noriega to retire and congressional and public pressure to remove him was mounting, administration officials raised and debated the military option. White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater indirectly acknowledged this when he said on 29 March 1988 that the United States was now "willing to take a look at all the hard options."[33] On 25 April, however, Treasury Secretary Jim Baker said, "There are other things that you can do but they all involve putting our military assets into play, and we're not going to do that."[34]

The Reagan administration was split on the military option. The State Department supported military intervention but Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) opposed it. In March 1988, Elliot Abrams suggested a limited use of force – a commando raid to capture Noriega and to bring him to trial in the United States, accompanied by 6,000 American soldiers to defend Delvalle against any PDF retaliations. But the Pentagon raised many practical and legal questions about such an operation. JCS Chairman William Crowe was concerned that the PDF might take American hostages. Others pointed to casualties and operational difficulties with any "Rambo"-type commando raid. One officer even raised legal and moral issues: "Kidnapping is a crime. Under what international law would you have us do that?" he asked.[35]

Abrams thought that the Pentagon was doing its best to avoid using force and considered the obstacles raised by officers ridiculous.[36] He considered Pentagon opposition an example of the Vietnam Syndrome, namely fear of the consequences of what could become an unpopular intervention. Senior military officers also invoked the Vietnam War experience to criticize their opponent. They viewed Abrams as a civilian official who too enthusiastically suggested and advocated

[32] Cited in Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 146.

[33] Bill McAllister, "US Patience Not Unlimited Noriega Warned," *Washington Post*, 30 March 1988.

[34] The statement was published without specific attribution, Peter Kilborn, "U.S. Preparing to Relax Some Panama Sanctions," *New York Times*, 26 April 1988. Shultz revealed that Baker made the statement in a background briefing, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1057.

[35] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 138–139.

[36] Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 84–86.

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violence with little understanding of the consequences.[37] Fearing that Reagan would somehow adopt the Abrams strategy, the Pentagon mounted a public attack on Abrams, including leaking some of his "harebrained" ideas to the press.

A similar debate over military action in Panama also took place in Congress. Speaker of the House Jim Wright, for example, said that "obviously we don't want to go [to Panama] with the force of military arms—that's ridiculous."[38] But in a telephone conversation with Reagan's new Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Senator Alfonse D'Amato accused the Department of Defense and the JCS of being "cowards" for their lack of military decisiveness in Panama.[39] After Carlucci had sent him a letter of protest, D'Amato claimed he had been misunderstood, but he still continued to favor the use of force in Panama.[40] Noriega could have concluded that the split in the administration and Congress was too wide for U.S. military action to be employed.

Since Reagan rejected military intervention, his administration tried again to negotiate a deal with Noriega.[41] In March 1988, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak offered Noriega a chance to retire on 12 August 1988, the fifth anniversary of his command, and to take a long vacation abroad, at least until after the May 1989 elections in Panama. In return, the United States would agree to drop the Florida indictments. On 11 May 1988 the White House officially announced that if Noriega retired, the indictments would be dropped.[42] The announcement drew severe criticism from Congress and also from Vice President Bush, who publicly opposed the negotiations and the proposed deal with Noriega.[43] Bush was then in the middle of his presidential campaign and for him, "the prospect of letting a drug-dealing dictator out of the indictment looked like political suicide."[44] On 17 May the Senate passed a nonbinding amendment to the 1989 Defense Authorization Bill that read: "No negotiations should be conducted, nor arrangement made by the United States Government with Noriega, which would involve the dropping of the drug-related indictments against him." The amendment passed by a vote of 86 to 10.[45] Although Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole thought that Noriega should be removed from power, Dole

[37] Interesting details about the debate between Abrams and the military were revealed more than a year later in an exchange of op-ed articles Abrams and Crow published in the *New York Times*, respectively on 3 and 16 October 1989.

[38] Cited in Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 147.

[39] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 137.

[40] See his criticism of a *Washington Post* editorial, published in the same paper on 13 August 1988.

[41] See Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1062–1079.

[42] Joe Pichirallo, "Noriega Given Offer to Drop Drug Charges," *Washington Post*, 12 May 1988.

[43] David Hoffman, "Bush Splits with Reagan on Handling of Noriega," *Washington Post*, 19 May 1988.

[44] Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause, The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 35. Also see Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1992), 158–159.

[45] Lou Canon and Helen Dewar, "Senate Opposes Ending Noriega Case," *Washington Post*, 18 May 1988.

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defended the amendment by arguing that the United States should not "send him off with a legal golden parachute."[46]

Despite this criticism, Reagan did not back off and approved the deal. In several stormy policy sessions, Reagan argued that the only alternative to get Noriega out of power was the use of force and he opposed this option.[47] The diplomatic effort, however, failed to produce an agreement. Reagan and Shultz let Noriega know that the deal must be concluded by 25 May. That was the day they were scheduled to travel to Moscow for an important summit with Mikhail Gorbachev. Hours before the expiration of the deadline, Noriega accepted the deal but wanted two weeks to persuade PDF officers to accept it as well. Shultz, who delayed his travel to Moscow, decided to withdraw the U.S. offer.

Even before the failure of this round of negotiations, the United States imposed harsh economic sanctions against Panama.[48] The sanctions consisted of freezing Panamanian assets in the United States, suspending canal payments to the Panamanian government, revoking Panama's most favored trade status, and banning all payments from American individuals and companies. The main purpose of the sanctions was to erode Noriega's base of support, primarily in the PDF and among government officials. The idea was to squeeze him financially to the point where he could no longer pay the salaries of his own loyalists so that they would turn against him. In addition, the sanctions were expected to hurt the Panamanian people, who would then blame Noriega for their hardship and demand his resignation. Finally, the sanctions were intended to provide the American negotiators with additional leverage against Noriega.

The sanctions did in fact succeed in damaging Panama's economy; Noriega failed to meet his financial obligations to the PDF and government workers. Reagan's new National Security Adviser Colin Powell said that the sanctions were having a "telling effect."[49] Elliot Abrams declared that Noriega was "clinging to power by his fingertips."[50] But the pressure was not strong enough to bring Noriega down. The Treasury Department made too many exceptions to the sanctions, which helped mostly Noriega and his supporters. Thus, "the sanctions were the economic equivalent of the neutron bomb: they destroyed the economy but left the leader standing."[51] Once again, the United States underestimated Noriega's remarkable survival power.

In crisis situations, states sometimes use armed forces for political purposes. They mobilize and deploy military forces and conduct military exercises in order

[46] Helen Dewar, "Dole Warns against Dropping Noriega Case," *Washington Post*, 17 May 1988.

[47] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1070–1079.

[48] Robinson, *Intervention or Neglect*, 117–119; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 132–140.

[49] Lou Canon, "Anti-Noriega Sanctions Are Having 'Telling Effect,'" *Washington Post*, 6 April 1988.

[50] Robert Pear and Neil Lewis, "The Noriega Fiasco," *New York Times*, 30 May 1988.

[51] Larry Berman and Bruce Jentleson, "Bush and the Post-Cold War: New Challenges for American Leadership" in Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, eds. *The Bush Presidency First Appraisals* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), 110.

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to scare opponents and make them do things that they would otherwise not do.[52] The political use of force can be effective only if an opponent understands the message and believes the threat is genuine. The United States already had bases and forces in Panama. The political use of force in this case, therefore, meant the redeploying of existing forces, dispatching additional troops, and carrying out exceptional military exercises.

In March 1988 the Reagan administration considered dispatching additional troops to bases in Panama to send a message to Noriega. SOUTHCOM chief, General Frederick Woerner, opposed this step, because he knew that Noriega would think that the United States was merely bluffing and did not intend to intervene at this time. Because he felt that Reagan did not seriously intend to launch a military action, Woerner said the policy was not credible and would not achieve its goal.[53] Despite Woerner's objections, Reagan decided to send approximately 1,300 troops to Panama on 6 April 1988. Woerner was right. If the purpose of the dispatch was to scare Noriega, it failed. Noriega was unmoved and did not alter his defiant behavior.

In addition to all of the preceding means, the United States conducted covert operations to remove Noriega. Very little information is available on the first two operations—Panama 1 and Panama 2.[54] In July 1988, Reagan authorized Panama 3 to help Eduardo Herrera Hassan, an exiled rival of Noriega, mount a coup. The CIA presented the plan to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 26 July 1988. The next day, the *Washington Post* published an article ironically titled "Covert Action on Noriega Is Cleared." The White House accused the committee of leaking information about the plan. The committee, in turn, accused the White House of doing the same thing.[55] The White House may have wanted to discredit the committee as part of a debate over the right of Congress to receive information about any covert operation plan in advance. Regardless of who leaked the information, the publication of the story killed the operation.

All the efforts of the Reagan administration to remove Noriega failed, mainly because of bureaucratic infighting, which resulted in the United States sending confusing messages. Shultz commented that the outcome of the negotiations "could well have been different if President Reagan had been supported in his decisions and if the execution of his decisions had been firm and accelerated.[56] Credible military threats could have affected Noriega's behavior and, perhaps, even his willingness to accept one of the deals offered to him. But Reagan ruled out military intervention, and the other methods the United States used to try to remove Noriega were ineffective. However, Bush's victory in the 1988 presidential elections created an opportunity to develop new ideas to deal with Noriega.

[52] Philip Zelikow, "The U.S. and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary" in George Osborn et al., *Democracy, Strategy and Vietnam* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 31–81.

[53] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 139.

[54] Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 152–158.

[55] *Washington Post*, 29 July 1988.

[56] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1079.

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Crisis 4: The Elections in Panama

Reagan and Bush held different opinions about Noriega. One of Bush's main themes in the 1988 presidential campaign was the War against Drugs. Bush, therefore, strongly opposed a deal with Noriega that would result in dropping the charges against him. Thus, Bush ruled out the deal favored by Reagan. Compared to Reagan, Bush's leadership image was much weaker, and he was more vulnerable to Noriega's provocations. On the other hand, with the changes in the makeup of his cabinet, Bush had the opportunity to impose one clear strategy on the various branches of his government. From the beginning of his term when referring to Noriega, he used tough language and set the stage for a major confrontation with the Panamanian leader.

On 22 December 1988, after a meeting with Reagan and Delvalle, Bush's spokesperson said: "There must be no misunderstanding about our policy. . . . Noriega must go."[57] Bush hoped Noriega would be defeated in the May 1989 elections in Panama, as this would have been an exclusively Panamanian solution to the long conflict. However, the Bush administration was concerned with two problems: the ability of the Panamanian opposition to mount a serious campaign against Noriega and the PDF's possible falsification of the election results. Bush decided upon measures to deal with both problems. First, Bush approved a new covert plan (Panama 4) to help the Panamanian opposition; and second, he encouraged many individuals and organizations to monitor the elections in Panama.

After much deliberation and Bush's personal pleading, Congress approved Panama 4 and allocated $10 million to cover opposition expenses for printing materials, advertisements, transportation, and communication.[58] However, the operation was hindered by failures and setbacks. About a month before the election, Noriega captured a CIA operative who was using some of this $10 million allocation to run a clandestine anti-Noriega radio network.[59] Shortly afterward, Carlos Eleta Alamaran, a Panamanian entrusted by the CIA to distribute the rest of the $10 million to the opposition, was arrested in the United States and charged with a conspiracy to import cocaine.[60] The case showed both deficiencies in the selection of agents and a complete lack of coordination between the CIA and drug enforcement agencies.

Recalling how Noriega rigged the 1984 elections, American officials made an effort to prevent fraud by calling for various organizations and monitoring groups to send observers to Panama. Former President Jimmy Carter led one of these teams. Yet, the monitoring teams did not deter Noriega and the PDF from rigging the elections. According to the official results, Noriega's candidate, Carlos Duque, won the elections by a 2 to 1 margin. Exit polls conducted on

[57] Bill McAllister, "Bush Vows to Press Noriega," *Washington Post*, 23 December 1988.
[58] AP Report, "Bush Directs Noriega Foes," *Washington Post*, 23 April 1989.
[59] Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 176.
[60] Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 158.

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election day, however, revealed a clear victory for the opposition: 55.1 percent for Guillermo Endara compared to 39.5 percent for Duque.[61] An exit poll conducted by the Catholic Bishops Conference found an even larger margin of about 3 to 1 in favor of Endara. The PDF managed to "win" the election by seizing ballot boxes, destroying tally sheets, and manipulating the counting process. All the observer teams agreed that the elections were fraudulent. Jimmy Carter accused Noriega of "robbing the people of Panama of their legitimate rights." Carter said he hoped there would be a "worldwide outcry of condemnation against a dictator who stole this election from his own people."[62]

Noriega's response to international criticism of the election process was to nullify the elections and appoint one of his high school classmates to serve as provisional president. This led to mass protests, which were violently put down by Noriega's paramilitary squads called Dignity Battalions. Television cameras worldwide showed Noriega's men brutally beating up Endara and his running mates—Ricardo Arias Calderon and Guillermo "Billy" Ford. The beatings were broadcast repeatedly on American television, and "the image of the white-haired Ford, robbed of his elected post, bloodied and temporarily blinded, became an instant symbol of the state of lawlessness and chaos in Panama."[63]

On 11 May 1989, Bush made a major statement on the situation in Panama and announced a seven-point plan designed to remove Noriega through a combination of threats and incentives.[64] In the introduction to the plan, Bush characterized the crisis as "a conflict between Noriega and the people of Panama, with the United States siding with the people." He indicated to the PDF that the United States hoped it would stand with the people and defend democracy. By ousting Noriega, Bush implied, the PDF "could have an important role to play in Panama's democratic future." This was again, not only a call for a PDF coup, but an attempt to separate Noriega from the PDF.

Then Bush announced seven specific measures:

- *Regional Diplomacy.* Supporting and cooperating with initiatives taken by OAS members to address the crisis.
- *Diplomatic Sanctions.* Recalling U.S. Ambassador Arthur Davis from Panama and reducing embassy staff to essential personnel only.
- *Safety Measures.* Relocating U.S. government employees and their dependents living outside of U.S. military bases or Panama Canal Commission housing areas, either to areas outside of Panama or to secure U.S. housing areas.
- *Safety and Preventive Measures.* Encouraging U.S. businessmen in Panama to send their dependents back to the United States.

[61] Ibid., 161.

[62] Lindsey Gruson, "Noriega Stealing Election," *New York Times*, 9 May 1989.

[63] Woodward, *The Commanders*, 84.

[64] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989*, Book 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 536–537.

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- *Economic Sanctions.* Continuing economic sanctions.
- *Panama Canal Treaties.* Affirming U.S. obligations and enforcing U.S. rights under the Panama Canal Treaties;
- *Military Actions.* Dispatching a brigade-size force (between 1,700 and 2,000 soldiers) to augment military forces already stationed in Panama.

Bush did not rule out further steps beyond these seven such as invasion, but said "an honorable solution" was still possible. The combination of a call for a PDF coup, the announcement of safety and preventive measures, and the dispatching of additional forces to Panama all raised speculations about U.S. military intervention, at least to support a coup. The administration, however, did not speak in one voice. On the same day that Bush announced his new strategy, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said on the *MacNeil–Lehrer Newshour* that U.S. troops would not intervene in Panama. The purpose of the troops, said Cheney, "is not to be involved with deciding who governs Panama." Moreover, DOD dispatched the troops slowly and again confused the intended message. The State Department wanted a quick show of force and the rapid dispatch of the additional forces, but Cheney slowed down the process.[65] He may have been influenced by Pentagon and JCS officials who opposed the action on the grounds that it could endanger American civilians living in Panama.

The change from Reagan to Bush did not correct the basic flaws in U.S. policy. Although Bush was more determined than Reagan to remove Noriega and was more willing to use force to achieve this goal, the results of his policy remained the same. Noriega continued to doubt the credibility of the American military threats and felt free to pursue his domestic abuses and to challenge the United States. Again, this happened mainly because of the continuing mixed and confusing messages coming from the administration.

Crisis 5: The Giroldi Coup

On 1 October 1989, the wife of Moises Giroldi, a member of Noriega's inner circle who had crushed the 1988 Macias coup attempt, informed SOUTHCOM officers that her husband was planning a nonviolent coup against Noriega and that he wanted limited U.S. help.[66] She said her husband wanted the United States to block two roads and to provide sanctuary for her and her children. Cheney approved these requests and told SOUTHCOM they could arrest Noriega in case the rebels turned him over to the American forces in Panama.

Giroldi's coup took place on 3 October 1989. Mrs. Giroldi and her children were given shelter, and the U.S. forces blocked the two requested roads. For a few hours Noriega was a prisoner in the hands of Giroldi, who tried unsuccessfully

[65] Richard Halloran, "U.S. Troops to Go Slowly into Panama," *New York Times*, 12 May 1989.

[66] For details about the coup, see Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 185–192; Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 197–218; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 369–397.

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to persuade him to retire. Apparently several rebel leaders, but not Giroldi, were then prepared to turn Noriega over to U.S. authorities. The rebels approached SOUTHCOM officers, but it was too late; Noriega was able to call for help from his special unit, Battalion 2000. This battalion used air transportation to circumvent the U.S. roadblocks and joined other Noriega loyalists in crushing the rebellion. When the original plan of blocking two roads did not work, the U.S. forces did nothing to prevent the loyalists from rescuing Noriega. Giroldi was severely tortured and killed as were several other coup leaders. Following this coup attempt, Noriega began to purge the PDF of dissident elements and to crack down even harder on civilian dissent. The PDF harassment of Americans intensified, and it became very dangerous for them to venture into downtown Panama City.

The American inaction during the coup raised a stormy debate in Washington. Congressional leaders from both parties, reporters and commentators, and even anonymous White House officials criticized the administration for missing an opportunity to capture Noriega and for failing to follow Bush's own strategy to encourage and help a PDF coup against Noriega. Senator Jesse Helms called the administration "a bunch of Keystone Kops" and bitterly predicted that, "after this, no member of the PDF can be expected to act against Noriega."[67]

Representative Les Aspin, then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and later secretary of defense, said the United States should be "ready at any opportunity to use the confusion and the uncertainty of a coup attempt . . . to do something about Mr. Noriega." Others, such as Democratic Congressman Dave McCurdy, chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, went so far as to ridicule Bush: "Yesterday makes Jimmy Carter look like a man of resolve. There's a resurgence of the wimp factor." Commentator George Will called the Bush administration "an unserious presidency," and Harry G. Summers, a highly respected military expert, wrote in his syndicated column: "Our national security decision-making process . . . was revealed to be in chaos."[68]

The administration countered the criticism by first denying prior knowledge of and involvement in the coup. It accused Giroldi of being as "mischievous" as Noriega and therefore did not deserve U.S. support. The administration also claimed that it did not miss an opportunity, since Giroldi had not intended to turn in Noriega anyway. And finally, senior officials used the casualty factor, suggesting that military intervention to save the coup would have been too costly. In a press conference held on 13 October 1989, Bush asserted that there was no inconsistency between his call for a PDF coup and his inaction during the Giroldi coup. He said he wanted to see Noriega thrown out of office and brought to

[67] David Hoffman and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Was Caught off Guard by Coup Attempt" and Molly Moore and Joe Pichirallo, "Cheney," *Washington Post*, 6 October 1989.

[68] David Hoffman and William Branigin, "Key Queries Never Put to Bush," *Washington Post*, 7 October 1989.

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justice, but that did not mean the United States would support every coup against him.[69]

The official explanations for the U.S. inaction were quite confusing. The argument that Giroldi was no better than Noriega was particularly strange. Whom did the Bush administration think could or would strike against Noriega? The PDF leadership was brutal and corrupt, but Giroldi was relatively less corrupt than the others. If administration officials thought that he was unlikely to serve American interests in Panama, why then did they promise him assistance. And when the coup did occur, why did they give shelter to Giroldi's family and block certain roads?

American policy towards the Giroldi coup was chaotic and inconsistent. One of the main reasons for the confusion was a simultaneous change in two top military positions. Shortly before the coup, the JCS Chairman and the SOUTHCOM chief were replaced. On 30 September 1989, three days before the coup, General Maxwell Thurman replaced Woerner as SOUTHCOM chief. One day later, General Colin Powell took over the JCS chairmanship from Admiral Crowe. Crowe and Woerner opposed the use of American troops to solve the Noriega crisis.[70] Powell and Thurman were willing to use force under certain conditions, but felt that these conditions did not characterize the Giroldi coup.

Thurman suspected that Noriega was using Giroldi to set up a trap to undermine and destroy his credibility during his first days as SOUTHCOM Chief.[71] He knew Giroldi had been very loyal to Noriega, and he thought the coup operational plan was too simplistic with too many details left out.[72] In addition, the execution of the coup had been delayed twice. Thurman communicated his concerns to Powell, who reportedly said "getting rid of Noriega was something that had to be done on a U.S. timetable." Powell said he did not like the idea of "a half-baked coup with a half-baked coup leader."[73]

Powell wanted a coup with no direct American intervention, or at the most with some limited assistance such as blocking roads. He thought that if the United States decided to use force in Panama, the objective would have to change from merely capturing Noriega to destroying and replacing his entire regime.[74] Since Powell came to office only a few days before the coup, he did not have time to develop the idea and to persuade the president and the other branches of the national security bureaucracy to adopt it. The result was a highly confusing policy toward the coup.

The U.S. response to the Giroldi coup exposed a conceptual confusion in the administration's policy toward Noriega. Powell and Thurman adopted stra-

[69] David Hoffman, "Bush Attacks Critics of Response to Coup," *Washington Post*, 14 October 1989.
[70] Robinson, *Intervention or Neglect*, 126.
[71] Woodward, *The Commanders*, 120; Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 199.
[72] Donnelly, *Operation Just Cause*, 67.
[73] Woodward, *The Commanders*, 121.
[74] Donnelly, *Operation Just Cause*, 66; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 190.

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tegic and tactical concepts that determined their interpretations of the coup and consequently their recommendation not to intervene. These concepts may have distorted their judgment of the coup. During the coup, Thurman did not know what was happening inside PDF headquarters. He did not check the facts on the ground, which contradicted his earlier negative perceptions of the coup and Giroldi. Senior officials in Washington, who depended on him for information and recommendations, consequently also did not know what was really happening.[75]

The U.S. response to the coup also dramatically revealed an enormous gap between Bush's rhetoric and action. In the eyes of the public, Giroldi had created an opportunity to remove Noriega that Bush had failed to seize. Despite his public defense of the inaction, Bush was clearly dissatisfied with the information and policy recommendations given to him during the coup. He reportedly said "amateur hour is over" and instructed his aides to review the handling of the crisis and to prepare better for the next challenge.[76] Indeed, this was an appropriate instruction, for it did not take long for a new challenge to emerge.

American Military Intervention

At the end of 1989, the Noriega crisis assumed larger and more critical proportions. The public wanted Bush to fulfill his campaign promise to combat drugs. In his first nationally televised speech from the White House, delivered on 5 September 1989, Bush said: "All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs" and called the drug problem "the toughest domestic challenge we've faced in decades."[77] The controversial Giroldi coup occurred just a month later.

Despite the failure of the Giroldi coup, Bush continued to encourage this option through a new covert operation. This time, however, he wanted a change in the operational rules. American covert operations against individuals were limited by an executive order banning U.S. government involvement in assassinations.[78] In October 1989, after the failure of the Giroldi coup, Bush determined that planning an assassination would still be prohibited, but U.S. officials would not be prosecuted if a coup accidentally caused the death of the coup target. Bush then authorized Panama 5, a new covert operation to topple Noriega through another PDF coup. The CIA received a budget of $3 million and was granted greater freedom to use force, although it was still prohibited from directly assassinating Noriega.[79] However, Panama 5 was not implemented, because it was

[75] Terry Deibel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991): 19.

[76] Woodward, *The Commanders*, 128.

[77] George Bush, "National Drug Control Strategy," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, vol. lv, no. 24 (1989): 738–740.

[78] Executive Order 12333 of the U.S. Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, *46 Federal Register*, 59941. Also see Mark Sullivan, "Panama: U.S. Policy After the May 1989 Elections," CRS Issue Brief IB89106 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1989), 12.

[79] See Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 195; Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 221.

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leaked to the media and articles about it were published in the middle of November.[80]

Noriega continued to provoke the United States and particularly to harass the American armed forces in Panama. On 15 December 1989, the Panamanian National assembly appointed Noriega chief of the government and "maximum leader of national liberation." The assembly also declared Panama to be in a state of war with the United States. The departure of Noriega seemed to be delayed indefinitely. After the Giroldi fiasco, a PDF coup was unlikely, and Panamanians were tired and weak.

The United States interpreted the declaration of war as a license to harass Americans. Indeed, in the following days, there were several serious incidents between the PDF and the U.S. forces in Panama.[81] On 15 December, PDF soldiers stopped a U.S. military patrol car and held the police officer at gunpoint. On the next day, they fired at an American vehicle in a checkpoint and killed Marine Corps Lieutenant Robert Paz. A Navy lieutenant and his wife who witnessed the shooting were arrested and beaten. The woman was also sexually assaulted. In a separate incident, other U.S. soldiers were detained at the airport and their weapons were taken. One day later, on the morning of 17 December, a U.S. officer shot a PDF policeman, thinking the Panamanian was reaching for his weapon.

Noriega's continuing rule in Panama and the new provocations created a personal problem for Bush, because they validated his wimp image. He used tough language against Noriega and made him the number one public enemy of the United States. Still it appeared that Bush was doing little to force him out of office. The gap between words and actions became too wide and Bush's own credibility was put on the line. This came at the worst possible time for him. The international system was on the verge of a major structural transformation. The Soviet Union was already disintegrating, and the United States was about to become the sole remaining superpower. If the United States could not handle a low-level dictator in a country where it maintained bases and large forces, how would it be able to deal with far more serious international challenges? The stakes were high for Bush in Panama: the issue was no longer just Noriega, but Bush's ability to conduct the war on drugs, to promote democracy in Latin America, and to lead world affairs.

In a crucial policy meeting held on 17 December 1989, Bush asked his principal advisers if a limited snatching operation would be sufficient.[82] Powell advocated a large scale intervention whose goal would be to destroy the PDF and the entire Noriega regime and not just the capture of Noriega. His rationale was that it could be difficult to find Noriega and arrest him at the beginning of

[80] See, for example, the report published in the *Washington Post*, 17 November 1989.

[81] Donnelly, *Operation Just Cause*, 94–97; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 198–199.

[82] Woodward, *The Commanders*, 167–171; Donnelly, *Operation Just Cause*, 98–99; Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, 228–233.

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the operation, but destroying the PDF would ensure Noriega's capture. Powell also thought that the PDF's destruction would be required to establish democracy in Panama. Bush agreed and approved the plan for large-scale military intervention in Panama.

Conclusions

Noriega's conflict with the United States escalated from one crisis to another, and each crisis ended with an actual or symbolic victory for him. Each victory strengthened his position inside Panama and motivated him to challenge the United States even further. Following each victory, the United States had to use tougher measures, ending with the most extreme one of military intervention. The United States continually redefined the Noriega problem, which finally became an issue larger than just Noriega and Panama. At stake was Bush's image as a weak president, his ability to take the lead in world affairs and to fulfill his campaign promise to combat drug abuse in the United States. During the first crisis, the Reagan administration considered Noriega's contributions valuable enough to override any liabilities. The policy was to pressure him to modify his behavior through persuasion and warnings. After the indictments in Florida, however, the United States wanted to remove Noriega from his powerful position while keeping his PDF-controlled regime intact. But Bush's decision to use force, which entailed greater political and economic costs, again changed the U.S. objectives in Panama. The new goals were to remove Noriega from power, destroy his regime, and establish democracy in the country.

Initially, the United States cultivated a relationship with an unscrupulous leader in the name of a cause ostensibly larger than his liabilities. The greater cause was helping the contras overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. But by employing Noriega, the United States compromised the long-term, more fundamental American interests of stability, security, human rights, and democracy in Panama. U.S. officials ignored Noriega's criminal activities and for a long period of time let him believe he would be protected from prosecution and retaliation. Noriega thought that only a few State Department officials wanted him removed from power, and he considered his allies in the intelligence and the national security establishments more influential than the diplomats. It was difficult for both Noriega and his supporters to change their perceptions of each other. Noriega's supporters in Washington were slow to understand his growing threat to U.S. interests, and Noriega failed to notice the transformation of his status from an ally to an enemy.

Bureaucratic infighting and mixed signals reinforced Noriega's misperceptions. This fighting, particularly inside the White House and between the State Department, CIA and DOD, was often leaked to the press and received wide attention. The internal feuds were responsible for many of the confusing signals. Reagan was unable to prevent the competing branches of his administration from supporting different strategies toward Noriega, who assumed the split would

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prevent the administration from using extreme measures against him, especially the use of force. The split in Congress and congressional disagreements with the White House also reinforced Noriega's misperceptions.

U.S. policies and threats in the Noriega crisis lacked credibility, which was one of the major factors in the escalation that led to the U.S. invasion. The United States preferred a Panamanian solution to the Noriega problem—a PDF coup or a popular uprising. American officials, including Bush, encouraged PDF officers and the people to remove Noriega, implying that the United States would help the Panamanians once they initiated such an action. But when the Giroldi coup took place, the United States did very little to help. Similarly, when Noriega brutally suppressed public demonstrations, the United States did very little to support the people.

On several occasions the United States dispatched forces to Panama and conducted military exercises. The main purpose of these actions was to send Noriega a message. However, in the absence of true intention to use force against Noriega, these actions only reenforced Noriega's belief that the United States was bluffing. The growing gap between the tough rhetoric and the meager action exposed the Bush administration to charges of weakness and impotence, which eventually contributed to Bush's decision to use force.

Noriega negotiated several times with various American and OAS officials. These officials assumed that Noriega was willing to resign if he was offered appropriate incentives. It is also probable that he never intended to step down regardless of the incentives and that he was just using the negotiations to play for time and to further embarrass the United States. Resignation could have meant death for him. Out of power, he could have become a target for drug-lords and other criminals whom he had double-crossed over the years. This may have been why he rejected all the deals offered to him. American policy makers should have examined realistically the potential to achieve an agreement through negotiations and revised their strategy accordingly.

The way in which the United States handled the Noriega affair was not an isolated case in how the United States has managed international crises in recent years. Several critical issues and mistakes made in this confrontation reappeared in subsequent international crises, most noticeably in the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis and war.[83] Like Noriega, Iraq's Saddam Hussein did not believe the United States

[83] For sources on the Gulf War, see Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Orbis* (Winter 1993): 123–134; Woodward, *The Commanders*, Part Two; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991* (London: Faber and Faber, 1993); Joseph Nye, Jr. and Roger Smith, eds., *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1992); U.S. News and World Report, *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Times Books, 1992); Stephen Graubard, *Mr. Bush's War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992); Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992); Elaine Sciolino, *The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis* (New York: John Wiley, 1991); David Scheffer, "Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order" in Louis Henkin, et al., *Right versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 109–172.

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would use force against him. Like Noriega, he received mixed and confusing messages from the United States, which led him to assume that he could take aggressive actions against the Iraqi opposition and neighboring states without risking a major confrontation with the United States. Indeed, as in the Noriega case, Washington considered Saddam a valuable ally serving a larger cause, in this case the battle against Iran's effort to spread Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East.

Saddam attacked Teheran with Scud missiles in 1988, used chemical weapons against the Kurds, threatened Israel with the same weapons, and then threatened Kuwait before he invaded the country in 1990. The U.S. response was weak and confined to a few critical statements. Before the invasion, some congressional leaders recommended that the Bush administration impose sanctions against Saddam. Bush not only opposed this recommendation but even went on to provide Iraq with substantial loan guarantees and access to advanced technology. This policy might have encouraged Saddam to believe that the United States would issue verbal denunciations of the invasion but would not use force to roll back the Iraqi forces. Following the invasion, the Bush administration used the same means to deal with Saddam that it had employed against Noriega, including dispatching forces, imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions, negotiating with Saddam's representatives, and calling upon the Iraqi army and people to rebel against Saddam. But just as in the Noriega case, all these means failed to resolve the crisis peacefully.

After the damage of bureaucratic infighting and miscommunication was evident in the Panama and the Gulf crises, one would have expected American policy makers to have learned the appropriate lessons. Also, after two decisive and highly publicized demonstrations of American determination to use force against challenging dictators, leaders in conflict areas such as Bosnia and Somalia were expected to take U.S. threats of intervention more seriously. Yet, neither American policy makers nor the dictators were able to draw the proper lessons.

In the case of Bosnia, the White House, the military, and Congress all had different attitudes towards U.S. military intervention.[84] The military opposed any intervention in the Bosnian civil war, because it feared an endless large-scale ground war in a difficult mountainous terrain. Congress was split on this issue, while President Bill Clinton made a strong statement warning the Serbians that if they did not stop the systematic shelling of cities and towns, the United States would intervene to halt the fighting. Serbian leaders Radovan Karadzić and Slobodan Milošević were aware of the contradicting messages coming from Washington, which reenforced their belief that despite its rhetoric, the United States would not use force in Bosnia. The aggressors in Bosnia have felt free to continue

[84] On the crisis in Bosnia, see William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 97–109; Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia; New War, Old Hatreds," *Foreign Policy* 91 (Summer 1993): 3–23; Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Fall 1992): 79–98; James Goodby, "Peacekeeping in the New Europe," *Washington Quarterly* 15 (September 1992): 153–171.

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their indiscriminate attacks on noncombatants, and military intervention might still be the only way to stop the fighting. As in the Noriega and Saddam crises, internal disagreements and confusing American messages led the Serbian leaders to ignore U.S. warnings.

In the case of Somalia, the United States, as well as the United Nations, sent confusing messages to clan leader Mohammed Aideed, who was fighting other clan leaders over control of Somalia. U.S. troops had originally been sent to Somalia in December 1992 to stop the civil war and protect supply routes to hunger stricken areas.[85] In May 1993 most U.S. troops were withdrawn except for 1,400 soldiers who remained under UN control. After this withdrawal, the United States sent mixed messages to Aideed, who was not sure whether the Clinton administration wanted him as a legitimate participant in Somali peace negotiations or whether it wanted him captured and his forces destroyed. Aideed felt threatened but thought he could attack American and other troops from UN command without triggering a major U.S. response. But like Noriega and Saddam, he miscalculated. In October 1993, Aideed attacked U.S. troops, killing seventeen American soldiers. Clinton then ordered a counterattack and sent thousands of American troops back to Somalia.

The United States tried hard to resolve the post cold war crises through peaceful means. However, persuasion, warnings, negotiations, sanctions, and threats, all failed to convince Noriega to resign or Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. These same means also failed to persuade Karadzić and Milošević to end the fighting in Bosnia, or Aideed to refrain from attacking U.S. forces in Somalia. Under certain circumstances, lengthy negotiations and moderate means may send the wrong signals to ruthless authoritarian leaders who play foreign policy games by their own rules. If the United States had delivered tougher and clearer messages early enough to Noriega, Saddam, and Aideed, it might have avoided using large-scale force against them, saving both lives and resources.*

[85] On the U.S. mission in Somalia, see Henry Kissinger, "Somalia: Reservations," *Washington Post*, 13 December 1992; Jonathan Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?" *Foreign Policy* 91 (Summer 1993): 138–154; Michael Elliott, "The Making of a Fiasco," *Newsweek*, 18 October 1993, 8–11; George Church, "Anatomy of a Disaster," *Time*, 18 October 1993, 40–50.

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Prescriptions for a New National Democracy

MICHAEL LIND

Americans tend to think of their history as one of unbroken continuity. The United States has been governed under the same federal constitution since the eighteenth century, and its borders have remained unchanged since the nineteenth century (with the exception of the admission to statehood of Alaska and Hawaii). This superficial continuity disguises the discontinuities between three successive American regimes or republics, each separated from its predecessor by a violent upheaval, each marked by a distinctive set of rules governing citizenship, race, and immigration. The First Republic of the United States, Anglo-America, lasted from the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1787-1789 until the Civil War. Its successor, Euro-America, coalesced in the aftermath of the Civil War and lasted until the Civil Rights Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. The present American regime, Multicultural America, was assembled in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Each republic of the United States to date has had its own political creed. The political creed of Anglo-America was federal republicanism; even before the Civil War inaugurated the Euro-American republic, this was giving way to federal democracy, as class-based restrictions on suffrage (at least among white men) were abolished. In Multicultural America, federal centralization has been combined with a cooptive system of racial preferences; in effect, territorial federalism has been overlaid by racial federalism. The idea of racial federalism is democracy *within* races, not democracy *across* races; its symbol is the racially gerrymandered majority-minority district.

The philosophy of liberal nationalism offers an alternative to the multicultural conception of American society. Liberal nationalists reject the multicultural idea of the United States as a federation of half a dozen biologically-defined ethnocultural groups in favor of a conception of the American community as a concrete

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historic nation engendered by cultural fusion and ethnic and racial amalgamation. If American nationality is defined by the use of American English and participation in a common vernacular culture, then most Americans of all races, with the exception of recent immigrants, are members of the transracial national majority.

What I call "national democracy" would be the political creed of a Fourth Republic of the United States based on the liberal-nationalist idea of American identity. National democracy has three elements: individual rights, equal voting power, and the social market. Realizing the ideal of national democracy in the United States would require a return to the original project of liberal integrationists of completely eliminating race as a legitimate category in American law and politics. It would require, as well, a genuine democratization of our money-dominated political system and a commitment to the kind of social democratic reforms that the color-blind integrationists of the 1960s envisioned as the next logical step after the eradication of formal white supremacy. In the Fourth American Republic, the nation-dividing mixture of racial preference, plutocratic politics, and free-market capitalism that defines the politics of Multicultural America would be replaced by a nation-uniting synthesis of color-blind individualism in civil rights, equal voting power, and social market capitalism.

Individual Rights

Every American republic to date has embodied its conception of the American nation (or nations) in civil rights law. In Anglo-America and Euro-America, to be a "real" American one had to be white, and the laws requiring or permitting racial segregation reflected this idea. Today's racial preference laws are based on two quite different notions; first, that America is a federation of five racial nations and second, that it is just and reasonable to discriminate against members of the "non-Hispanic white" category in the interests of the other four.

The liberal nationalist conception of American identity is completely at odds with this idea. Liberal nationalists reject not merely racial preferences, but the very definitions of the races themselves. The lines of culture and the lines of race do not coincide in the United States; and nationality, properly understood, is a matter of culture, not race. The division of humanity into three, or five, or sixteen "races" is an inherently arbitrary activity; in the United States, the arbitrary is joined by the absurd when dubious categories are linked to real government-enforced benefits and disabilities.

Racial labeling by the government must be ended, as soon as possible. The U.S. government should no longer give any official sanction to arbitrary color-coded identities—white, black, brown, yellow, red—that do not correspond to the way that Americans actually think about themselves. According to a recent study sponsored by the Ford Foundation, most "Hispanics" prefer to be identified by their country of origin—Mexico, Cuba, or Puerto Rico—rather than as "Hispanics" or "Latinos." The same survey revealed that English is the primary language for most U.S.-born Hispanics, and that Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and

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Cubans think better of "Anglos" than of other Hispanic national-origin groups. Most, furthermore, are indifferent to Latin America and oppose increased immigration.[1] The federal government should not make a bad situation worse by adding new official races (like the "multiracial" category that is promoted by some mixed-race Americans). Even less should the government substitute a linguistic-cultural criterion, distinguishing Trans-Americans of all races from culturally different but genetically related groups (though such a system would approximate reality better than our present official categories).

The time for racial classification schemes like the five-race pattern promulgated in 1977 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in Statistical Directive 15 is past. The color-blind liberals were right, in the early 1960s, to favor the complete elimination of government racial labels. The U.S. government should no more classify native-born American citizens as whites, blacks, Hispanics, or Asians, or for that matter as mixed-race, than it classified white Americans as Swedish- or Irish-Americans. There should no longer be an ominous-sounding Division of Racial Statistics at the Census Bureau. If people are to be labeled for record-keeping purposes, it should be solely on the basis of country of *personal* (not ancestral) national origin. For government record-keeping, there should be only two categories of U.S. citizens—native-born citizens, and naturalized immigrants (the two groups, of course, would have absolutely identical rights). Only naturalized Mexican-born immigrants to the United States would be described as Mexican-Americans. As far as the U.S. government is concerned, their children, born and raised in the United States, would be Americans.

The government should not be hostile to subcultural identities within the Trans-American nation, but it should exhibit a principled indifference toward them. If self-decribed Asian-Americans wish to perpetuate themselves as a distinct population by limiting marriage among themselves to Americans of Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Korean, and Malaysian descent, and by teaching their children a fabricated Sino-Indo-Filipino-Korean-Malaysian tradition, similar to the fake African-American and pan-Hispanic traditions, they are welcome to do so—but this should be a purely private matter, like the perpetuation of Polish- or Italian-American identities (and mythologies). Complete obliviousness to race is not necessary for national integration, merely the decline of powerful racial identities into "symbolic ethnicities," so that Americans eventually think of themselves as black or white or Asian in the same way that white Americans now think of themselves as Irish or Anglo or Polish. Conventionally defined race would be one of the facts people note about each other, like height and build, but it would have lost its social connotations and emotional valence. If this seems utopian, recall that only a few generations ago even thinkers on the left like Horace Kallen thought that the white "races" of America—the Germans, the Italians, the Irish—were immutable groups that would forever define the identities of individual Americans.

[1] "Latinos: Speaking in Their Own Voices," *News from the Ford Foundation*, 15 December 1992.

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It might be objected nonetheless that for many generations to come the public would continue thinking in terms of traditional racial distinctions, even if the government ceased labeling citizens by race. The argument from popular prejudice to government policy is unconvincing. Suppose that a majority of Americans were misguided enough to believe that Jews are a race. Should the pseudoracial category of Hispanics be joined by a pseudoracial category of Hebraics? In the nineteenth century, many thought that the Irish formed a distinctive Celtic race. Does the need to overcome the legacies of anti-Irish prejudice justify labeling Irish-Americans as Celts and putting Anglo-, German-, and Scandinavian-Americans together in the category of Teutons?

Four centuries of racial labeling are enough. Let the U.S. Census of 2000 A.D. be the first in American history that does not ask citizens to identify themselves by quasi-fictive categories of race.

The end of racial labeling should be accompanied by the abolition of all racial preference policies, whether carried out by the government or private-sector institutions. Subnational racial group entitlements should be replaced by individual rights and entitlements that are the same for all members of the American citizenry, no matter what their ancestries. The civil rights laws of the Fourth Republic of the United States should be founded on a principle rejected by the drafters of the first three American republics: absolutely color-blind law.

In his dissent in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), the case that legitimated Jim Crow segregation, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan summarized the color-blind ideal of individual rights:

> There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are created equal before the law. The law regards man as man and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.

Three quarters of a century later, another justice, William O. Douglas (one of the most influential liberals ever to sit on the Court, it should be noted) denounced the emerging system of racial preferences in his dissent in *Defunis v. Odegaard* (1974) as passionately as Harlan had denounced the emerging system of Jim Crow in his day:

> The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy some theory of how society ought to be organized. The purpose of [the university] cannot be to produce Black lawyers for Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, and Irish lawyers for the Irish. . . . A segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result despite contrary intentions.

The color-blind ideal was repudiated by the governing class in both Euro-America and Multicultural America. Let Trans-America be the first republic of the United States in which a citizen's race has no legal consequences whatsoever.

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All racial preference programs should be consigned to the junkyard of history. Racial gerrymandering to produce "majority-minority" districts by carving up electorates that happen to be the wrong color should be outlawed. All minority set-asides should be eliminated. Busing in order to achieve racial balance should be forbidden by law. Giving preference to individuals on the basis of their race in hiring, promotion, or college admissions, for whatever purpose, should be banned by federal law. Colleges and universities should be forced to end scholarships limited to members of one race, on pain of losing their federal tax-exempt status and federal funding and being subject to antidiscrimination suits. The present amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that force the racial gerrymandering of districts are scheduled to expire, unless renewed, in 2007. That year should be set as the date by which all race-conscious provisions of American law and public policy are repealed or allowed to lapse. Whether racial preference is eliminated by federal law or by a constitutional amendment is a matter of expedience. However it goes, it must go.

Without racial quotas, some ask, how will poor black and Hispanic Americans ever move out of poverty? And how will upwardly mobile middle-class and upper-middle-class nonwhites be able to overcome the almost invisible but strong and resilient webs of nepotism and inherited advantage that link members of the white overclass?

The social mobility of many blacks and Hispanic Americans is impeded by three quite different kinds of obstacles—active racism, barriers to entry in the economy and politics, and acquired disabilities. No single strategy is appropriate for all three obstacles. Active racism against individuals must be neutralized by rigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination law. Barriers to entry in the economy and politics have to be dismantled by sweeping legislative reforms of how business is done and how elections are carried out in the United States. Acquired disabilities—by which I mean the very real culture of poverty that equips many children of the ghetto and barrio with attitudes making them unfit for the mainstream, workaday community—are the most difficult, because the most subtle, of all obstacles. To the solution of all these problems, racial preference is irrelevant.

A serious attempt to integrate American society, would consist of coordinate efforts in different spheres—the judicial (antidiscrimination law), the political (legislative reform of education, the professions, electoral methods, and government structures) and the economic (targeted programs to liberate the hereditary poor, as well as broader programs like universal health care and public education benefiting all wage-earning Americans).

Under a new, color-blind legal regime of individual rights, there would continue to be redress in the courts for individuals who suffer as individuals from actual discrimination. The abolition of government racial labeling need not affect antidiscrimination law at all; it is already against the law for employers to discriminate against people on the basis of religion, even though employers are not required to keep records of the religious status of their employees. However, in all cases where racial discrimination has been proven redress should be victim-

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specific, not collective. If an employer discriminates against a black American in promotion, then only the victim of the discrimination should be entitled to redress. The employer should not be required to go beyond ceasing to discriminate against blacks to promising to promote other blacks in some arbitrary quota fixed by a judge, just as an employer who discriminates against one Catholic should not be compelled to hire other Catholics according to some mathematical formula. Such collective justice is dehumanizing. It assumes that all members of a particular group of the population are interchangeable, identical units.

The abolition of racial preference, then, need not affect antidiscrimination law at all. Indeed, even as group preferences are being abolished, the scope of individualistic antidiscrimination law should be expanded to protect (not favor) new categories of individuals. To name one example, the federal government should strike down all remaining sodomy laws and prohibit public or private discrimination against homosexuals in all areas outside of family law (a complex area where even the rights of heterosexual citizens are far from absolute or simple). It should be against the law to refuse to hire, or to fire, or to refuse to rent to any American citizen on the basis of sexual orientation.

Not only "liberal" sexual privacy rights, but "conservative" property rights should be extended by federal legislation, too—when it comes to important matters, property owners and businesses should not be at the mercy of local governments and state legislatures. As the United States has increasingly become a single continental society, rather than a confederation of regional subsocieties, the argument in favor of permitting extreme variation in basic individual rights from state to state is weaker then ever. Why should restrictions on abortion vary between New York and Nevada? Why should a company have to deal with entirely different rules for tax assessment in Florida and Maine? Why should a homosexual employee of IBM be considered a law-abiding citizen in Massachusetts and a felon in Alabama, to which he is transferred by the corporation he works for? What is the point of national citizenship at all, if one's most basic personal rights—not just those touching on sex and marriage and parenthood, but also property rights—depends on the territorial jurisdiction in which one happens, perhaps temporarily, to live?

The argument that state legislatures are closer to the people begs the question—*which* people? When it comes to one's individual rights as a citizen, the only relevant population is the American nation as a whole. Perhaps the conclusion would be different if the states corresponded to actual social units, like the German-, French-, Italian- and Romansch-speaking cantons in Switzerland. Most state lines, however, are purely arbitrary, cutting across more natural geographic, cultural, and economic regions. State populations are not genuine moral communities. There is no "Louisiana" morality, no "Massachusetts" morality. A social conservative in Louisiana has more in common with a social conservative in Massachusetts than with a libertarian who happens to be a fellow citizen of Louisiana.

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No one, in proposing a constitution for new democracies today—say, in Eastern Europe—would be demented enough to propose that the basic sexual and property rights of citizens should depend on the accident of their residence in a particular state or province. Some forms of federalism are justifiable, but civil rights federalism is an evil anachronism. The more basic the right, the more important that it be protected by the national government from bigoted or misguided local majorities that are national minorities. The twentieth century has seen a gradual nationalization of civil rights in the United States. In the twenty-first century, the process should be completed. Congress, with the help of the federal judiciary, should preempt and codify state legislation in many areas, imposing uniform basic rights laws in place of fifty separate state legal codes, in matters of racial equality, sexual privacy, family law, and the rights of property and business. The basic individual rights of all American citizens should be exactly the same, everywhere on American soil.

Defenders of group preferences often point out that these have always existed in the United States; for generations, civil and political rights were limited to white men. The evolution of notions of citizenship, however, was in the direction of universal individual rights, before the tragic perversion of the color-blind Civil Rights Revolution into a racial and gender preference revolution. Insofar as there is not a single consequence of white-supremacist racial preference that cannot be best addressed by color-blind socioeconomic reforms of the kind I describe later, we are justified in trying to make Justice Harlan's dissent the new consensus: *There is no caste here.*

Equal Voting Power

After color-blind individual rights, the ideal of equal voting power is the second element of the liberal nationalist creed of national democracy. Equal voting power means more than formal equality in voting for candidates who have been preselected by a small group of wealthy donors. It means the substantive realization of the one-person, one-vote ideal. In the United States, realizing this ideal requires success in three major reforms: the separation of check and state, the promotion of multiparty democracy, and the transformation of the malapportioned federal Senate into a new, national Senate.

Separation of Check and State

Today's U.S. government is democratic in form but plutocratic in substance. The American campaign finance system could not work better if it had been deliberately designed to ensure government of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich. In a misguided 1976 decision, *Buckley v. Valeo*, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not limit spending by rich Americans promoting their own candidacies. This decision was to the equalization of voting power what *Dred Scott* was to abolitionism. In *The Yale Law Review*, Jamin Raskin and John

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Boniface have argued that political candidates in the United States must win a "wealth primary." Candidates without enormous amounts of money, either from their own fortunes or from rich individuals and special interest groups, cannot hope to win party primaries—much less general elections. Indeed, the *Buckley* decision is one reason why more than half of the members of the Senate today are millionaires.[2] The bias toward the rich embodied in American campaign finance practices makes a mockery of America's democratic ideals. Genuine democracy requires not only juridical equality among races when it comes to individual rights, but also political equality among the different socioeconomic classes of citizens.

It is time to build a wall of separation between check and state. Curing the disease of plutocratic politics requires a correct diagnosis of its cause: the costs of political advertising. The basic problem is that special interests buy access and favors by donating the money needed for expensive political advertising in the media. Elaborate schemes governing the flow of money do nothing to address the central problem: paid political advertising. Instead of devising unworkable limits on campaign financing that leave the basic system intact, we should cut the Gordian knot of campaign corruption by simply outlawing paid political advertising on behalf of any candidate for public office. The replacement of political advertising by free informational public service notices in the electronic and print media would level the playing field of politics and kill off an entire parasitic industry of media consultants and spin doctors.

An outright ban on paid political advertising and the imposition of free time requirements on the media are radical measures, but nothing less is necessary if we are to prevent our government from continuing to be sold to the highest bidders. The argument against strict public regulation of money in politics is based on a false analogy between free spending and free speech protected under the First Amendment. The analogy is false, because limits on campaign finance do not address the *content* of speech—only its volume, as it were. It is not an infringement on free speech to say that, in a large public auditorium, Douglas will not be allowed to use a microphone unless Lincoln can as well.

Indeed, the separation of check and state might permit us to re-create, in modern conditions, something like the American democracy of a century ago. When Illinois voters had to choose between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas, they were not treated to different thirty-second spots—an "image" commercial for Lincoln showing a slave in chains and then cutting to a blurry, idealized log cabin, an "attack" commercial by Douglas showing quotes from Lincoln opposing the Civil War, taken out of context to make him look like a traitor. Instead, nineteenth-century Illinois voters could see Lincoln and Douglas debate for several hours. Today, television technology permits such debates without requiring candidates to travel from town to town. Our televised public debates, sponsored by nonpartisan bodies like the League of Women Voters, represent

[2] E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Democracy or Plutocracy," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1994.

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the best part of our campaign system; the paid political advertisements are the worst. The advertisements should go, the debates remain.

Campaign finance reform is not properly described as a free speech issue at all; it is, first and foremost, a civil rights issue. The progressive exclusion of monetary advantage from the civic sphere, and its confinement to the marketplace, is one of the clearest signs of political progress. When the ideal of popular democracy has triumphed over plutocratic democracy, future generations will look back on the practice of buying access and votes from politicians by means of campaign contributions with the same amazement, horror, and disgust with which we regard the poll tax, the selling of exemptions from the draft to the sons of wealthy families during the height of the Civil War, or the college-student exemption to the Vietnam draft. Today progress means, in the words of E. J. Dionne, making sure "that the votes of majorities matter more than the dollars of minorities."[3]

Multiparty Democracy

The United States is one of the few democracies in the world that retains the archaic plurality system for electing legislators. Under the plurality system—sometimes known as "first past the post" or "winner take all"—a representative is elected by a plurality of voters in a single district. The drawbacks of this system are obvious. A candidate who gets 40 percent of the vote, as long as he gets more votes than any other candidate, can be elected—even though 60 percent of the voters voted against him. In what sense is that 60 percent majority represented by the candidate thus elected? Even worse, the plurality system encourages a two-party monopoly, because votes for third parties are wasted. Finally, plurality systems reward the gerrymandering of single-member districts to give parties (or, in the United States, particular racial groups) built-in advantages.

Proportional representation (PR) is free from these defects. In the most common form of PR, the party-list system, a country, or subunit like a state, county, or city, is divided into multimember districts. Several parties present lists of candidates within each multimember district. The voters vote for the parties, rather than the candidates. Seats are allocated among the parties, on the basis of the proportion they receive of the total vote.

The kinds of distortions that take place routinely in plurality systems are impossible in PR systems. Under a PR system, a party that wins 40 percent of the vote in a multimember district will win only 40 percent of the seats. PR encourages multiparty democracy, because it permits even small parties to elect representatives (in order to discourage tiny, extremist parties, most democracies with PR now require that parties pass a minimum threshold of the total vote; in Germany, extremist parties have been checked by a 5 percent threshold). PR also reduces the incentives to engage in partisan or racial gerrymandering. Under

[3] Ibid.

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PR, in multimember districts every significant party or voting bloc will be represented more or less in proportion to its strength in the entire electorate, regardless of how the district lines are drawn. Only in "winner-take-all" plurality systems, in which the voters in an area of several blocks may make the difference between losing everything and winning everything by a few percentage points, is there an incentive to gerrymander.

In the United States, proportional representation would permit us to do away with both partisan and racial gerrymandering, while, at the same time, increasing the political options (as new parties formed) and making it easier for members of minority groups—not only racial, but religious and cultural—to elect at least one member of multimember delegations. PR achieves the goal of the Voting Rights Act— greater voting power for black and Hispanic Americans—but by color-blind, nonintrusive means that benefit members of numerical minorities in general. Under PR, black and Hispanic voters would find it much easier to elect black and Hispanic candidates, if they chose. They would not, however, be maneuvered into such a choice by being electorally ghettoized in safe minority-majority districts. They would not have to live in minority neighborhoods in order to enjoy a greater range of options, and to wield greater individual power at the polls.

PR could be easily adopted for city councils, county commissions, and state legislatures simply by changes in state law. Furthermore, although many people believe mistakenly that winner-take-all plurality elections and their inevitable result, the two-party monopoly, are enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, nothing more than an act of Congress would be required to establish the election of members of the House of Representatives by PR.[4]

Our archaic first-past-the-post plurality electoral system preserves a two-party monopoly rejected by a growing number of alienated American voters, forces many Americans to waste their votes, and effectively disfranchises substantial numerical minorities. There are practically no arguments in its favor, other than the fact that it is more than two hundred years old. The Founding Fathers, however, did not so much choose the plurality method as take it for granted. They were not able to consider the merits of proportional representation as an electoral method, because it had not been invented yet. Noting that "the highly cultivated members of the community" find it difficult to be elected under a winner-take-all plurality system, John Stuart Mill wrote, "Had a plan like Mr. Hare's [for proportional representation] by good fortune suggested itself to the enlightened and patriotic founders of the American Republic, the Federal and

[4] Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; *but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,* except as to the Places of chusing Senators" (Emphasis added.) Congress, then, has the power to preempt all state electoral laws governing the election of members of the House and to mandate a system of multimember districts and PR. For a more detailed discussion of how PR elections to the U.S. Congress might work, see Michael Lind, "A Radical Plan to Change American Politics," *The Atlantic,* August 1992, 73–83.

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State Assemblies would have contained many of these distinguished men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest reproach and one of its most formidable evils." The Founding Fathers did not know of alternatives to the inherited electoral system. We do not have that excuse.

The National Senate

It would be relatively easy to begin electing representatives by PR from new multimember districts in the fifty states. PR would not work for elections to the U.S. Senate, as it is now designed. All the more reason, then, to redesign the U.S. Senate.

The Senate has been the most defective branch of American government. In the Anglo-American republic, the Southern planter class, thanks to the informal compromise embodied in the sectional balance between slave states and free states, was able to exaggerate its political power. Had there been no Senate, or had the Senate been elected on the basis of population, slavery probably would have been abolished in the United States by the northern majority much sooner. In late-nineteenth-century Euro-America, the Senate became the favorite branch of government of the new industrial plutocracy. The only major structural change in the Constitution in more than two centuries was that effected by the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the direct election of senators, who had formerly been elected by state legislatures whose members auctioned off senatorial seats to corporations and trusts. The Seventeenth Amendment did not alter the malapportionment built into the Senate; it merely gave small-state populations, instead of small-state legislatures, an unfair weighted vote in federal policy making.

That weighted vote grows heavier with every passing year. Today, thanks to Senate malapportionment, 16 percent of the nation can elect half the Senate—and thwart the senators representing the 84 percent of the public who live in the twenty-five most populous states.[5] Since most population growth, as a result of replacement and immigration, is taking place in a few populous states, the disparity can only grow over time. Will 10 percent of the public elect half the Senate in 2010? 5 percent in 2020? 2 percent in 2050? If the Constitution is not amended, by the middle of the twenty-first century a tiny, almost exclusively white minority of the U.S. population, living in the largely empty states of the continental interior, may control a majority of the seats in the Senate. As it happens, small-state whites tend to be political allies of reactionary members of the white overclass in the large states. A few generations from now, conservative small-state whites may use their weighted vote to consistently block every program beneficial to the mixed-race or nonwhite majority, most of whose members will live in a few populous coastal states like California, Texas, and New York. This trend is already ominously apparent, in the way that public-spending programs that would benefit nonwhites and whites alike in the populous states are routinely killed by

[5] Tom Geoghegan, "The Infernal Senate," *The New Republic*, 21 November 1994, 17–23.

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small-state senators in the Senate, after having been passed by the more responsive and representative House.

How are black and Hispanic Americans—to say nothing of big-state whites—going to react, when it becomes evident that the policies they favor are being consistently thwarted by senators representing a tiny number of mountain and prairie state whites? If the U.S. Congress is perceived to be held in a choke hold by a shrinking sliver of a white population that is itself shrinking, pressures will grow for the presidency or the courts to circumvent a deadlocked Congress altogether and take urgent policy-making tasks into their own hands. That way lies presidential dictatorship or government by judiciary.

Sooner or later, in some manner, Senate malapportionment must be eliminated. The best approach would be to sever the Senate from the states altogether. That senators represent the interests of state constituencies is already a fiction, inasmuch as most senators today depend more on out-of-state campaign contributions than on money raised at home. Our corrupt campaign finance system has already, in effect, nationalized the Senate. Let us formally nationalize it, clean it up, and, while we are at it, democratize it. Let senators be elected by proportional representation, in national elections, and serve four years, concurrent with the president. Members of the House, elected from small multimember districts by PR, would adequately represent local interests; senators, with their national constituencies, would tend to be more concerned with the nation as a whole.

These reforms may sound radical. In fact, they are conservative. Their purpose is to conserve the essence of our constitutional system, by eliminating the factors—campaign finance abuses, unfair electoral methods, and malapportionment—that are alienating an ever-growing number of Americans from the political process. In the words of Tennyson, "That man's the true conservative/Who lops the moulder'd branch away." The legitimacy of the United States Congress is at an all-time low. If it is not restored by timely reforms that restore the confidence of the American people in the institution, people will turn away from Congress and look for leadership elsewhere—in a quasi-dictatorial presidency; even, if they despair enough, in a military strongman. If the historic succession of Republics of the United States is not to be replaced by a succession of pseudo-democratic executive regimes—Protectorates, Directories, Consulates, Empires—we must, sooner rather than later, realize the ideal of equal voting power: not one dollar/one vote, nor one acre/one vote, but one citizen/one vote.

The Social Market Contract

Social mobility in twenty-first century America will require good jobs for unskilled and low-skilled Americans at good wages with good benefits. All of this, in turn, requires a new social contract—the social market contract—between the national government, employers, and workers, to replace the New Deal system, which has been breaking down since the 1960s. A post-New Deal social market contract must promote high wages for American workers without bankrupting

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either employers or the government, or imposing excessive rigidity in the labor market.

A new social market contract might have the following features. Benefits which are now linked to employment and paid out of payroll taxes, like Social Security and most health care, should be completely severed from any connection with a particular job (though a requirement of work of some kind should be enforced to prevent the development of a class of idle parasites). Employer mandates would be replaced by direct government-to-citizen transactions, financed out of progressive income taxes and consumption taxes (from which staples would be excluded). Higher wages could be encouraged, by ending the influx of unskilled immigrant labor, by passing laws against reliance on temporary workers instead of full-time employees, by discouraging teens from working (they should be studying), and by encouraging caregivers, male or female, to leave the job market or enter it only part-time in order to care for children or aged relatives.

The most promising way to quickly raise wages at the bottom of the income ladder in the United States is to restrict immigration. In the furor over California's Proposition 187, much of the overclass press has attempted to smear all proponents of immigration restriction as immigrant-bashing nativists. No doubt prejudice against the new immigrants—against Hispanic immigrants, in particular—accounts for opposition to immigration on the part of some Americans. Concern about high levels of immigration, however, cannot in itself be dismissed as racism. A sober look at the numbers might be enough to make a restrictionist of the most humanitarian liberal.

Thanks to ever-growing legal immigration, the U.S. Census Bureau has revised its estimate of annual immigration upward *by 50 percent* to 880,000 per year, and now predicts growth from 252 million in 1991 to 383 million in 2050. Largely as a result of the post-1965 immigration wave, the population in 2050 is projected to be 82 million greater than it would have been if immigration had ended in 1991. The U.S. rate of 1.1 percent per year, though it sounds low, is enough to double the U.S. population in sixty-four years.[6]

In addition to enlarging the U.S. population much more rapidly than may be desirable, mass immigration, by increasing the availability of low-wage labor, may have retarded the progress of automation in the United States by making it cheaper for corporations to hire immigrant workers rather than invest in labor-saving technology. Even worse, the continual enlargement of the low-wage labor pool in the United States by immigration since the 1960s is probably one of the reasons that wages have stagnated or declined at the bottom of the American class system. Cutting off the competition of native-born or naturalized Americans with new immigrants for jobs could have salutary effects for the bottom half of the American population. Although the ethnic basis of early-twentieth-century U.S. immigration restrictions was objectionable, the overall effects of the restric-

[6] Virginia D. Abernethy, *Population Politics* (New York: Plenum Press, 1993), 259–261.

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tion of immigration in the 1920s were positive. Immigration restriction helped black Americans by opening up good entry-level jobs that would otherwise have gone to newly arrived Europeans. The postwar American economic boom could hardly have occurred if immigration levels had continued at their turn-of-the-century levels, with impoverished and illiterate Europeans crowding into the big cities, and employers using immigrants in sweat-shops to evade labor laws and break American unions. If immigration restriction had these beneficial effects once, why not once again?

The restriction of legal immigration should not be limited to low-wage workers who compete with the native-born poor and working poor for a limited number of unskilled jobs. The United States has benefited, and one hopes will always benefit, from a moderate influx of foreign scientists, scholars, journalists, and other educated immigrants. Furthermore, no immigration policy that turns away people in danger of genocide would be acceptable. Even so, there must be some limit to the number of skilled immigrants who are admitted, if educated Americans, along with low-skilled Americans, are not to see their incomes dragged down. Today many college-educated Americans are being forced to settle for noncollege jobs. Since 1970, the proportion of college graduates taking jobs that do not require college degrees has doubled to 20 percent.[7] From 1990 to 2005 the growth of job openings for college graduates will diminish while the number of bachelor's degrees awarded grows.[8] When growing numbers of college-educated Americans cannot find work worthy of their training, why should they have to compete with skilled immigrants for a diminishing number of places in good universities and desirable jobs? If we must import well-educated foreigners to be scientists and engineers, clearly we are failing to equip native white, Hispanic, black, and Asian-Americans with the necessary skills or necessary attitudes. The East Asian countries managed to create first-rate science and engineering professionals by educating their own people, rather than by bringing in great numbers of Americans and Western Europeans; why can't we, too, raise up the bottom half of the population?

One can debate how much immigration should be reduced, in order to create a tight labor market, boost American wages, and increase opportunities for upward mobility. The best policy might be one of "zero net immigration"—limiting the number of legal immigrants to the number of people who voluntarily emigrate from the United States each year, around 200,000 (down from 7–800,000 today), and reducing the number of illegal immigrants to as near zero as possible.

One result of immigration restriction might be to encourage the flight of U.S. manufacturing abroad. If immigration restriction denied U.S. business access to an ever-growing pool of cheap, nonunionized labor within U.S. borders, more businesses might follow the precedent of transferring production abroad to countries where wages and benefits are kept low by inherited poverty, overpopulation,

[7] "Training Up America," *The Economist*, 15 January 1994.

[8] John Judis, "Why Your Wages Keep Falling," *The New Republic*, 14 February 1994, 29.

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or tyrannical governments that suppress workers. Immigration restriction therefore should be accompanied by checks upon the expatriation of American industry. A social tariff, in the amount of the difference between American and foreign wage rates, might deter American employers in some industries from responding to rising wages in a tight American labor market by transferring production abroad. Any price advantage that, say, Motorola gained by manufacturing in Malaysia rather than in California would be eliminated by the imposition of a social tariff on imports from Motorola's Malaysian factories. Since the same social tariffs would be imposed on all imports, American businesses would not be penalized in competing with foreign manufacturers seeking to sell to the American market.

Social tariffs imposed to deter the relocation of production by employers seeking to evade generous wage and labor laws need not wreck the world economy, if they are adopted by most or all of the advanced industrial democracies. For example, the United States, Canada, and the EC might create a common high-wage trading bloc—a common social market—with a common social tariff. American or German corporations transferring production to low-wage countries would be penalized, if they tried to export to the common social market. Within the common social market, however, trade barriers might be progressively eliminated, so that trade flows increased, say, between the United States and Germany. Unlike free trade between a First World and a Third World country, free trade between First World countries tends to be an unalloyed good, inasmuch as companies derive their advantages from superior quality, organization, or technology, rather than from a particular country's low wages or low regulatory standards. As a general rule, then, free trade should be encouraged between high-wage countries but trade between high-wage and low-wage countries should be regulated in order to prevent mobile transnational corporations from using the poverty of available workers in the latter to drive down wage and benefit levels in the former.

The most compelling argument for the adoption of a common social tariff by the high-wage industrial countries is the preservation of middle-class living standards in the First World. The goal of U.S. economic policy is to raise the living standards of ordinary Americans; whether the pursuit of high incomes for Americans happens to promote global welfare is a matter of secondary importance. A common social tariff, protecting a common social market, might, however, have an incidentally beneficial effect, insofar as it encouraged Third World countries to develop by creating well-paid workforces and large domestic markets, instead of by treating the poverty of their people as a resource in a never-ending competition to host offshore production facilities owned by American, European, and Japanese corporations. The common social tariff would not affect investment from the developed countries, as long as that investment was limited to transplant factories making goods for local consumption. While American investors would be discouraged from making computers in, say, India for the American market, they would be free to grow rich by investing in Indian factories producing for

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the local Indian market. The United States, Japan, and Germany developed on the basis of production for protected domestic markets, with the help of foreign investment. The claim of free-market globalists that the successful development by protectionism of the three leading capitalist countries of our day can never be repeated, and that Third World countries can only hope to develop by specializing in low-wage piecework for foreign-owned companies and foreign markets, finds no support in history.

The point is not to promote protectionism in the abstract against free trade in the abstract, but to promote pragmatism in trade and investment policy. We do not assume that a single tax policy is best, for all countries, at all levels of development, in all phases of world history; why should we assume that a single trade policy should be the *only* trade policy? Trade-building is like road-building; the dogma that we always need more roads, and it does not matter where they are or where they go, would be a poor guide to rational decisions about building a national infrastructure. We must be pragmatic and experimental in our national and multinational economic strategy, not guided by abstract rules that purport to be the best for all times and all places. *Realpolitik* in military and diplomatic strategy needs to be joined by a pragmatic policy of economic realism promoting the interests of the salaried majority in the United States and similar high-wage countries: *Realekonomik*.

The combination of immigration restriction with a social tariff, by dramatically reducing the effective labor pool for corporations selling goods and services in the United States, would tend to drive up the average American wage. Employers would have a choice between paying higher wages – thereby arresting the economic decline of the least fortunate Americans – or moving toward automation, something that, however disruptive in the short term, would promote the long-term evolution of the U.S. economy as a capital-intensive and technology-intensive rather than labor-intensive economy. The low-wage, low-investment strategy that American business has followed since the 1960s, a strategy made possible by a constantly renewed supply of cheap immigrant labor and low-wage overseas production sites, would be replaced by a high-wage, technology-intensive strategy. Robots in American factories, yes; immigrant workers in America and workers in American-owned or funded sweatshops abroad, no.

This would not be a Luddite strategy, because it would welcome, even encourage, the replacement of workers by machines. Automation is already destroying not only traditional blue-collar industrial jobs but "pink-collar" secretarial and clerical jobs. The high-wage strategy would accelerate this new version of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter called creative destruction. Within a few generations, thanks to automation, the number of Americans engaged in factory work and routine office work may be as small as the number engaged in agriculture. If handled properly, this transition from a labor-intensive industrial economy to an automated industrial economy could usher in a new age of widespread affluence.

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The potential for disaster, however, is high. America's ghettos are full of the children and grandchildren of rural Southern agricultural workers displaced by technology in the early twentieth century. The public housing estates of Europe and the shantytowns of Latin America, like the *favelas* of Brazil, are crowded by the white and mestizo urban underclasses similarly created by the dispossession of peasantries by mechanized agriculture. Prudent action by government will be required to prevent the decline of technologically obsolete blue-collar and pink-collar workforces into new hereditary urban or suburban underclasses composed of the alienated, the ignorant, and the unemployable.

Governmental redistribution of the gains from automation might take the form of increased spending on public services and amenities or subsidies to enable more people to obtain basic services and amenities in the private sector. The very distinction between the "public" and "private" sectors might become blurred, in a system of "voucher capitalism," in which citizens were given consumption vouchers not only for basic necessities like housing and transportation but for amenities like recreation and entertainment. Thanks to such consumption subsidies, the most important market for the services of middle-class workers would be other middle-class workers, not the wealthy few.

What would those middle-class service careers be? Many would be familiar in-person service jobs: teaching, nursing, cleaning, police and fire protection, janitorial work. Today these are poorly paying and low-status occupations. In a high-wage, high-tech economy, however, they might be transformed into respectable middle-class vocations, that not only command higher wages but demand higher skills. Tomorrow's nurses, police officers, and janitors may not be menial laborers; they may oversee complex robots and computers, which will perform many of the routine or degrading or dangerous tasks done by people today. Already, as "smart" or computer-controlled buildings become more common, the blue-collar "super" is giving way to a new breed of building superintendent or "resident manager" skilled in computer electronics as well as business and personal diplomacy.[9]

The War on Oligarchy

Will janitors be members of the solid, educated middle class in 2050? The idea seems strange today, but for the past few centuries formerly despised vocations have consistently moved upward in social status. Few people in 1850 could have imagined that despised mechanics like unionized auto workers would be the very model of middle American affluence in 1950, just as few in 1750 could have dreamed that merchants and lawyers – at that time the insecure, ridiculed members of the middle rung of an aristocratic social order – would be at the top of the status hierarchy in countries like the United States in 1850. Since the industrial

[9] Mervyn Rothstein, "Meet the New Super Super of the High-End Residence," *New York Times*, 25 September 1994.

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revolution, as if they were on an escalator, the lower rungs of society have consistently moved up, in affluence and status, with one era's lower class becoming the next era's middle class.

The corollary trend has been the disappearance, or at least the marginalization, of a series of upper classes. In the Euro-American world, the landowning elite gave way to a proprietary industrial bourgeoisie, which then gave way, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the dominant professional classes of managers, lawyers, and financiers. As James Burnham and others were realizing as early as the 1930s, modern industrial organization, with its separation of ownership and control, has created a class of managers of large economic enterprises who tend to fuse with accredited professionals in a managerial-professional elite. The term "new class" originally referred to this elite, before it was distorted by conservative polemicists. The contemporary credentialed managerial-professional elite will not be automatically or painlessly transformed or replaced by the mere operation of economic processes. That will take the equivalent, for the upper class, of the war on poverty—a war on oligarchy.

The war on oligarchy would be the class-war strategy on a post-Marxist egalitarianism. Post-Marxist egalitarians would recognize that in a managerial society the ownership of the means of production may take many forms: concentration in the hands of a few families or trusts; decentralized private ownership by vast numbers of small shareholders (say, through pension funds); even government ownershop (where enterprises are allowed to pursue profits in a more or less rational way). All of these different patterns of ownership are compatible with the same monopolization of the best positions in the managerial-professional elite by a hereditary or quasi-hereditary social class. If the United States government nationalized all of the banks tomorrow, *and that were the only reform,* the class backgrounds of bank officials would be utterly unchanged. CEOs and professionals would, at least nominally, be civil servants, but in this new socialist United States the children of the white overclass would still predominate in the higher reaches of the economic bureaucracy, and black and brown Americans would be concentrated disproportionately in the lower tiers.

Real radicalism is not compensating the losers of a crooked game, but rewriting the rules of the game itself, so that more people can play and so that there are more opportunities to score. The rules of the class game in America revolve primarily around professional licensing and education. In a country where control of the means of production is more important than ownership of them, and where access to that control depends on credentials, the *real* class war must take the form of struggles over credentialing.

James Fallows, among others, has proposed that the professions be disaggregated into small subfields, each of which would have lower (and less expensive) barriers to entry. Medicine need not be monopolized by M.D.s, if nurse-practitioners were permitted to write some simple prescriptions; the J.D., who now must have four years of undergraduate education and three years of law school in addition in most states, could be replaced by a variety of legal-services special-

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ists—say, conveyancers, who could make valid wills and trusts on the basis of an eight-month study course. A Ph.D., that nineteenth-century Germanic credential, would no longer be required for college teaching (much of which, anyway, is now done by underpaid graduate student teaching assistants). Brain surgeons, corporate lawyers, and distinguished academics would continue to meet high standards and command high fees, but much of what is now done by doctors and lawyers would be done by New Professionals, to the benefit of middle-class and working-class Americans (who would move into these newly multiplied trades) and of consumers of all classes (who would pay lower fees).

This is merely carrying the logic of capitalist rationalization of efficiency through the division of labor through to its conclusion. The professional generalist would continue to give way to the professional specialist. The legal profession would become the legal services industry, divided into dozens of specialized functions. Professional management would become management services. The professoriate would be replaced by the higher education services industry. The medical profession would give way to the medical services industry. In every case, subdivision would open up new jobs with lower entry requirements—that is, new opportunities for working-class and middle-class Americans.

A national debate over professional educational and licensing practices is long overdue. The federal government has no business trying to determine fair compensation for CEOs, lawyers, or doctors. It can, however, assume the task of professional regulation from the fifty state governments, and investigate and proscribe attempts by the great guilds of management, law, and medicine to artificially drive up salaries and fees by prevailing on state legislatures to write monopolistic guild regulations into law. What is more, the federal government has the right and the responsibility to determine not only what the requirements for entry into the professions should be, but how the professions are defined in the first place. A reform like dividing the Great Guilds of law, medicine, management, and the professoriate into dozens of modest vocations is the sort of thing that democratic legislatures are supposed to do. The professions, after all, are artificial creatures of statute; new professions can be formed from old ones and existing professions broken down with the stroke of a pen.

The final redoubt of oligarchy in the managerial-capitalist United States, after the great professions like law, management, medicine and the professoriate, is our caste-like educational system. Without diluting standards of intellectual excellence, the rules of the educational game, as well as the rules of professional accreditation, need to be rewritten to make social mobility easier in America—to the benefit not only of black, Hispanic, and Asian-Americans but of a majority of white Americans as well.

For generations, Americans have perceived the link between universal public education and social mobility. That link needs to be restored, by efforts that revitalize the public school system—for example, by equalizing funding for all public schools (a reform underway in a number of states) and imposing statewide and national standards to measure how much students actually learn. Experiments

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with vouchers and student choice might be worthwhile, as long as their purpose is to reinvigorate public education, not destroy it.

We should also give some though to turning higher education from a largely private luxury into a universal entitlement and a regulated public utility. The rationing of access to higher education by parental income and wealth—the chief means by which inherited money is converted into managerial-professional credentials—should be brought to an end. One way to achieve this goal might be the adoption, from some health care schemes, of a universal, single-payer system for higher education. Here is how it might work. Colleges and universities would be banned from accepting any payments from students or their parents except for government higher education vouchers, on pain of losing their federal tax-exempt status. All young adults in America would be entitled to a voucher, though the amounts would vary based on academic achievement, measured by achievement tests (which are less biased than IQ and aptitude tests) and other race-neutral and gender-neutral measures. Most Americans might receive two- or four-year vouchers; the top 10 or 20 percent, in terms of academic achievement, would get six- or eight-year vouchers. The vouchers would not be loans. They would be free of any obligation, except the obligation to adequately finish a course of study.

In order to prevent the costs of this new middle-class entitlement from spiraling out of control, the federal government would have to impose tuition caps on all colleges and universities, private or state, that accept the vouchers (and the tax-exempt status that comes with it). The tuition at Yale and Harvard would be exactly the same as the tuition at, say, the University of Nebraska—a few thousand a year. Would this tend to erase the difference between the expensive Ivy League schools and other colleges and universities? Naturally—and about time, too. The abolition of private financing of higher education, along with the outlawing of alumni preference, would force the Ivy League to abandon its historic role as a credentialing institution for a social oligarchy. The prestige of a college in the new system would depend on its attracting the brightest students, of all backgrounds, not on coaxing funds from rich alumni parents in return for warehousing their mediocre children for four years.

These suggestions seem radical now. But tuition cost inflation (driven by our inequitable system of loans, rather than grants, to middle-class students) is rapidly pushing American higher education toward bankruptcy. At some point in the twenty-first century, this design defect of our present system of financing higher education will have to be dealt with, if the college experience is not, as in the nineteenth century, to be limited to the children of the rich. Wealthy Americans have many advantages over middle-class Americans; the ability to buy a first-rate education for their children should no longer be one.

Even in the absence of sweeping reforms like these, equalizing access to higher education requires the outlawing by the federal government of one of the pillars of social oligarchy in America: legacy preference in college admissions. In an industrial, bureaucratic society in which access to wealth and power depend

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on educational credentials, alumni preference in university admissions is the managerial-professional equivalent of primogeniture. Legacy preference is affirmative action for the Haves.

The arguments in favor of legacy preference are so obviously specious that they need only be mentioned to be refuted. There is, for example, the argument that, in return for lower admissions standards for their offspring, wealthy alumni contribute money that goes to scholarship students. By this logic, it might save time and trouble simply to sell diplomas for their children to rich alumni parents through the mail.

The argument that outlawing legacy preferences would be a sort of sinister socialistic interference with private institutions is just not convincing. Private colleges and universities are chartered by government, the agent of the democratic citizenry, and they are bound to follow any regulations that the citizenry sees fit to impose—the ban on racial discrimination today, a ban on the class discrimination represented by alumni preference tomorrow. Eliminating legacy preference in college admissions would open up as much as a fifth of the spaces at elite schools for talented Americans of all races who are now passed over in favor of less qualified students with family connections.

Democratizing the professions, making higher education a universal civic entitlement rationed by demonstrated ability rather than by parental income, and outlawing the oligarchic institution of legacy preference—all of these can be seen as the latest in a series of historic reforms intended to realize the American ideal of a society in which individuals compete, sometimes fiercely, on the basis of their talents, not their family wealth or connections. The abolition of titles of nobility and primogeniture and entail, during the American Revolution; the elimination of property restrictions on citizenships in the Jacksonian period; the elimination of the ability to buy exemption from military service in wartime; the extension of civil rights to non-Christians, nonwhites, and women—all of these have pushed America a little closer to the goal of a meritocratic social order. The products of affluent and educated families will always derive indirect and informal benefits from their origins; they should not derive any direct and formal benefits. Family advantage may put one ahead at the starting line, but one should still be required to clear the hurdles all by oneself, at every point along the track, before reaching the finish line.

The social market contract would create a floor for wage earners; the war on oligarchy would create a new and more accessible ladder, or staircase. Neither can be taken advantage of by members of the American underclasses, as long as they are, metaphorically, in another room.

There are several hereditary underclasses in the United States. There is a rural white underclass, concentrated in the Appalachians and the Ozarks, and the makings of Hispanic underclasses in the barrios. As important as it is not to neglect these groups, it is even more important to rehabilitate, employ, and integrate the black ghetto underclass of the major metropolitan areas. The goal must not be to reupholster the ghetto, but to eliminate it completely, through the

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assimilation of its inhabitants to mainstream American norms, and their gradual dispersal throughout metropolitan suburbs.

It is difficult to imagine a successful program for dispersing the ghetto poor that would not have an intermediate stage of education and acculturation and, if necessary, rehabilitation. That stage would have to involve a period of separation from the ghetto environment and incentives for learning standard English, mainstream manners, and useful skills. The government, perhaps working through charitable or religious institutions, would have little choice but to assume moral as well as material tutelage of its poorest wards, in the hope of making them productive members of the national community. The model might be something like the settlement houses for European immigrants of Jane Addams and other turn-of-the-century social reformers. A government effort along these lines would combine idealism with a freedom from romantic illusions, like the fantasies of white overclass liberals about ghetto gangsters as romantic countercultural revolutionaries, or the equally romantic fantasies of laissez-faire conservatives about ghetto entrepreneurs. It would be paternalistic, in the best sense of the term. Instead of "maximum feasible participation," the ideal of the romantic countercultural liberals of the 1960s, the ideal would be "maximum feasible paternalism."

The reforms I have suggested here are intended as examples, not as an exhaustive enumeration of all possible liberal nationalist proposals. In discussing reforms, it is important not to lose sight of the basic perception of color-blind liberal nationalism—namely, that the answer to the problem of racial separation by class is not tokenism that chiefly benefits affluent nonwhite Americans but the weakening of class barriers and increasing mobility between classes, to the benefit of the transracial American majority. Greater movement from the lower ranks naturally corresponds to an accelerated eviction rate at the top; those moving up should be given a hand, and the skids should be greased for those going down. The goal is not to eliminate the abstract categories of rich and poor—there will be high- and low-income people in any capitalist society (and, in practice, in any noncapitalist society). The goal, rather, is to minimize the correspondence between income categories and *social classes*—to ensure that the rich do not tend to share a common upper-class accent and habits, and that the poor do not tend to have a similar complexion. To put it another way, the goal is a society in which the middle class, as a distinct social class, not merely an economic group, is overwhelmingly dominant. The rich would rise out of the middle class, but their offspring would quickly fall back into it; the ranks of the poor would be made up, for the most part, by unfortunates who had dropped out of the middle class temporarily, rather than by hereditary underclasses whose members are cut off more with each generation from middle-class customs and norms.

Neither of the two national parties today is hospitable to liberal nationalism, as I define it. The Democrats—under FDR, Truman, and LBJ, the great champions of the national state and national integration—since McGovern have been identified with the multicultural conception of America as a coalition of groups.

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The alienation of Democrats from the national sentiments of the American majority accounts, in large part, for the Democratic party's loss of both houses of Congress to the Republican party in the mid-term elections of 1994. Post-1960s Republicans, while they have almost monopolized the language and imagery of American patriotism, have lost contact with the older Republican tradition of strong national government and civil rights (Goldwater, the father of the modern Republican party, voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Jacob Javits, in *Order of Battle* (1964), his defense of the Hamiltonian tradition in the GOP against Goldwaterite conservatives of the South and West, got it right: "This is the spirit which has represented the most dominant strain in Republican history. Hamilton-Clay-Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt: they represent the line of evolution embodying this tradition."[10] No one of any influence in today's GOP thinks this way. The Democrats, it might be said, believe in the State but not the Nation, while the Republicans believe in the Nation but not the State. Neither party unites the two halves of Hamiltonian nationalism into a theory of the strong and integrated American nation-state.

The particular party or parties used as a vehicle for a liberal nationalist movement—populist Democrats, centrist Republicans, or a new reform party—is of secondary importance. What is important above all is the mobilization of an electoral majority around the liberal nationalist agenda, to arrest the slow decay of the United States into a pseudo-multicultural oligarchy and renovate it as a meritocratic, melting-pot nation-state under a government no longer dominated by the rich and their agents. Liberal nationalism, if successful, would redefine the consensus as to what constitutes American identity. Liberal nationalist concepts would define the terms of debate for *all* parties in the twenty-first century, in the same way that Appomattox and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 altered the meanings of conservatism and liberalism for generations afterward. The Trans-American "left" and "right" would debate the extent of civil rights for individuals, but both sides would agree that group preferences are illegitimate. Trans-American liberals and conservatives would disagree over the details of a new social market contract, not over the everlasting need for a third way between laissez-faire capitalism and unworkable socialism. If liberal nationalism were to succeed, talk of America as a multicultural society will sound as archaic and grotesque to the ears of twenty-first century Americans as talk of "the Anglo-Saxon mission" and Social Darwinism does to us today.

The difficulties confronting proponents of national renewal should not be underestimated. Machiavelli warns in *The Prince*: "It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new."[11]

[10] Jacob K. Javits, *Order of Battle: A Republican's Call to Reason* (New York: Pocket Books, 1966), 63.

[11] Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, George Bull, trans. (London: Penquin Books, 1961), 51.

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Cynics may argue that plans to radically improve American society and government are utopian projects that are doomed to fail. History suggests another conclusion. American society has been transformed dramatically for the better every few generations since 1776. When one considers the differences between the United States of 1800 and 1900 and 2000 A.D., then dramatic change seems much more thinkable. Less than a century ago, Americans reformed the Constitution to provide for direct election of senators and an income tax; only sixty years ago, the New Deal assured all Americans of basic economic security; and it was only thirty years ago that the three-century-old white-supremacist caste system was torn down. Again and again in our history, Americans have recreated their state and their society, to reflect new ideals, or to embody old ideals in a better way. Progressives at the end of the nineteenth century faced problems remarkably similar to those that we face at the end of the twentieth—the decline of the dominance of a superpower that had policed the world and promoted international free trade (Britain in their case, America in ours); the emergence of a new, multipolar world order based on regional military and economic blocs; massive immigration overburdening the institutions of assimilation; corrupt urban political machines and patronage systems; an unrepresentative Senate; the manipulation of politics by free-spending corporate interests and rich individuals; the coexistence of dreadful squalor with plutocratic opulence. Now, as then, renewing the American republic will require a new generation of bold leaders, no longer fighting the battles of the 1960s and 1970s, a generation of men and women sharing the vision and confidence of Secretary of State John Hay in his eulogy for the murdered President William McKinley almost a century ago:

> The past gives no clue to the future. The fathers, where are they? and the prophets, do they live forever? We are ourselves the fathers! We are ourselves the prophets![12]

[12] *Congressional Record*, vol. 35, pts. 3–5, 57th Cong., 1st sess., (27 February 1902), 2202, quoted in Martin J. Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 440.

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Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of Irish Americans

DAVID CARROLL COCHRAN

Sustaining a stable political system in a multiethnic society while remaining committed to democratic norms is a problem. The difficulty lies in the fact that ethnic groups tend not to get along. This may be a rather simplistic way of stating the problem of ethnic conflict, but history has a way of proving its basic validity with depressing frequency. Incorporating several ethnic groups into a single political system means incorporating the basic problem of ethnic conflict as well, and this can place considerable strain on the political system in question. Such a system carries the seeds of instability within its constituent parts, and unless it can control the potential for ethnic conflict dwelling within it, such a system will fly apart.

A commitment to democratic norms can be a liability for this kind of political system. Group loyalties dividing a multiethnic society can undermine a common identity, national culture, or consensus on democratic values. The intensity often characterizing ethnic confrontations can make political compromise impossible, and the discrimination often practiced by dominant groups to perpetuate group inequalities can spark violent, destabilizing confrontations. Conventional wisdom claims that often the only way to unite diverse ethnic groups into a single political system is through coercion. Like the Soviet Union or Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia, a stable political order must be imposed from above. Indeed, the historical record for ethnically diverse democracies is weak; multiethnic states have traditionally required force to hold them together.[1] At best, those wishing to unite diverse

[1] Michael Walzer, "Pluralism in Political Perspective" in Michael Walzer, Edward T. Kantowicz, John Higham, and Mona Harrington, *The Politics of Ethnicity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 6.

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ethnic groups into a single political system that is both stable and democratic face an uphill battle. This is the problem of ethnic diversity, political stability, and democracy, and it is one that the United States seems to have overcome, though with important exceptions and qualifications.

The United States is an ethnically diverse society that also enjoys a remarkable degree of stability in its democratic politics. I use the concepts of stability and democracy in a broad and relative sense. American history does contain important instances of political violence, instability (a civil war), the gross violation of democratic principles, group discrimination and domination including enslavement, and the exclusion of entire ethnic groups from the political process. However, with these important qualifications in mind, there has also been widespread observance of basic democratic norms, the relative absence of system-threatening violence, and the survival through time of the country's basic political institutions and constitutional order. While far from ideal, the United States has been able to establish a relatively stable and democratic political system in a multiethnic context. This article tries to account for this achievement by answering the following question: Given that the United States is a multiethnic society, what are the sources of the stability that characterizes its democratic politics?

Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability

In order to identify where I think an effort to answer this question should begin, I will briefly mention a recent attempt by John Harles to address the same question.[2] I will argue that an answer should be based upon precisely what Harles's argument misses.

Harles proposes to solve the "puzzle" of the United States as "an ethnically heterogeneous but stable democracy" by focusing on its immigrant roots, claiming that "the secret to America's success lies in the immigrant origins of its population" and that "immigrants promote political stability" rather than threaten it.[3] Harles argues that immigrants view America as a "lifeboat" promising a rescue from the environment they have fled, and this experience of rescue insures an immigrant's loyalty to the United States.[4] He also claims that immigrants tend to be politically quiescent, offering little challenge to the existing system. Immigrants are "improbable participants in American public life" due to their lack of material resources and an unwillingness to cause trouble in their new home; they have neither the means nor the desire to rock the lifeboat once they are aboard.[5] Far from being a threat to democratic stability, Harles argues that immigrants are the perfect

[2] John C. Harles, *Politics in the Lifeboat: Immigrants and the American Democratic Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

[3] Ibid., 1–2.

[4] Ibid., 3, 84–85.

[5] Ibid., 3, 101–102.

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citizens for its maintenance, since "they ask little from government yet are fervently loyal to it."[6]

Harles's answer misses the mark for several reasons. First, he portrays immigrant identification with the United States too simplistically. Immigrants may be willing to offer allegiance to their new homeland, but they do not leave their ethnic identifications behind. Indeed, the trauma of the immigrant experience often causes them to identify even more closely with their fellow ethnics, and this identification forms the basis for an American-ethnic identity nested within their larger identification with the United States as a lifeboat. Second, Harles overstates the political quiescence of immigrants. While immigrants may not participate in political life at the same levels as native-born citizens, they are never completely out of sight politically. The history of labor and socialist politics in the United States bears witness to the important political roles immigrants can play. Finally, and most importantly, Harles fails to make a case for extending his theory beyond the immigrant generation. Heterogeneity does not end with the first generation of ethnics on America's shores. Ethnic identification often persists well past the immigrant generation, and in fact the political mobilization of ethnic groups in the United States often occurs with the second or third generations.[7]

Harles attempts to identify the sources of political stability within the multiethnic United States without confronting the persistence of ethnic identifications and of political mobilization based on these identifications running through American history. Yet, these are precisely the considerations that should form the basis for such a project. While assimilation is an important process in the United States, it is far from comprehensive or uniform. Some ethnic groups remain almost completely unassimilated, others reach only partial assimilation, and those groups that do approach full assimilation usually do so only after an important lag that can last for several generations. The result of these patterns is an American society that at any given time contains a host of distinct groups with powerful ethnic identifications. Furthermore, these identifications frequently provide the basis for mobilization by such groups in the political arena.[8] An answer to the question of American democratic stability must begin with the recognition that ethnic identity and ethnically-based political activity are fundamental features of the American landscape.

Given this presence of politically assertive ethnic groups in the United States, the stability of its democratic politics depends on how it controls the potential for ethnic conflict that results. If politics is about regulating conflict, then ethnic politics is about regulating ethnic conflict; and political stability in a multiethnic context hinges on how effective this regulation is over time. The United States

[6] Ibid., 4.

[7] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," *American Political Science Review* 59 (December 1965): 896–908.

[8] Edgar Litt, *Beyond Pluralism: Ethnic Politics in America* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1970), 9.

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has maintained a stable and democratic political system in large part through a process of accommodating the political mobilization of key ethnic groups and of managing the potential for ethnic conflict that results. In this way, rather than eliminating ethnic conflict altogether, the American political system controls its expression and its effects. Given all this, the original question must be restated: How does the United States accommodate the political mobilization of key ethnic groups and manage the resulting potential for ethnic conflict in ways that sustain the stability of its democratic political system?

In answering this question, I will draw upon the history of Irish Americans as a distinct and active ethnic group in American political life. About 4.1 million immigrants from Ireland arrived in the United States between 1820 and 1920. Of these, 1.4 million arrived before the end of the nineteenth century.[9] This influx radically transformed the character of America's growing cities, especially in the Northeast.[10] Thomas Sowell calls the Irish "the first great ethnic 'minority' in American cities," and Lawrence McCaffrey refers to them as the "pioneers of the American urban ghetto."[11] This flood of Irish into the American urban landscape caused considerable social and political strain. They were the first ethnic group in American history to be concentrated in urban neighborhoods where problems of poverty, crime, and alcoholism were acute. This did not escape the notice of native-born Americans, many of whom saw the Irish as a dangerous stream of wretched, rebellious, inferior, unskilled, and drunk aliens bringing a foreign culture and subversive religion to the shores of the American republic. The Irish migration constituted one of the earliest and most pressing instances of the need to maintain political stability in the face of ethnic diversity. Attention to the ways in which this large, different, and potentially destabilizing ethnic group fit into American social and political life can help uncover many of the sources of American democratic stability.

The Irish American case reveals an important process of dealing with ethnic groups and their destabilizing potential in the United States, a process that better

[9] Michael Hout and Joshua R. Goldstein, "How 4.5 Million Irish Immigrants became 40 Million Irish Americans: Demographic and Subjective Aspects of the Ethnic Composition of White Americans," *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994): 65; Steven Erie, *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 25; Andrew Greeley, *The Irish Americans: The Rise to Money and Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 72.

[10] Several historians criticize what they see as an overemphasis in the literature on the Irish in urban centers and in the Northeast. See Donald Harman Akenson, *Being Had: Historians, Evidence and the Irish in North America* (Ontario: P. D. Meany, 1984); Dennis Clark, *Hibernia America: The Irish and Regional Cultures* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); and Timothy J. Sarbaugh, "The Irish in the West: An Ethnic Tradition of Enterprise and Innovation, 1848–1991," *Journal of the West* 31 (April 1992): 5–8. However, the Irish did in fact settle overwhelmingly in urban and urbanizing areas and they were concentrated most heavily in the Northeast and Midwest. See Doyle, "The Irish as Urban Pioneers in the United States, 1850–1870," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 10 (Fall 1990): 36–59.

[11] Thomas Sowell, *Ethnic America: A History* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 17; Lawrence John McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 164.

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accounts for American democratic stability than Harles's lifeboat thesis. Several crucial factors in American cultural, economic, and political life make up this process, one of accommodating the political mobilization of ethnic groups and of effectively managing the potential for ethnic conflict that such mobilization entails.

Cultural Space and Economic Opportunity

Two factors form the necessary cultural and economic context within which the later and specifically political factors operate. In order to effectively mobilize in the political arena, groups need the opportunity to define both their cultural needs and their economic interests.

Acceptance of Cultural Pluralism

In 1915, Horace Kallen envisioned America as "a great republic consisting of a federation or commonwealth of nationalities."[12] Considering America's ethnic diversity a source of strength and arguing against those who wanted to "Americanize" members of ethnic groups, he claimed the United States should celebrate its cultural diversity and protect the freedom of groups to develop their own ethnic identities. While not necessarily accepting Kallen's argument in theory, American society has usually accepted it in practice. In spite of a history of nativism, ideological hostility to cultural pluralism, and demands for forced assimilation into the American way of life, the United States has actually provided most groups with enough room to define themselves culturally. "Americanizing" movements intending to enforce cultural homogeneity by imposing a version of the dominant culture have usually generated more rhetoric than sustained action. The attacks on the cultural integrity of African slaves and indigenous Americans remain important exceptions. In fact, hostility from the larger American society has often served to reenforce the cultural identity of ethnic groups rather than eliminate it. While the United States has not always upheld a principled commitment to the cultivation of cultural pluralism, it has usually settled on a de facto acceptance of it. This has provided a space for ethnic groups to exercise a significant measure of cultural autonomy and self-definition.

Irish Americans were not welcomed with open arms. The mid-nineteenth century witnessed anti-Irish riots in major cities, the sporadic burning of churches and convents, the presence of "No Irish Need Apply" signs, and the rise of anti-immigrant movements like the Know-Nothing Party. Popular literature of the time included lurid descriptions of debauched life behind the walls of Catholic convents; and popular comic art portrayed the Irish as ape-like, stupid, and

[12] Horace M. Kallen, "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot" in Richard J. Meister, ed., *Race and Ethnicity in Modern America* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1974), 58.

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uncivilized.[13] Facing hostility from a dominant culture that viewed them as "lower-class, Catholic aliens," the Irish fell back on their own cultural institutions.[14] In response to the bigotry of the Protestant mainstream, they clung to their Catholicism with renewed fervor. The Catholic Church offered Irish Americans a comfortable, autonomous space in a hostile land. Neighborhood-based parishes and their parochial schools provided the "glue of the Irish community" in America.[15] Having more than strictly religious functions, the parish was the focus of social, educational, and cultural life; it provided a way of preserving and expressing group culture. Irish nationalism, the group's dedication to the cause of a free and united Ireland, also provided considerable group cohesion through heightened ethnic identity.[16] While facing hostility from mainstream American society, Irish Americans were able to establish their own cultural space in which they could retain their own institutions, traditions, and holidays. They found a space in which they could sustain their ethnic identity.

The issue of assimilation is intertwined with this concept of autonomous cultural space. Historically, many ethnic groups in the United States have exhibited significant assimilatory tendencies, and Irish Americans are no different. However, assimilation is a long, complex, and uneven phenomenon, and it is rarely an all encompassing process. Andrew Greeley argues that even after many generations in the United States, Irish Americans still retain a distinctive subculture characterized by such things as family structure, socializing patterns (gregariousness and frequency of tavern visits, for example), political styles, religious beliefs, and attitudes toward marriage, children, work, and changing social roles.[17] Indeed, a group can become integrated into a society's institutions, regions, associations, occupations, and economic classes—in short, into the structure of that society itself—without giving up important parts of its ethnic subculture or feeling assimilated in a subjective sense.[18] Ethnic identity itself can remain a more or less salient feature of group members' self-definitions for generations, even after they are largely integrated into the dominant society. So, in spite of

[13] William Shannon, *The American Irish* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 41–42; Edward M. Levine, *The Irish and Irish Politicians: A Study of Cultural and Social Alienation* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 62, 90; Jennifer K. Hardy, "Caricature of the Irish in British and U.S. Comic Art," *The Historian* 54 (Winter 1992): 283–288.

[14] Levine, *The Irish and Irish Politicians*, 68.

[15] McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 59.

[16] Greeley, *The Irish Americans*, 90.

[17] Andrew Greeley, "The Talk Goes On: Irish Culture in Europe and America" in Enda McDonagh, ed., *Survival Or Salvation? A Second Mayo Book of Theology* (Dublin: The Columba Press, 1994); Greeley, *The Irish Americans*, 8–9.

[18] For discussions of the complex ways in which groups can become integrated or even acculturated into a society without being truly assimilated, see Milton J. Yinger, "Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology* 11 (1985): 154–155; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics" in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, eds., *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 51; Andrew Greeley, *That Most Distressful Nation: The Taming of the American Irish* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 7–8; and Litt, *Beyond Pluralism*, 15.

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significant assimilatory tendencies, a group's distinct cultural space in American society remains important. It certainly provides support for an ethnic group before and during the often long and uneven process of assimilation, but it also continues to hold those elements of group identity and culture that assimilation has difficulty eliminating.

American society has looked with a suspicious eye on many of the cultural traits brought by immigrant groups, but it has also provided room for these groups to sustain their cultures within ethnic neighborhoods, businesses, churches, and associations. The frequent hostility expressed by American society toward ethnic minorities has even tended to reinforce this space for cultural autonomy. Facing a strange and frequently unfriendly American society, ethnic groups often rely on their own institutions and traditions to maintain feelings of collective self-worth and to cultivate ethnic pride among group members. The importance of American society's de facto acceptance of cultural pluralism lies in the opportunity it provides ethnic groups to define and express their largely psychological and cultural needs. Since these psychological and cultural needs—a sense of group worth, cultural autonomy, and the maintenance of ethnic identity—are of central importance in an ethnic group's political mobilization, a space where these needs are developed is crucial to the operation of ethnic politics in the United States.

The Long-Range Promise of Economic Gains

The other background factor that contributes to American democratic stability is the tendency of the United States to provide immigrant-based ethnic groups with economic opportunities. This is not to imply that the United States is free from economic inequalities and discrimination based on ethnicity or race but, rather, that enough opportunities exist for members of most ethnic groups to believe in the possibility of economic gain for themselves or, often more importantly, for their children. John Harles is correct in observing that most immigrant groups arrive hoping for material gain and that American history shows a consistent, though uneven pattern of economic improvement for most groups.[19] While the United States falls far short of its mythical claim as the land of economic opportunity that pays no regard to social or ethnic backgrounds, the power of this myth inspires members of ethnic groups to hope for the long-term success of themselves or their children. The actual opportunities offered by the American economy provide enough success stories to keep this hope alive.

Most Irish arrived in the United States poor and desperate. Unlike other mid-nineteenth-century immigrants, notably Germans, they lacked the capital to move inland and establish farms.[20] Instead, the Irish, a rural people in the land of their birth, stayed in the cities and fed an expanding industrial economy with

[19] Harles, *Politics in the Lifeboat*, 81, 98–99.

[20] George E. Reedy, *From the Ward to the White House: The Irish in American Politics* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1991), 39.

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a mass supply of unskilled labor. They lived in squalor, worked in dangerous and health-destroying occupations, and faced severe discrimination. However, they did have jobs and food (the two things they desperately needed), and they found enough surplus income to send a steady flow of money back to Ireland.[21] By the turn of the century, Irish Americans, having benefited from entering the industrial work force early, had risen to occupy skilled blue-collar jobs, while newer immigrants moved in as unskilled laborers below them.[22] In income, education, and occupational-status levels, they began breaking into the American mainstream in the first few decades of this century, and following World War II, they moved into middle and upper-middle class American life. By 1980, Irish Americans had surpassed the average American in levels of income, education, and occupational status.[23] While there is still significant debate on questions of how and exactly when Irish Americans passed each rung on the economic ladder, it is clear that they succeeded in climbing to a position much higher than where they began.

The United States has witnessed gross economic inequalities among ethnic groups sustained by pervasive discrimination, but it has also provided enough economic opportunity for many groups to improve their material circumstances, both in absolute terms and in relation to other groups in American society. A history of rather consistent economic growth and expanding opportunities has provided a space for ethnic groups to acquire and develop material interests. These economic interests are one of the chief concerns of ethnic groups mobilizing for political action, and so a space for their development is crucial to the operation of ethnic politics in the United States.

The two background factors examined in this section—the de facto acceptance of cultural pluralism and the promise of economic gain—provide a context for the political factors identified in the next section. Each provides a space in which an ethnic group can identify and develop its central concerns, which include psychological and cultural needs—a sense of group worth, cultural autonomy, and the maintenance of ethnic identity—and economic interests—income, employment, housing, and the related material concerns of group members.[24] These needs and interests form the basis for an ethnic group's political mobilization. For this reason, distinct spaces where groups can define and develop both their needs and their interests are indispensable background factors in the process of accommodating their political mobilization.

Political Conditions and Stability

Certain political factors contribute to American democratic stability by providing for a process of accommodating group mobilization and managing the resulting

[21] Shannon, *The American Irish*, 39.

[22] McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 29.

[23] Greeley, *The Irish Americans*, 2–4, 111; McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 41.

[24] I will refer to these clusters of concerns as group needs and group interests throughout the rest of this article.

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potential for ethnic conflict. These factors address both group needs and group interests, and they include features of the political system as well as the strategies for mobilization employed by ethnic groups themselves. Some of these factors continue to exist today, while others lie mainly in the past.

A Space for Group Mobilization

In general, the United States allows its ethnic groups to mobilize for political action. As usual, there are important exceptions – mainly a history of racial apartheid in the South. But for the most part, there are few legal barriers to political action by ethnic groups through such things as their associations, churches, lobbying activities, and the political roles played by official and unofficial ethnic leaders.

Ethnic identity can be a powerful and complex basis for political mobilization. Martin Heisler argues that ethnicity in modern industrialized democracies, including the United States, is not a static, all-encompassing feature of an individual's identity. Rather, it is a largely "part-time aspect of people's self-concepts," and this means they have a certain amount of choice in the "level of salience accorded ethnicity in their conceptions of themselves."[25] This variable salience of ethnic identity provides groups with a flexible tool for mobilizing their members. Susan Olzak observes that ethnic boundaries are not necessarily "prior to ethnic conflict" but are often the product of manipulation by groups in their efforts to mobilize politically.[26] Daniel Bell writes, "Those social units are most highly effective . . . which can combine symbolic and instrumental purposes."[27] He claims that ethnic groups gain political strength by finding such a combination. They are "both expressive and instrumental," and they "can combine an interest with an affective tie."[28] In other words, groups who use ethnicity to mobilize politically do so on the basis of both group needs and group interests, their "expressive and instrumental" concerns.

Irish Americans used the space for political mobilization provided by the United States to advance both their needs and their interests. The discrimination they faced in business and the professions left politics as one of the only areas in which early Irish Americans could reach positions of distinction. William Shannon writes that "politics was the only major profession in which it was an asset rather than a drawback to be an immigrant."[29] The sight of group members rising to prominent positions in politics filled the group's need for recognition

[25] Martin O. Heisler, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in the Modern West" in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 45, 25.

[26] Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 24.

[27] Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change" in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 165.

[28] Ibid., 169–171.

[29] Shannon, *The American Irish*, 64.

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in American society. Such advances provided symbolic acknowledgment of group worth and status, and they enhanced feelings of group prestige and ethnic pride.[30] Politics also provided opportunities to advance group interests. The use of patronage by Irish machines to help their own is legendary. Steven Erie calls it "an early and effective ethnic affirmative action policy."[31] Irish Americans used their political clout to deliver jobs to their fellow ethnics, and the process of pulling the group out of the unskilled working class through jobs in police and fire departments, city bureaucracies, and publicly funded construction projects was crucial in helping them move up the first rung or two of the economic ladder. Several historians question the long-term economic effects of political patronage on Irish Americans,[32] but it is clear that they had the opportunity to pursue and protect their material interests in the political arena and that they were successful enough and had enough examples of group members who had "made it" to keep the promise of continued economic advance a compelling one.

Rather than trying to eliminate ethnic conflict by attempting to quash group mobilization, the United States puts itself in a position to control the effects of ethnic conflict by providing space for ethnic groups to mobilize on the basis of their group needs and interests.[34] This accommodation of group mobilization sets the stage for the effective management of ethnic conflict within the system.

Ethnic Groups and the Two-Party System

A major way in which the United States manages ethnic conflict within its political system is by incorporating ethnic blocs into its stable two-party structure. American parties are political coalitions resting on a host of socioeconomic cleavages, some of the most important of which have always been ethnic cleavages, and the historical stability of party identification in the United States is based in large part on ethnic allegiance. As Edgar Litt points out, political parties traditionally form an important bridge between ethnic group membership and political action.[33]

Irish immigrants of the mid-nineteenth century arrived as the parties were in a popular mobilization phase.[34] Competing parties need numbers to win elections, and the Irish had numbers, if little else. In the electoral realignments surrounding the Civil War and its aftermath, the Irish became a crucial part of the Democratic coalition. In the North, the GOP became the party of the Protestant establishment and of Yankee-stock rural areas, so Irish Catholics in the cities

[30] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); Wolfinger, "Ethnic Voting" and "Some Consequences."

[31] Erie, *Rainbow's End*, 59.

[32] For an argument that it delayed Irish American economic progress by keeping them in low-paying, lower-middle-class jobs until after World War II, see Erie, *Rainbow's End.*

[33] Litt, *Beyond Pluralism*, 27.

[34] Erie, *Rainbow's End*, 32–33.

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flocked to the Democratic party.[35] In a few cities, the Irish joined Republican machines, and in some national elections they crossed party lines in significant numbers. But the overwhelming tendency of Irish Americans throughout their history was to remain loyal Democrats. The Democratic party was their primary route to positions of political prestige (including the presidency) and their primary political arena for pursuing and protecting their economic interests.

Incorporation into the two-party system provides American ethnic groups with a way to mobilize politically, but it also balances their demands against those of other ethnic groups in the same coalition. The parties in local, state, and national elections play to group needs for recognition and status through balanced tickets that include members of various ethnic groups.[36] They also furnish avenues for the pursuit of group interests through bargaining for material benefits and enhanced economic opportunities in exchange for electoral support. The presence of two competitive parties—the post-Reconstruction South provides yet another troubling exception—insures that each party will be at least minimally responsive to the needs and interests of its ethnic coalition members in order to protect against their defection to the other party. The American two-party system accommodates the needs-based and interests-based political mobilization of ethnic groups. In so doing, it also manages the potential for ethnic conflict this creates by enforcing patterns of coalition-building, bargaining, and ticket-balancing.

The Role of the Urban Machine

Urban political machines in the United States had a remarkable tendency to integrate various ethnic groups into a single political structure and control the potential for conflict through certain patterns of power-sharing. Since the model of formal power-sharing among diverse ethnic groups in a single political system (also known as consociationalism) includes a host of features and requirements that the American urban machine clearly did not possess, it cannot be called a true power-sharing arrangement in any strict sense.[37] However, the urban machine was consistent, at least informally, with several of the central characteristics of

[35] Reedy, *From the Ward to the White House*, 53; Levine, *The Irish and Irish Politicians*, 112. For an argument that Irish Americans also embraced the Democratic party because of its history of anti-British sentiment going back to Jefferson and his allies in the eighteenth century, see Shannon, *The American Irish*, 47.

[36] Edward T. Kantowicz, "Voting and Parties" in Walzer et al., *The Politics of Ethnicity*, 45; Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., "Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups" in Blain A. Brownwell and Warren E. Stickle, eds., *Bosses and Reformers: Urban Politics in America, 1880–1920* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 13.

[37] For the features and requirements of formal power-sharing, see Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach" in Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking*; Kenneth D. McRae, "Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management" in ibid.; and John McGarry and Brandan O'Leary, introduction to *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts* (London: Routledge, 1993).

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ethnic power-sharing; these provided important ways of managing ethnic conflict within the machine's political structure.

No other ethnic group's history is more closely tied to urban machine politics in the United States than that of the Irish. They were major players in almost every city that had both a machine and a sizable Irish population, and they came to dominate many big-city machines in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Irish use and abuse of urban machines is legendary, but there is still considerable debate on how Irish-dominated machines interacted with other ethnic groups, especially the waves of immigrants who arrived after them. Some argue that the Irish machines were a benefit to subsequent immigrants, that they helped smooth their traumatic entry into the United States and facilitated their integration into American life.[38] Others argue that this role is overstated, that Irish machines did little to help more recent immigrants.[39] While it is clear that Irish politicians usually put the concerns of their own group before those of others, they did have their political survival to consider, and this meant they had to pay sufficient attention to other ethnic groups to gain enough support to stay in power. To this end, they drew representatives of various ethnic groups into the machine.[40] Urban machines were able to incorporate political elites from key ethnic groups into the governing hierarchy. While these elites were able to represent their group's needs and interests in the governing coalition, the distribution of influence and patronage (money and jobs) was far from proportional. Differences in group size, economic status, and political power insured that this power-sharing was a biased and unequal process.

However, much in machine politics was symbolic. New groups looking to break into the system found recognition and an affirmation of group worth in their incorporation into the machine, even as junior partners.[41] Machine politics favored some groups over others, but it also provided diverse groups with the political access they required to pursue their needs (recognition as junior partners) and interests (patronage). This rough form of power-sharing left groups with cultural autonomy in their own neighborhoods, it existed in a local context that was small enough to allow elites the personal contact required for political bargaining, and it united urban ethnic groups for their common protection from what they viewed as a hostile "Anglo-Protestant establishment."[42]

Through much of American history, including periods of significant immigrant absorption, machines incorporated ethnic groups in greater or lesser degree into unified political organizations. In so doing, they accommodated the political mobilization of ethnic groups within the machine's structure and managed the potential for ethnic conflict through biased but largely effective power-sharing arrangements.

[38] See, for example, Shannon, *The American Irish*, 135–137.
[39] See, for example, Erie, *Rainbow's End*, 246.
[40] Cornwell, "Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups," 11.
[41] Wolfinger, "Some Consequences."
[42] McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 102.

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In addition to their power-sharing features, political machines also provided a way for many ethnic groups that formed a relatively small minority in the whole of American society to exercise considerable political power at the local level. While Irish Americans were only a fraction of the entire U.S. population from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, they made up large minorities in many cities and clear majorities in many urban wards. As a group, they carried out their most significant political action on the city and ward levels, where they had enough leverage to pursue their needs and interests through group mobilization. This kind of political action was made possible by an American regional federalism that devolved significant amounts of power down to state and local governments and by a kind of pseudocantonization within city machines that relied on relatively homogeneous ethnic wards.

George Reedy writes, "Irish machines were parochial in the full sense of the word."[43] Not having the numbers or resources to enter politics on the national level in the early years, the Irish made good use of American federalism by grabbing power at the local level. In many cities, power was further devolved downward in a system of ward-level politics that was similar to a system of cantonization in important ways. John McGarry and Brandan O'Leary describe cantonization as a process of devolving power down to relatively small, ethnically homogeneous units, which enjoy considerable political autonomy.[44] As in the case of power-sharing, urban political machines in the United States did not fit the theoretical model of cantonization very neatly, but they did exhibit some important similarities. Within an ethnically heterogeneous city, machine politics was often based on homogeneous wards, and "ward politics consisted largely of bargaining among the representatives of nationality groups."[45]

This highly localized system of political power allowed the machines to be fairly responsive to the needs and interests of neighborhood-based ethnic groups. With a network of precinct captains reporting to ward leaders and ward leaders reporting to city leaders, the machine was able to stay in close touch with its constituents and provide them with a feeling of personal access to the system.[46] Depending on the delivery of benefits to their constituents for votes, machine leaders responded to constituent demands. In fact, Greeley argues that machine-led cities delivered more material benefits to lower socioeconomic residents of ethnic neighborhoods than did most so-called reformist-led cities.[47] Doing more than just delivering material benefits, machines also served the personal needs of their constituents. Precinct captains were able to offer "friendship" in exchange for votes, and a neighborhood political clubhouse provided a focus for community

[43] Reedy, *From the Ward to the White House*, 94.
[44] McGarry and O'Leary, *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict*, 30–31.
[45] Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, 51.
[46] Ibid., 118–119; Greeley, *That Most Distressful Nation*, 208.
[47] Greeley, *The Irish Americans*, 164.

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social life.[48] Jane Addams made similar observations at the turn of the century, arguing that the local alderman (ward boss) is "really elected because he is a good friend and neighbor" who looks out for his constituents and gives them a personal connection to political power.[49]

While urban machines were certainly pioneers in the development of political corruption, they also provided an effective and fairly responsive way of organizing local political power in such a way that national ethnic minorities would have an alternative space for effective political action. At the local level ethnic groups, working out of their minority-majority wards, could mobilize politically for the pursuit and protection of their needs and interests. Since effective mobilization was unrealistic on the national level, where an ethnic group was severely outnumbered, it was accommodated on a smaller scale. This same process also managed the destabilizing potential of ethnic mobilization by limiting its scope to local contexts and by keeping it firmly within the machine's political structure.

The Incentive to Follow the Rules

The stability of democratic politics in the United States depends upon its ability to promote the kinds of group mobilization that have little potential to cause instability. The mobilization strategies that groups employ are largely a function of the opportunities, or lack of opportunities, provided by the political system.[50] In the United States, this relationship between the structural opportunities of the political system and the kinds of strategies employed by mobilizing groups is crucial to the process of maintaining general democratic norms and of upholding the stable operation of American political institutions. The United States provides opportunities for key groups that might threaten its stability to mobilize within the political system. In so doing, it gives them the incentive to mobilize in ways that uphold the system's basic rules and procedures.

Initially, Irish Americans looked as if they had little inclination to follow the rules in American social and political life. Early Irish American history is filled with instances of unruly, often violent behavior. Irish laborers working on the railroads got into streetfights with the residents of towns as they moved across the country laying track.[51] Several cities saw rioting by Irish immigrants and battles with state militia sent in to impose order, including the famous draft riots in New York during the Civil War.[52] In 1844, following anti-Irish violence and the burning of several Catholic churches in Philadelphia, the Irish archbishop in New York, seeking to prevent similar actions in his city, surrounded churches

[48] Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, 117–120.

[49] Jane Addams, "Why the Ward Boss Rules" in Reedy, *From the Ward to the White House*, 197.

[50] Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 135.

[51] Ellis Cose, *A Nation of Strangers: Prejudice, Politics, and the Populating of America* (New York: Morrow, 1992), 27.

[52] Ibid., 28–29, 39–41.

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with armed Irish guards and publicly threatened to burn New York to the ground if a single church were attacked. The churches remained unharmed.[53] The mid-nineteenth century witnessed a violent gang culture among young, urban, Irish males, who engaged into street fights, broke up Protestant parades, and laid the groundwork for Irish involvement in organized crime.[54] Irish workers were also involved in American labor unrest during the late-nineteenth century. The Molly Maguires of Pennsylvania's coal fields, a society of coal miners that organized a violent campaign against those it considered the enemies of labor, were largely Irish.[55] In short, the early Irish did not strike American society as being particularly law-abiding or willing to uphold the peaceful norms of a democratic culture.

Nevertheless, while early Irish instances of social disruption, high crime, and sporadic violence indicated considerable friction in U.S. society and prompted fearful responses by many native-born Americans, most of these instances were not specifically directed toward the overthrow of American society or its political system as such. They were expressions of protest and frustration rather than rebellion. As an immigrant-based ethnic group in American society facing severe economic and political discrimination, Irish Americans wanted better economic opportunities and greater access to the political system. These goals entailed greater incorporation into existing social and political structures rather than their overthrow. Early in the nineteenth century, a group of about 200 Irish Catholics in New York City stormed a caucus meeting at Tammany Hall and started a brawl.[56] However, they were not protesting Tammany's control of New York politics so much as they were protesting their own group's lack of representation in the organization. Irish Americans began an outsiders trying to break into American economic and political life, and as outsiders they often resorted to unruly and, from the system's point of view, illegitimate ways of pressing their group needs and interests.[57] However, their ultimate goal was greater access, and over time, the United States blunted the destabilizing potential of Irish protest and social disruption by accommodating their political mobilization within the system.

Several decades after their attack on Tammany Hall, Irish Americans were running the place. They had gone from being outsiders in American political life to being the ultimate insiders, at least in those local political spheres that were the focus of their mobilization. However, incorporation of Irish Americans into the political system did not necessarily insure their allegiance to the rules as the dominant society viewed them. Irish political ethics were sharply at odds

[53] McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 21.

[54] Shannon, *The American Irish*, 36–44.

[55] McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 33.

[56] Shannon, *The American Irish*, 48.

[57] For discussions of how groups and social movements trying to break into the American political arena often rely on unruly and nontraditional forms of social protest, see William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990); and Theodore J. Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

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with the Anglo-Protestant ideal (if not practice) of disinterested public service and rule according to republican principles of the common good.[58] The Irish politician emphasized his own and his group's needs and interests, the importance of personal and ethnic loyalty, and the relevance of naked power considerations over any sort of abstract political principles. And, of course, there was the legendary political corruption. Irish politicians often traded in bribes, favors, and votes on a daily basis. Many were quite willing to stuff ballot boxes, intimidate political opponents, and use enforcement gangs (often thinly disguised as volunteer fire companies) to impose their will.[59] In politics, Irish Americans often flaunted specific democratic procedures and made up their own rules.

Nevertheless, these violations of democratic ideals were kept within certain limits by the political structures within which Irish politicians worked. Irish machines may have been corrupt, but they still had to operate in the context of party politics, regular elections, and the basic procedures that these institutions entailed. They had to remain relatively responsive to voters in order to maintain their power through elections. According to a strict definition of democratic rules, Irish politicians may have had a poor track record; but a stable democratic system does not depend on ideal performance, only adequate performance. Irish politicians usually worked within and upheld stable, legitimate, and at least minimally democratic political institutions.

The success of the United States in fostering a commitment from ethnic groups within its political system to general democratic rules and procedures is exemplified by the legitimate, orderly, and largely nonviolent transfers of power between ethnic groups in American cities. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan detail the remarkable decline of Irish power in New York City during the 1950s and 1960s as newer groups pushed them aside, and other cities saw a similar rise and fall of Irish political power.[60] Just as the Irish used their numbers and political opportunities to displace older elites and gain power, newer ethnic groups were able to push the Irish aside in many cities through their growing electoral clout. While urban ethnic politics has its history of corruption and fraud, its overall pattern shows a consistent tendency to uphold the legitimate transfers of power that characterize democratic electoral politics.

The United States reinforces the stability of its political system in the face of ethnic diversity by accommodating the mobilization of its ethnic groups—especially those groups that engage in the kinds of social protest that have a destabilizing potential. This directs a group's political efforts within the system rather than against it, and such incorporation gives groups a stake in observing and enforcing the system's basic rules and procedures—in short, in upholding its stability. This process relies on a political system with limited permeability

[58] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Knopf, 1955).

[59] McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 94; Erie, *Rainbow's End*, 104–105.

[60] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), lvii–lviii; Erie, *Rainbow's End*, 118–119.

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and limited flexibility. The system is permeable in that it provides ethnic groups with space to mobilize politically for their needs and interests; but this permeability is limited in that some ethnic groups may be excluded altogether, and the space provided for mobilization is not equally distributed to all groups. The system is flexible in that it can adapt to changing circumstances brought by new groups. Irish Americans brought new ways of conducting politics with their political machines that the system was able to absorb. The system is also flexible enough to allow a certain level of rule-breaking by different groups facing different circumstances; political norms and procedures are not set in stone and tend to be loosely defined. Yet this flexibility is limited by an overall commitment to broad democratic procedures; rule-breaking is only tolerated below a certain threshold. Irish machines could manipulate elections by stuffing ballot boxes, but they could not suspend the electoral process itself or declare the results of a particular election invalid.

The opportunities for ethnic group mobilization afforded by a relatively permeable and flexible political system in the United States provide groups with a powerful incentive to employ those kinds of mobilization strategies that work within the system's political institutions and uphold its basic rules. This process gives ethnic groups a stake in sustaining the stability of the system itself.

Conclusion

This article has sought to account for the stability found in American democratic politics given the multiethnic character of U.S. society. This stability lies, in large part, within a process of accommodating the political mobilization of key ethnic groups and of effectively managing the potential for ethnic conflict that such mobilization entails. The factors—cultural, economic, and political—that make this process possible help establish a rough but abiding bargain between the United States and most of its ethnic groups. The bargain has the United States accommodating the political mobilization of these groups by being at least minimally responsive to their needs and interests. But the price of this responsiveness is that the groups must respect the limits imposed by those political structures into which they are incorporated—the parties, the machines, the electoral process.

However, this bargain is not the same for all groups, and sometimes it is not offered at all. Different ethnic groups are treated differently in the United States, and so looking at only one, such as Irish Americans, cannot establish a single pattern for all. The aim of this article has been to use the Irish American case to describe an important process of dealing with the problem of diverse ethnic groups and their destabilizing potential for ethnic conflict in the United States, a process that better accounts for American democratic stability than Harles's lifeboat thesis. But, clearly, this process does not apply to all American ethnic groups in the same way, and in some cases it may not apply at all. The extent to which various groups do conform to this process can only be established by taking each in turn, a project beyond the scope of this article. However, I

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do think the general pattern that I have outlined, one of accommodating group mobilization and managing potential ethnic conflict in ways that maintain democratic stability, probably holds for most white (European) ethnic groups in American history. Nonwhite (non-European) groups, on the other hand, often face a much different process. The general accommodation of group mobilization has rarely applied to African Americans or to indigenous Americans. Sometimes the United States maintains stability by simply eliminating ethnic conflict through severely repressive measures. For example, Glazer and Moynihan characterize the "Southern model" of maintaining ethnic stability as the use of violence and repression to maintain a form of rigid, racial subordination.[61] Of course, such measures can produce stability, at least in the short run, but certainly not the democratic sort.

The fact that the process described in this article clearly does not apply to all groups in the same way, and to some not at all, prompts several conclusions. First, more research is needed on how the political mobilization of particular ethnic groups has been and continues to be accommodated and managed in ways that help maintain democratic stability. It is still unclear how extensively the Irish American example is applicable to other major ethnic groups in the United States. Second, the process can only be considered partial and incomplete. There is plenty of room for improvement by providing greater fairness and equality to all groups, while still maintaining stability. Finally, the "we made it in America so why can't you" charge leveled against some groups is nonsense. If there is anything the Irish American case shows, it is that the system affords some groups a much greater opportunity for mobilization and is more responsive to their needs and interests than others.

With immigrants continuing to enter the United States, and with some older ethnic groups remaining unassimilated to a significant degree, it is clear that American democratic politics will continue to face the problem of maintaining stability within a multiethnic society. Its prospects are good. While two of the factors discussed above are rooted in the role of urban political machines that have largely disappeared from the political landscape, the general pattern remains strong, and the role of ethnic coalitions in local politics is still vitally important in many areas. The United States has an established tradition of accommodating the political mobilization of most ethnic groups within its political structures in ways that uphold democratic norms and reduce the likelihood of instability. This process has been relatively successful over time, and there is little reason to believe it will not continue to be so. The challenge for the future is to extend the process by accommodating the political mobilization of ethnic groups in ways that are less discriminatory while at the same time continuing to manage the always present potential for ethnic conflict in ways that promote stable and nonviolent outcomes.*

[61] Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, xxiii–xxiv.

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The Maastricht Treaty As High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration

MICHAEL J. BAUN

In December 1991, European Community leaders met in the Dutch town of Maastricht and gave their approval to the Treaty on European Union. At the time, the treaty—whose centerpiece was an agreement to achieve full monetary union by the end of the decade—was hailed as a monumental step in the direction of European economic and political unity. Within a matter of months, however, the Maastricht Treaty was in grave trouble; not only did it face growing popular opposition to ratification in several countries, but its ambitious plans for monetary union were undermined by economic stagnation and crisis. Nevertheless, the treaty was finally ratified and enacted on 1 November 1993. The European Community then became officially known as the European Union. Since this article refers mainly to events prior to November 1993, however, the term European Community (EC) will be used throughout. While there are now many who believe that it will never be fully implemented, the Maastricht Treaty still represents a significant moment in the history of European integration.

Explaining the Maastricht Treaty and its meaning for European integration after the cold war is the purpose of this article. One possible explanation of the treaty, focusing on the core agreement on monetary union, views it as mainly a competitive response by the EC and its member countries to global economic developments and forces.[1] This political economy thesis is in broad accord with popular American perceptions of the treaty, which emphasize the role of a unified Europe as a powerful economic competitor of the United States in an emerging

[1] On the political economy approach to explaining EC institutional development, see Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s" in Keohane and Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 22–23.

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tripolar world. A second explanation can be derived from neofunctionalist theories of European integration, which have enjoyed a resurgence of academic interest in recent years; this basically explains the agreement on monetary union as an inevitable outgrowth, or spillover effect, of the dynamic of economic integration unleashed by the Community's single-market project (Europe 1992) in the 1980s.[2]

In this article, however, I will argue that the Maastricht Treaty, while it does in fact have important roots in economic and institutional developments prior to 1989, must be understood primarily as a political response by EC countries to German unification and the end of the cold war. In particular, it represents a political bargain between the EC's two most important members, Germany and France, each of whom viewed the agreement as a means of securing vital national interests. In order to demonstrate this, the article traces the history of the Maastricht process, beginning with its origins in pre-1989 developments and continuing through the negotiation of the treaty and the subsequent ratification crisis. Because of its central importance for understanding the dynamics of the treaty process, the article focuses a good deal of attention on the months immediately following the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In the conclusion, I argue that the high politics nature of the Maastricht Treaty is both a divergence from the model of EC politics typical of the previous three decades and an indication of the changing nature of European integration after the cold war.

The Roots of Maastricht: The EMS and Delors Plan

Although the Maastricht Treaty was essentially a political response to German unification and the end of the cold war, it does have roots in economic and institutional developments prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall. An initial attempt at European monetary union had been made some two decades earlier, but foundered in the midst of global monetary instability in the early-1970s.[3] By 1978, however, economic and political conditions in Europe favored a second attempt at monetary cooperation. Taking the lead in this initiative were German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who presented a joint proposal on monetary cooperation to the EC summit in April. This resulted in the formal establishment in December 1978 of the European Monetary System (EMS).[4] At the core of the EMS was the European Exchange

[2] For examples of the neofunctionalist approach, see Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC," *Millennium* 20 (Spring 1991): 1–22; David Mutimer, "1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism Reconsidered," *Journal of European Integration* 13 (Fall 1989): 75–101. For a general review of theories of European integration, see Keohane and Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," 1–39.

[3] For details, see Loukas Tsoukalis, *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977).

[4] On the creation of the EMS, see Peter Ludlow, *The Making of the European Monetary System* (London: Butterworth, 1982).

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Rate Mechanism (ERM), a system of fixed exchange rates that permitted a limited (2.25 percent) fluctuation around the official established rate for national currencies. A wider band of 6 percent was created for the Italian lira as a concession to the relative weakness of that country's economy. At the limits of the fluctuation bands, central banks would be required to intervene in order to maintain currency values within the established margins.

In terms of its own stated objective of creating "a zone of monetary stability in Europe,"[5] the EMS proved to be fairly successful; in the 1980s the Community experienced the reduction of both inflation and exchange-rate instability.[6] While there is some disagreement about the extent to which the institutional mechanisms of the EMS alone can be given the credit for these trends—versus international developments and the domestic policy commitments of individual European states, for instance—there can be little doubt that the EMS is a major part of the explanation. At the same time, others have noted that the EMS has had positive political consequences through promoting habits of cooperation in economic and monetary affairs among European governments, thus helping to prepare the grounds for further steps towards monetary union.[7]

The EMS has not been without its negative aspects, however. Chief among these are declining rates of economic growth in Europe throughout the 1980s, which some have attributed to a built-in deflationary or antigrowth bias of the system. A primary reason for this, it has been argued, is that the EMS is an "asymmetrical" system that is dominated by the conservative monetary priorities of Germany and its independent central bank (the Bundesbank). Under the rules of the EMS, Germany, because it has Europe's strongest economy and most stable currency, basically determines European monetary policies. At the same time, however, the Bundesbank, which has the statutory mandate to fight inflation and maintain the stability of the D-mark, is under no formal obligation to take into consideration the economic and political needs of other EMS members when making its policies, nor to intervene in currency markets or otherwise act to defend exchange rates. This task falls instead to weaker countries in the system.[8] This asymmetry of the EMS has brought charges of German hegemony and has been the source of considerable resentment among other EC countries. In particular, France has chafed under the restrictions of German monetary dominance. A key moment came in 1983, when the Socialist government of François Mitterrand was forced to abandon its expansionary economic program in order

[5] See the "Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the Establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and Related Matters," reprinted in ibid., 303–308.

[6] Elke Thiel, "Changing Patterns of Monetary Interdependence" in William Wallace, ed., *The Dynamics of European Integration* (London: Pinter, 1990), 76.

[7] John T. Woolley, "Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions" in Alberta Sbragia, ed., *Euro-Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 187–188.

[8] On the issue of the EMS' deflationary bias and its asymmetry, see Loukas Tsoukalis, "The Political Economy of the European System" in Paolo Guerrieri and Piercarlo Padoan, eds., *The Political Economy of European Monetary Integration* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 59–61, 65.

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to remain within the EMS. Since this point, establishing control over German monetary policy through the creation of supranational monetary institutions has been a central objective of the French government.

Such political considerations, largely centering on the resentment of German monetary dominance, would prove to be the primary force behind new initiatives for European monetary union in the late 1980s. There were also functional economic reasons for supporting this goal, however, which stemmed from the Community's efforts to liberalize its internal market. In the mid-1980s, in an attempt to overcome prolonged economic stagnation and bolster Europe's competitiveness against the more dynamic economies of the United States and Pacific Rim, the EC launched its so-called 1992 project. This was aimed at increasing economic efficiency and growth through the removal of all national barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor within the Community. For many, however, the continued existence of different national currencies remained a major barrier to trade and cross-border economic efficiency. By the end of the 1980s, therefore, with the single market project already well underway, the sentiment was growing that Europe must create a currency and monetary union if true economic integration was to be achieved. At the same time, the goal of monetary union enjoyed strong support from Community officials, particularly Commission President Jacques Delors, who saw it as a means for advancing the European project toward its ultimate destination of political union.

A renewed attempt at monetary union began in January 1988, with a French proposal for the creation of a European central bank. While the German government was wary, it agreed, mainly for political reasons, to allow discussion of the idea by the Community—despite the strong opposition of the Bundesbank, which remained hostile to any attempts to undermine its sovereignty over monetary policy.[9] At the June 1988 EC summit in Hannover, therefore, national government leaders decided to establish a commission under the chairmanship of Delors to study the possibilities for monetary union. Nearly one year later, in April 1989, the commission made public the so-called Delors Plan. This envisaged a three-stage process leading to full monetary and currency union. In the first stage, which was set to begin on 1 July 1990, closer coordination of national monetary policies would begin and controls on transborder capital movements within the Community would be terminated. In stage two, for which no starting date was proposed, the margin for fluctuation of national currencies within the ERM would be tightened and a European system of central banks—leading to the creation of a single regional bank—would be established. In the third and final stage, a single currency would be created to be managed by the European central bank, and EC authorities would assume greater powers to direct the economic and financial policies of members states.[10]

[9] *The Economist*, 30 January 1988, 35; 13 February 1988, 76–79; 5 March 1988, 14.
[10] For a summary of the Delors Report, see *The Economist*, 22 April 1989, 45–46.

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The contents of the Delors Plan were endorsed by national leaders at the June 1989 Madrid summit, although Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed some strong reservations. In addition to approving the July 1990 date for beginning stage one, Community leaders also decided to convene a special intergovernmental conference to discuss the remaining steps for achieving economic and monetary union (EMU). Although no specific date was set, it was generally felt that this conference should begin sometime in the second half of 1990, after stage one had been initiated. It was agreed, however, to make the final decision on the starting date for this conference at the EC summit scheduled for December 1989 in Strasbourg.[11]

The New German Question and the EC

By the middle of 1989, the discussion of European monetary union was already well underway. The growing political instability in Eastern Europe, however, culminating in the dramatic opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, placed the issue of monetary union in a wholly new context. Most importantly, with the cold war division of Europe now coming to an end and the long-moribund hopes for German unification suddenly revived, the age-old "German question" was once again on the agenda. As in the past, this concerned the identity and role of a powerful Germany in the center of a politically fragmented Europe. During the cold war era, this problem had been temporarily resolved through the division of Germany into two separate states and their incorporation into competing political-military blocs. With the demise of the communist system and the increased prospects for German unification, however, the problem of containing German power now made its reappearance. In particular, many Europeans feared that a united and unbound Germany might in the future become increasingly independent and nationalistic, and thus turn away from the course of peaceful integration into Western institutions that had characterized the postwar identity and policy of the Federal Republic.

Concern about the power and orientation of a united Germany led many European leaders to espouse a strengthening or deepening of EC institutions; this, it was believed, would serve to permanently bind Germany to the Community, thus preventing a more independent or nationalistic course in the future. While this was a widely shared view within the Community, among its most prominent exponents was Commission President Delors, who in a speech in October 1989 argued that the construction of a federal Europe was "the only satisfactory and acceptable response to the German question."[12] The most important advocate of this view, however, was the French government. Perhaps more than any other country, France stood to lose from unification and the end of the cold war. Not only would a united Germany be larger than France, but

[11] *The Economist*, 1 July 1989, 37–38.
[12] *The Economist*, 21 October 1989, 50.

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the end of the cold war meant a removal of international constraints on German sovereignty that had been in place for the previous four decades and that had given Paris important advantages in its bilateral relations with Bonn. At the same time, the shift from a security order dominated by military power and concerns to one based on economics favored the German civilian power over the French nuclear state. In the new Europe, in other words, the value of the D-mark would be significantly enhanced relative to that of the bomb.[13] To compensate for these developments, France sought a deepening of EC structures, which would allow it to retain some influence and control over its powerful neighbor. At the same time, France feared that an EC that neglected further integration and remained instead a simple trading bloc would be more capable of being dominated in the future by Germany, and that within such a Community, France's own national standing would be even further diminished.[14]

In opposition to this majority view, the British government under Prime Minister Thatcher argued against EC deepening, and instead gave priority to widening the Community to incorporate new members. This would include not only such advanced economies as Sweden, Austria, and other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), but also the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe. Among the main considerations behind this strategy was the need to stabilize the new democracies in Eastern Europe by integrating them into the EC. There was also the traditional British reluctance to surrender further aspects of national sovereignty to supranational institutions, since rapid expansion of the Community would favor its evolution into a looser confederation of independent states rather than a more unified federal Europe. Another important motivation for Britain, however, was fear of German power. According to Thatcher and in direct contrast to the French position, a tightly integrated EC would be more easily dominated by Germany than would a broader grouping of sovereign states.[15] Nevertheless, the British preference for widening over deepening was a minority viewpoint within the Community and would remain so throughout the Maastricht negotiations.

For its part, Germany was also in favor of deepening the EC, although it was adamant that this should not preclude expanding the Community, and indeed claimed that widening and deepening could occur together. The German preference for integration had its basis in fundamental national economic and political interests, as well as in the experiences of history. In general terms, West Germany had been a primary beneficiary of integration into international institutions over

[13] Dominique Moisi, "Die Mark und die Bombe," *Die Zeit*, 9 December 1988; on Germany as a "civilian power," see Hans Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Winter 1990/1991): 91–106.

[14] For an overview of France's EC policy and of different national visions for post-cold war Europe, see Ole Waever, "Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian," *International Affairs* 66 (July 1990): 477–494.

[15] On the British position, see Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 759–763, 789–815.

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the past four decades and viewed a continuance of this pattern as the key to its future economic prosperity and political security. More immediately, however, the German government in 1989–1990 was well aware of the suspicions and fears of its neighbors, and was anxious to dispel them. Chancellor Helmut Kohl in particular was determined to show that German unification and European integration were not contradictory but instead complimentary or mutually reinforcing processes. In addition, Kohl placed a high priority on maintaining positive relations with France as the basis for Germany's European policy. For these reasons, he viewed Germany's agreement to further EC integration and in particular monetary union as the price that had to be paid for gaining Europe's acceptance of German unification.[16]

After the Wall

Even before the opening of the Berlin Wall, developments in Eastern Europe were raising concerns among Germany's EC partners about Bonn's commitment to European integration, prompting some Community leaders—including Mitterrand and Delors—to advocate an accelerated pace for EMU negotiations.[17] The dramatic opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, however, gave the monetary union issue an even greater urgency. Sensing the concerns of Germany's neighbors, Chancellor Kohl and other government leaders made repeated assertions of commitment to the EC and Western institutions in the days and weeks following the opening of the Wall. In a 16 November address to the federal parliament (Bundestag), for instance, Kohl declared that the prospects for unification would not diminish Germany's enthusiasm for the EC, and that indeed it would be a "fatal error" to slow the pace of European integration at this time.[18] The chancellor also underlined Bonn's continued commitment to European union at a special EC summit in Paris on 18 November, declaring that further integration was "now more than ever of prime importance."[19] On 22 November in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Kohl stressed yet again his view that the processes of German unification and European integration must be closely linked.[20]

Whatever success Bonn may have had in convincing others of its commitment to European integration was dissipated, however, by Chancellor Kohl's stunning

[16] On the relationship between German unification and European integration, see Kohl's speech to the Bundestag ("Regierungserklaerung") on 10 May 1990, reprinted in *Europa-Archiv* 45 (1991): D289–294; on Germany's EC policy more generally, see Gerd Langguth, "Deutschland, die EG und die Architektur Europas," *Aussenpolitik* 42 (1991): 136–145.

[17] See the statements made by Delors and Mitterrand in October 1989, cited in *The Economist*, 21 October 1989, 50; and 28 October 1989, 58.

[18] Serge Schemann, "Kohl Says Bonn Will Not Press East Germany on Unification," *New York Times*, 17 November 1989.

[19] *The Week in Germany*, 24 November 1989, 1.

[20] Ibid., 2.

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announcement on 28 November of a ten-point plan for confederation of the two German states.[21] The announcement of the plan caught other European governments by surprise, with many being upset that they were not consulted beforehand. As a result, it only confirmed the already substantial fears of many European leaders that Bonn's proclamations of commitment to the EC were essentially rhetorical, and that Germany was set to become more independent.[22] It also further soured the mood prior to the crucial EC summit in Strasbourg. Increasingly, Germany's position on monetary union and in particular on the issue of a timetable for EMU negotiations had become viewed as a key test of its commitment to the Community and European integration. Attention now focused on Strasbourg, with President Mitterrand and others making it known that they expected a positive gesture from Bonn on EMU at this meeting. In the admonitory words of one Paris official, just prior to the summit: "Up to now, West Germany, France and the European Commission had been the engines of integration. We are going to have to see how the Germans behave. But if they don't push ahead, there will be a terrible backlash in Europe."[23]

Also generating unease among Germany's EC partners was the growing debate over monetary union within Germany and the apparent strength of sentiment within the federal government that EMU negotiations should be delayed. In the weeks following the opening of the Wall, the Bundesbank and Finance Ministry—both already skeptical of monetary union plans because of the threat they posed to Bundesbank sovereignty—had begun to argue more forcefully that in view of the enhanced prospects for German unification, the timing for negotiations was not ripe. Instead, they argued that more preparatory work needed to be done, and that attention should focus for now on completing the single market project and the first phase of EMU. Added to such technical economic considerations were political ones: leaders of the governing coalition parties—the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic party (FDP)—feared that rapid moves towards monetary union could leave the federal government vulnerable to charges from the nationalist right that it was not putting German interests first but was instead selling out to other countries by giving away the beloved D-mark. To avoid it becoming a campaign issue, they favored withholding any decision to begin a conference on monetary union until after the federal elections scheduled for late 1990. In contrast to this view, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher favored setting firm dates for the con-

[21] "A Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe" (Official Translation), *Statements and Speeches*, vol. xii, no. 25 (New York: German Information Center, 19 December 1989).

[22] While the initial public reaction of EC governments to the ten-point plan was largely positive, considerable dismay was expressed in private. At a 4 December NATO meeting, for instance, several European governments voiced strong complaints to U.S. President Bush about German behavior. Craig R. Whitney, "Rapid Change in East Is Taking a Toll on the Western Allies," *New York Times*, 6 December 1989.

[23] Alan Riding, "Mitterrand Backs Europe Integration," *New York Times*, 8 December 1989.

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ference and a timetable for EMU. He argued that a failure to do so would be interpreted by Paris and other national governments as a sign that Bonn was backtracking on its commitment to European integration.[24]

Further problems were created by a letter from the chancellor to Mitterrand just days before the summit, in which Kohl argued against setting a firm date for beginning the monetary union conference and proposed a slower timetable for EMU than that favored by France. Moreover, in the letter Kohl appeared to link German approval of further steps towards monetary union to EC political-institutional reform and especially the strengthening of the European Parliament, something to which France was opposed.[25] Kohl's letter stunned the French government, which warned Bonn of a crisis in bilateral relations and asserted that any wavering on the issue of monetary union would be interpreted by other countries as a sign of weakening German commitment to the EC and an indication that Bonn was more interested in pursuing unification than European integration. At the same time, the German demands for political-institutional reform were viewed as a ploy to delay EMU. Commission President Delors, for example, while supporting the German call for strengthening the European Parliament ("One cannot have economic and monetary union without institutional reform and a democratic counterweight"), stated that such institutional changes "must not be made a precondition" for negotiations on monetary union. Expressing his fear that the summit might end in failure and bitterness, Delors warned of "serious crises" for the EC if national leaders were not able to reach agreement on a starting date for the EMU conference.[26]

The Kohl letter produced a flurry of consultations among French, German, and EC officials, with Bonn striving to downplay the rift with Paris over EMU. In the end, just hours before the opening of the summit, a compromise was reached. The German government accepted the French demand that an EMU conference would begin in the second half of 1990, while Paris conceded the German request to delay this until after the federal elections in early December. As a result, it was agreed that the conference would be formally opened at the EC summit scheduled for mid-December, with actual negotiations beginning in early 1991.[27] In addition to delaying the conference until after the federal elections, the Germans gained another concession—viewed as vital for domestic political reasons—by extracting from France and other EC countries a postsummit statement endorsing the idea of a single German state, as long as unification took place within the context of broader European integration. Through this trade-off, "the risk . . . of a rupture" in Franco–German relations, as Mitterrand put it,

[24] David Marsh, "Kohl Wants Meeting on EMU Put Off," *Financial Times*, 7 December 1989, 2; *The Week in Germany*, 1 December 1989, 6.

[25] Marsh, "Kohl Wants Meeting"; Riding, "Mitterrand."

[26] "Bonn Strives to Calm Summit Concert," *Financial Times*, 8 December 1989, 24.

[27] David Buchan, Robert Mauthner, and Ian Davidson, "EC Leaders Isolate Thatcher at Summit," *Financial Times*, 9–10 December 1989, 1; Alan Riding, "European Leaders Give their Backing to Monetary Plan," *New York Times*, 9 December 1989; *The Week in Germany*, 15 December 1989, 5.

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"was avoided."[28] The Germans themselves were pleased with the outcome of the meeting, which Kohl personally described as "extraordinarily successful."[29]

The Franco-German Rift

The compromise achieved by EC leaders at Strasbourg did not end the tensions between Bonn and its neighbors, however. In particular, despite the conciliatory rhetoric after the summit, there had emerged a growing rift between Germany and France over the issue of unification. Paris was irritated at not being consulted about inter-German developments and felt increasingly powerless and in danger of being pushed to the sidelines of European politics. For this reason, in the initial months after the opening of the Wall, the French government flirted with the strategy of blocking German unification.

In a visit to Bonn in early November 1989, President Mitterrand had publicly voiced his support for an eventual unification of the two German states, bravely proclaiming that "I am not afraid of reunification."[30] As the momentum for unification began to build, however, he increasingly sought to delay the inevitable. In early December, Mitterrand traveled to the Soviet Union, thus reawakening in Bonn old fears of a Franco–Russian alliance directed against Germany. While in Kiev on 6 December, Mitterrand delivered a speech in which he pointedly warned Bonn not to force the pace of unification, arguing that to do so could upset the political balance in Europe and have negative consequences for European integration. Further EC integration, he argued, should precede "changing borders" (that is, unification).[31] While on this trip, Mitterrand sought the help of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in preventing unification from taking place. He also tried to use the possible impact of unification on internal Soviet politics as leverage, telling Kohl in a private meeting some weeks later that Gorbachev had informed him on this trip that "the day German unification is announced, a two line communique will announce that a marshal is seated in my chair."[32]

Mitterrand's efforts to delay unification, along with the open questioning of German intentions and loyalties by Paris, annoyed Bonn greatly. Perhaps most galling, however, was the French president's visit to East Germany in late December, parallel to Chancellor Kohl's first trip to the GDR after the Wall's opening. In a speech delivered in Leipzig, Mitterrand repeated his warnings about a rush to unity, asserting that while he supported the right of the German

[28] Steven Greenhouse, "European Talks Called a Success," *New York Times*, 11 December 1989; Robert Mauthner, "States Tackle Minefield of Reunification," *Financial Times*, 11 December 1989, 3.

[29] Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 72.

[30] Craig R. Whitney, "Unease Fills Western Allies over Rapid Changes in East," *New York Times*, 1 December 1989.

[31] "Mitterrand, in Kiev, Warns Bonn Not to Press Reunification Issue," *New York Times*, 7 December 1989.

[32] Julius W. Friend, *The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950–1990* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 81–82.

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people to self-determination, such decisions must also "take the European balance into account."[33] Not only the message, but also the fact of the visit itself greatly upset officials in Bonn, who correctly saw the first visit to communist East Germany by a Western head of state as an attempt to shore up a rapidly crumbling GDR and thus delay the unification process. The Kohl government had expressed its concerns about the trip to Mitterrand beforehand, but to no avail. For this reason, in the words of one top adviser to the chancellor, the trip was viewed by the German government as an "unfriendly" act.[34] As such, it accentuated a growing deterioration of relations between France and Germany.

In early 1990 the tensions in Franco–German relations grew as the momentum for rapid German unification continued to build. Against this background, Mitterrand sought to use the issue of Poland's border with East Germany as a lever to influence inter-German developments. At an 18 February meeting with Kohl in Paris, the French president underlined his acceptance of German unity and indicated approval of plans for German monetary union, which had been announced in the previous week; at the same time, however, he stressed the need for formal recognition by Germany of the Polish border as a precondition for unification.[35] Then, on 9 March, Mitterrand appeared at a joint press conference in Paris with Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, at which he declared his support for Poland's demand to be represented at the "two-plus-four" talks in discussions over the border issue, something the Germans strongly opposed. Also, Mitterrand termed inadequate the Bundestag resolution of the previous day, which had declared the inviolability of the Polish border but put off a formal recognition until after parliamentary elections in a unified Germany. This set France apart from both the United States and Britain, which had indicated their satisfaction with the resolution. To German officials, it had become clear that the French government intended to act as the representative of Polish interests among the Western powers and that French support of Polish demands was a ploy to slow down the unification process.[36]

From the middle of March, however, the French strategy toward Germany underwent rapid revision. Suddenly, positive signals on German unification began to come out of Paris, and French officials instead focused their efforts on containing Germany by integrating it more closely into the EC. Perhaps influenced by the stunning electoral triumph for Kohl and the Christian Democrats in the 18 March East German elections, which meant a clear path for rapid unification, the French government decided that a single German state was now inevitable, and sooner rather than later. This change in France's position was indicated by

[33] "Mitterrand, in East Germany, Calls for Caution on Unification," *New York Times*, 22 December 1989.

[34] Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 95: also Ronald Tiersky, "France in the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Spring 1992): 132.

[35] Teltschik, *329 Tage*, 150–151.

[36] Ibid., 164–172.

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the statements of Foreign Minister Roland Dumas on 20 March, in which Bonn was urged to absorb the GDR and complete the unification process as quickly as possible so that it could once again turn its attention to EC affairs. The real challenge now, Dumas claimed, was "to advance further, faster and more deeply toward building Europe," as a political as well as an economic entity.[37]

The Road to Rome

The conflict between France and Germany had represented a potential crisis for the EC. As has been frequently noted, these are the two most important members of the Community, and Franco–German cooperation has traditionally been the motor of successful efforts at European integration. By the end of March 1990, however, it was apparent that the Franco–German axis was functioning once again, and from this point plans for further EC integration moved rapidly forward.

An important basis for reconciliation was French acceptance of German demands on political union. While monetary union remained the key objective of France, Germany sought a stronger European parliament and more cooperation in foreign and defense policy. Such goals were not only in keeping with Germany's federalist leanings, but they also provided Germany with multilateralist cover for unification and its enhanced power position in Europe. In addition, gains on political union were necessary for domestic political reasons, so that Chancellor Kohl could claim to have extracted something in return for agreeing to surrender the D-mark and German monetary sovereignty. As a result, after weeks of secretive bilateral bargaining, Kohl and Mitterrand sent a joint letter to the president of the European Council on 19 April in which they not only proposed an accelerated pace for monetary union but also called for new initiatives on political union. For this purpose, the letter suggested that a second intergovernmental conference on political union be held parallel to the one on EMU. Both conferences, it was proposed, should begin in December and conclude their work within a year, thus allowing the agreements to be ratified and put into effect by the beginning of 1993.[38]

As so often in the past, Franco-German cooperation resulted in rapid EC movement. The suggested timetable for EMU negotiations was subsequently adopted by the European Council at a special meeting in Dublin on 28 April.[39] At their regularly-scheduled summit in Dublin on 25–26 June, Community leaders

[37] Alan Riding, "France Urges West Germany to Speed Unification," *New York Times*, 21 March 1990.

[38] George Graham, David Marsh, and Philip Stephens, "Bonn and Paris Move to Speed European Unity," *Financial Times*, 20 April 1990, 1.

[39] Alan Riding, "Europe United?" *New York Times*, 28 April 1990; Craig R. Whitney, "Europe's Alliance Seeks Closer Ties," *New York Times*, 29 April 1990; David Buchan and Robert Mauthner, "Political Union Talks in Prospect after EC Summit," *Financial Times*, 30 April 1990.

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formally approved a second conference on political union and announced that both sets of negotiations would begin in mid-December.[40]

The decision to launch parallel conferences on monetary and political union was a significant achievement for France and other Community countries, who remained keen to gain a firm German commitment to EMU. It also represented, however, a great diplomatic success for the Bonn government and a personal triumph for Kohl. By playing a key role in bringing this about, the chancellor had gone a long way toward overcoming the doubts of other EC governments about Germany's commitment to integration and toward convincing them of the sincerity of Bonn's claim that German unity and European integration were not contradictory processes. That this was the case was indicated by the statement of EC leaders at the April summit, in which they warmly welcomed German unity, and voiced their confidence "that German unification . . . will be a positive factor in the development of Europe as a whole and of the Community in particular."[41]

Nevertheless, the road to Rome over the ensuing months would not be a smooth one. By the fall, there were renewed doubts about Germany's commitment to monetary union, which stemmed from the increasingly vocal opposition to EMU of German monetary and financial authorities. In particular the Bundesbank, having been forced to accept against its strong disapproval rapid German monetary union, was determined to delay or alter plans for EMU and to ensure that important decisions affecting German monetary stability were not once again made, as Bundesbank chief Karl Otto Pöhl had put it, for essentially "symbolic" or political reasons.[42] The Bundesbank based its campaign against EMU on the argument that much greater convergence in the economic conditions and performance of EC countries was necessary before monetary union would be possible. This meant, of course, convergence at German standards of low levels of inflation, interest rates, and budget deficits, something that would necessitate a long period of transition before full EMU could come into effect. To ensure that such convergence took place, the Bundesbank opposed setting any firm timetable for the remaining stages of EMU. In addition, it promoted the possibility of a two-speed approach to EMU, whereby full monetary integration would initially take place among a small group of countries that had already achieved substantial economic convergence—such as Germany, France, and the Benelux countries—with other countries being allowed to join later, once their economies were ready.[43]

By the fall it was apparent that the Bundesbank's counterattack against EMU was having some effect, as Chancellor Kohl and other government officials began

[40] *The Week In Germany*, 29 June 1990, 2.

[41] "German Unity Welcomed," *Financial Times*, 30 April 1990, 2.

[42] George Graham, "Paris and Bonn Back Monetary Union Plan," *Financial Times*, 7 April 1990, 2.

[43] On the Bundesbank's views on EMU, see *The Week in Germany*, 15 June 1990, 5; *The Economist*, 7 July 1990, 25; 1 September 1990, 48; 15 September 1990, 61–62; "Survey on Germany," *Financial Times*, 29 October 1990, 12.

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to publicly express doubts that firm dates for the future stages of EMU could be set. This led to a growing uncertainty in Europe about Bonn's support for the goal of monetary union.[44] In a warning to the German government issued in September, Commission President Delors admitted that setting firm dates for EMU was a "way of testing Germany's commitment to economic and monetary union," and that this was necessary to "bind Germany into Europe irreversibly."[45] Delors went on to question the commitment of Germany to further European integration by asking, "Do the Germans really want economic and monetary union? Quite frankly, I often wonder."[46]

An important breakthrough occurred in October, however, when Kohl communicated to Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, the current president of the European Council, that he was now ready to set firmer dates for the next stages of EMU. Kohl also indicated that because of the uncertain political and economic climate in Germany, with new federal elections taking place in early December and growing economic problems stemming from unification, he could not guarantee that he would be able to make a similar commitment at the Rome summit in December. This implied a window of opportunity that Andreotti and other EC leaders quickly decided to seize.[47] As a result, at a special EC summit in Rome on 27–28 October the decision was made that stage two of EMU should begin on 1 January 1994, provided certain conditions were met. These were rather minimal, consisting mainly of completion of the 1992 single-market project, the beginning of a process to make national central banks independent by the start of stage three, and limitations on the fiscal policies of member states. It was also decided that a European monetary institution would be established at the beginning of stage two, and that the next phase would begin within three years of the launching of the second stage. These decisions left numerous important questions unanswered, but the general parameters and timetable for a treaty on monetary union had now been set.[48]

Several weeks later, on 7 December, a joint proposal was made by Kohl and Mitterrand, which laid the tracks for negotiations on political union. This centered on the development of a "common foreign and security policy, which could in time lead to a common defense." While the key innovation in foreign policy would be more majority voting in the European Council, the basis for a common defense would be a revitalized West European Union (WEU). In addition, the proposal called for giving more powers to the European Parliament, the creation of a common "European Citizenship," and the extension of EC competencies in such areas as environmental, health, social, and energy policy. It also called for

[44] *The Economist*, 22 September 1990, 60.

[45] Ibid., 29 September 1990, 58.

[46] Alan Riding, "Hesitation Now Greets Europe's Unity Plans," *New York Times*, 1 October 1990.

[47] *The Economist*, 3 November 1990, 55.

[48] Ibid., 55–59; David Buchan and John Wyles, "Thatcher Left Trailing as a Summit Fixes EMU Date," *Financial Times*, 29 October 1990, 1.

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greater intergovernmental cooperation on internal security and police matters. Beyond its practical significance for the upcoming intergovernmental conference on political union, the joint proposal was of great symbolic importance to the governments of France and Germany. After the tensions experienced over the previous year, both Paris and Bonn viewed it as an indicator that the Franco–German partnership had survived the test of German unification and remained the primary motor of European integration.[49]

The Maastricht Treaty

On 15 December 1990, EC leaders met in Rome and formally launched the dual intergovernmental conferences on monetary and political union. While the EMU conference began with a firm timetable and outline for agreement, there remained much to be negotiated and determined. Key points of dispute included: the exact nature of stage two, including the powers and duties of the new European monetary institution during this period; the nature of the final transition to stage three, including questions of timing and the issue of precisely which countries under what terms would be permitted to join full EMU; and the nature of stage three itself, including the role of EC authorities in the making of national budgetary and fiscal policies, and the question of whether there should be a common currency, or if instead the values of national currencies should simply be permanently fixed. On one issue there was relatively little argument, however, and that was the organization and nature of the European central bank. In fact, it had largely been decided before the conference even began that the future Eurofed would basically replicate the German Bundesbank, with independence from political authority and a statutory mandate to fight inflation.

In contrast to the EMU conference, the discussions on political union were much less focused. This, in part, was due to the greater diversity of issues being discussed, which in turn meant a proliferation of the national and nonstate interests involved. At bottom, however, the key difference between the two conferences was their divergent status and relative importance. While monetary union was the core objective of most EC countries and was viewed as the centerpiece of a strategy to make German unification compatible with European integration, the political union conference was largely a set of side-bargains. Most importantly, it was viewed as a concession to the German government, which needed an agreement on political union so that an EMU treaty would be politically defensible at home.

After months of negotiations, final agreement on many important issues was not reached until the days leading up to the Maastricht summit, and in some instances compromises were hurriedly pieced together at the summit itself. The

[49] Alan Riding, "Regional Defense Plan Urged for Europe," *New York Times*, 8 December 1990; Ian Davidson, "Joint European Foreign Policy Urged by France and Germany," *Financial Times*, 8–9 December 1990, 1; *The Week in Germany*, 14 December 1990, 1.

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impetus for agreement came from a sense of urgency that stemmed from the impression that if the Community did not act now to forge an agreement that would permanently integrate Germany, it would be missing an historic opportunity that might never come again. Exemplary of these concerns were the views of Andre Szasz, deputy president of the Dutch central bank, who declared in late November that Maastricht possibly represented Europe's last chance to firmly bind a united Germany to Western Europe. Failing this, he claimed, it was inevitable that Germany would become more of a central European power with interests that increasingly diverged from the rest of the Community. For this reason, he argued, "If we do not grasp this opportunity there may not be another one."[50] These sentiments were also shared by Chancellor Kohl, who in public statements prior to the summit repeatedly noted that a failure to reach a treaty agreement would be catastrophic for the EC and could perhaps even mark "the beginning of the collapse of our Community."[51]

Spurred by a commonly felt sense of urgency, Community leaders met on 9–10 December and gave their approval to the Treaty on European Union. The centerpiece of the treaty was an agreement to achieve full monetary union by the end of the decade. According to the treaty, stage two of the EMU process would come into effect on 1 January 1994, with the establishment of a European Monetary Institute (EMI); while monetary sovereignty would remain in the hands of national authorities during this transitional phase, the EMI would help to coordinate national monetary policies and oversee the preparations for full EMU.At the end of stage two, the EMI would formally become the European Central Bank, an institution that would closely resemble the German Bundesbank in its organization and powers. The first opportunity for full EMU would come in 1996, if by then a majority of EC countries met a set of strict criteria for economic performance. If this was the case, a two-thirds vote in the European Council would be sufficient to approve the final transition to EMU, which would take place on 1 January 1997. Failing this, EMU would automatically come into existence in 1999, with the participation of all countries meeting the economic convergence criteria. As a price for its agreement to the treaty, which required the unanimous approval of EC member states, Britain was given an opt-out clause, which allowed it to delay making a final commitment to EMU. The same privilege was not extended to other countries, however.[52]

The agreement on monetary union was not matched, however, by success on political union. Instead, the Maastricht Treaty provided for only a limited

[50] David Marsh, "Dutch Fearful of Germany Going Its Own Way," *Financial Times*, 28 November 1991, 2.

[51] Stephen Kinzer, "France and Germany Issue Warning to Britain over European Community," *New York Times*, 16 November 1991.

[52] For details on the EMU agreement, see "Single Currency by 1999 Despite UK Objections," *Financial Times*, 10 December 1991; Alan Riding, "Europeans Accept a Single Currency and Bank by 1999," *New York Times*, 10 December 1991; Riding, "Europeans Agree on a Pact Forging New Political Ties and Integrating Economies," *New York Times*, 11 December 1991.

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enhancement of the powers of the European Parliament and contained vague commitments to work toward common foreign and defense policies. In addition, there was agreement to coordinate police and internal security affairs more closely, as well as the decision to make increased use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers on a number of policy issues. The treaty also called for a new intergovernmental conference in 1996 to review progress on the Maastricht agreements, with the possibility of taking further steps toward political union at that time. The limited outcome on political union was a particular disappointment for Chancellor Kohl, who had made progress in this area a requirement for Germany's agreement to EMU; repeatedly throughout the previous year, Kohl had proclaimed that monetary and political union were not separable but were instead two sides of the same coin.[53] Nevertheless, as the date for the Maastricht conference had approached, the chancellor backed away from his demands on political union, subsuming them to his overriding interest in gaining an acceptable EMU agreement.[54]

Also playing a role in the Maastricht compromise was the developing situation in Yugoslavia in the summer and fall of 1991 and the side-bargaining among EC governments this engendered. In the face of strong public pressure, the German government had sought early recognition by the EC of Slovenian and Croatian independence, something to which France and Britain were opposed. In the end, Bonn gained the agreement of other Community countries to recognize the independence of the two republics,[55] but only at the cost of German concessions on European union. For the French, who were opposed to giving greater powers to the European Parliament and Commission, the Kohl government agreed to reduce its demands on political union. Britain, on the other hand, used its position on Yugoslavia as leverage to secure German agreement to an opt-out on EMU.[56]

While the Maastricht Treaty contained a number of compromises, it represented a major victory for those countries concerned about the future strength and orientation of Germany. In the final analysis, they got what they wanted, which was a firm German commitment to monetary union with a definite timetable

[53] See, for instance, Kohl's 30 January 1991 speech before the German parliament, reprinted in *Europa-Archiv* 46 (1991): D135; also his speech of 20 May 1991 at Georgetown University, "The Agenda of German Politics in the Nineties," *Statements and Speeches* 14 (New York: German Information Center, 6 June 1991), 3.

[54] Quentin Peel and Robert Graham, "Kohl Holds Out Hope of Maastricht Compromise," *Financial Times*, 28 November 1991; Stephen Kinzer, "Germany Now Leading Campaign to Strengthen the European Community," *New York Times*, 1 December 1991.

[55] Formal EC recognition was given on 15 January 1992, but only after Germany, in a move that shocked its EC partners, broke ranks and announced it would unilaterally recognize Slovenia and Croatia in December. See *The Economist*, 21 December 1991, 57; Stephen Kinzer, "Slovenia and Croatia Get Bonn's Nod," *New York Times*, 24 December 1991; Kinzer, "Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup," *New York Times*, 16 January 1992.

[56] *The Economist*, 18 January 1992. On the role of the Yugoslavia crisis and the recognition issue, see John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round: Dodging the Problem," *The New Yorker*, 24 August 1992, 60–71.

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and a certain amount of automaticity. It was in particular a victory for France, which was desperately searching for ways to tie down and keep pace with its powerful neighbor. The German government could also claim victory, however, since it was able to ensure that a future European monetary regime would essentially replicate the German model; as a result, it could claim that EMU entailed little risk of a loss of monetary stability. Germany also gained acceptance of the need for economic convergence as a precondition for EMU and of adherence to a set of stringent economic criteria as a measure of this. Also of central importance was the provision for a two-speed movement to monetary union implicit in the treaty, in the event that not all EC countries were able to meet the specified convergence criteria. Perhaps most important of all to the Kohl government, however, was that by playing an active role in fathering the Maastricht Treaty Bonn had managed to calm the fears of its neighbors about an independent Germany, while providing convincing evidence of its continued commitment to European integration. Primarily for this reason, therefore, Kohl was able to declare the treaty a tremendous success and argue that as a result, "the way to European unity is irreversible."[57]

This assessment was soon to appear overly optimistic, however. After its official signing in February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty required the ratification of individual EC countries. There was little doubt, though, that this could be accomplished by the end of the year, thus allowing the treaty to go into effect on 1 January 1993. Within only a matter of months, however, the treaty was in trouble. Beginning with its rejection by Danish voters in a June 1992 referendum, the treaty was buffeted by a series of political and economic crises. The political backlash against Maastricht also manifested itself in the narrow win for the "yes" vote in the September French referendum and the growing opposition to EMU in Germany. Opposition stemmed mainly from popular concerns about EC bureaucratic centralization and the loss of national sovereignty at a time of great economic and social uncertainty. At the same time, the ambitious monetary union goals of the treaty were undermined by the currency crises of September 1992 and July–August 1993; these not only gave evidence of the still considerable economic divergence among EC countries, but they also shattered the ERM, the mechanism for preserving exchange-rate stability that was a necessary basis for EMU. Despite these political and economic crises, however, the Maastricht Treaty was finally ratified by all twelve EC countries and officially went into effect on 1 November 1993, although some ten months later than originally planned.[58]

As a consequence of both political opposition and economic instability, it appeared at the end of 1993 that some of the Maastricht Treaty's more lofty goals, along with the grander ideal of a federal Europe, might never be realized. Instead, a chastened Community was turning its attention to the pressing issues

[57] Stephen Kinzer, "Kohl Predicting Unity of Europe," *New York Times*, 14 December 1991.
[58] *The Economist*, 6 November 1993, 56–61.

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of enlargement and pragmatic institutional reform, not to mention joint efforts to combat the growing problems of economic stagnation and unemployment. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider the Maastricht Treaty dead. Among other things, many of its less heralded provisions, such as the enhanced role of the European Parliament and the increased use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers in a number of new policy areas, will undoubtedly make a significant impact on the future functioning and evolution of the Community and on the relationship between the EC and its member states. Beyond this, it is also much too early to bury the treaty's ambitious goals of monetary and political union. A notable feature of the turbulent ratification process was the unwavering support of European political elites for the treaty and in particular the close collaboration of the French and German governments to ensure that it survived. Especially significant in this regard were the actions of Chancellor Kohl and the German government to help the embattled Mitterrand during the tense ratification debate in France and to support the French franc during the exchange-rate crises of 1992 and 1993.[59] Such actions can only be explained in terms of the considerable political and symbolic importance attached to the treaty by both sides and the high politics nature of the stakes involved. As a consequence of this cooperation and joint action, the basis for some type of European monetary and political union in the future was preserved, even if this is a much more limited one than that envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty.

Conclusion

This article has argued that the Maastricht Treaty was essentially a political response by the EC and its member countries to German unification and the end of the cold war. In particular, it represents a bargain between the Community's two most important countries, Germany and France, each of whom viewed the agreement as a means of securing vital national interests. For Germany, the treaty was necessary to assuage the fears of its EC partners about a more independent united Germany and to convince them of its unflagging commitment to the Community and European integration. For France, an agreement on monetary union was a means of integrating Germany even more firmly into European institutions and structures and of retaining some degree of leverage and control over its powerful neighbor. The leaders of both countries also regarded the maintenance of positive bilateral relations as a crucial objective, and the Maastricht Treaty was viewed as a means for preserving the Franco–German axis of European cooperation in the post-cold war era. In the final analysis, the Maastricht Treaty was a mechanism by which German unification and European integration could be reconciled and made compatible.

[59] Admittedly, German support for the French franc in the latter crisis was more limited and grudging than in September 1992. For an account of the secretive Franco–German meetings on the exchange-rate crisis in July 1993, see David Marsh, "Faultlines Show in Franco-German Unity," *Financial Times*, 23 December 1993.

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The Maastricht Treaty, therefore, can be understood as an exercise in high politics, with the primary motivations of the key players being broad considerations of national security and advantage rather than technical solutions to domestic economic and social problems (low politics). This is nothing particularly new, for the entire history of the EC and European integration has involved a mixture of high and low politics. In particular, Germany and France have tended to view European integration in terms of broader strategic and positional interests. What is different in the present situation, however, at least from the pattern of EC politics over the previous three decades, is the dominance of high politics concerns. In this respect, the politics of European integration in the 1990s somewhat resembles that of the 1950s, when France and West Germany were first exploring new ways of living together—and developing new institutions for this purpose—in the postwar context of a divided Europe. At that time as well there were a number of false starts and failed attempts, with the European Defense Community (EDC) being perhaps the most outstanding example. Eventually, however, within the context of a stable cold war framework, EC politics settled into the low politics model of incremental adjustments in economic cooperation which characterized it for the past thirty years.

The end of the cold war and German unification, however, have given this comfortable and somewhat stagnant EC model a severe jolt. Suddenly, the Community and its member countries are confronted with the need to adjust to a radically new strategic and security environment. This includes not only an open and politically fragmenting Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, but also the likelihood of a greatly reduced security presence and role for the United States. Of greatest importance, though, is the revitalized German question. A key basis of EC politics in the past was a rough equilibrium of strength between France and Germany. Unification and the end of the cold war, however, have tilted the balance rather decisively in favor of Germany. The Maastricht Treaty, as this article has argued, was an attempt to address this new German question; in this, however, it has been only partially successful, and the problem of German power and hegemony remains. As a consequence, it can be expected that efforts to constrain German power and independence will continue to be a central feature of European politics and at the heart of the EC's future institutional development.

In conclusion, German unification and the end of cold war have considerably altered the dynamics of European integration. In a new and more unstable post-cold war context, it is to be expected that considerations of national security and position will once again come to dominate European and EC politics. To be sure, this new balance-of-power game will be played out within the context of established European and supranational institutions, thus mitigating its potential negative consequences. Nevertheless, as a result of its high politics nature, European integration after the cold war will become increasingly problematic and more highly politicized. The Maastricht Treaty is both a good example and indicator of this.

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Colin Powell's *American Journey* and the Eisenhower Precedent: A Review Essay

FRED I. GREENSTEIN

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was as American as log cabins and hard cider for victorious generals to go on to the nation's highest civilian office. George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Ulysses S. Grant owed their presidencies at least in part to their military eminence. In the twentieth century, however, military achievement has been a path to the White House only in the case of Dwight David Eisenhower. Then in 1995 another widely acclaimed general—Colin Luther Powell—emerged as a widely discussed presidential possibility. Indeed, until his dramatic announcement that he would not be a candidate for public office in 1996, Powell appeared well positioned to win the Republican nomination and the presidency itself.[1]

What light does the Eisenhower experience shed on the emergence of Colin Powell as a potential presidential contender? And what can be learned from Powell's autobiography and other available evidence about the qualities he would have brought to the presidency in 1996, or might bring to it in the future?[2]

In spite of the vast difference in magnitude between the European campaign in Europe in World War II and Operation Desert Storm, the parallels between

[1] On the pre-twentieth century experience, see Dorothy Goebel and Julius Goebel, Jr., *Generals in the White House* (New York: Doubleday, 1943). In an observation that is as relevant to the twentieth century experience as that of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the authors comment that "the public has turned to military chieftains because they have possessed reputation and have given promise to ideals beyond mere party" (p. 268).

[2] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995).

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Eisenhower and Powell are remarkable. Both rose from humble origins. Eisenhower's father was a mechanic; Powell's a stock clerk. Both were from groups that are peripheral to American society. Eisenhower's parents were members of a small Pennsylvania Dutch religious sect; Powell's were Jamaican immigrants. Yet both men came to be viewed as personifications of mainstream American values.

The resemblances continue. They both had lackluster undergraduate records, but excelled in their early assignments, gaining admission to the prestigious Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Eisenhower graduated first in his class, Powell second. Both were then assigned to high-level staff responsibilities and spent significant portions of the remainder of their military careers in Washington. Finally, both proved to have enormous popular appeal once they assumed publicly visible military commands.

Eisenhower was widely viewed as a presidential possibility even before he returned from Europe at the end of the war. In August 1945 Gallup asked Americans if there was anyone not presently in political life they would like to see in the White House. The main references were to two wartime generals, Eisenhower and Douglas A. MacArthur. But MacArthur's support proved to be narrowly confined to Republican conservatives, whereas Eisenhower's was broad-based, bipartisan, and strong.[3]

Interest in an Eisenhower presidential candidacy continued after his return to the United States, even though he insisted that he had no political aspirations and refused even to declare a party affiliation. Between 1945 and 1952, Eisenhower was successively chief of staff of the Army, president of Columbia University, and the first military commander of NATO. During that period pollsters consistently found that whether he was presented to the public as a hypothetical Republican or Democrat, Americans favored Eisenhower over all other potential candidates, including President Harry Truman.

In 1948 Eisenhower fended off efforts on the part of both Republicans and Democrats to draft him as their party's presidential nominee. The defeat of New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey by Truman and the need for the Republican party and possibly the Democratic party to select a nominee in 1952 insured that Eisenhower's political future would be a matter of continuing preoccupation in the political community. During his time as president of Columbia University, Eisenhower's occasional pronouncements on domestic policy made it evident that his leanings were more Republican than Democratic. But his internationalist convictions put him at odds with those Republicans who were disposed to retreat from the nation's global commitments, including Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft, the most probable 1952 GOP presidential nominee.

[3] On Eisenhower's pre-presidential career, see Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). On his public support between the end of the war and his accession to the presidency, see Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1955–56): 26–30; also, George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll, 1935–1971* (New York: Random House, 1973).

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Early in 1952 Republican internationalists entered Eisenhower in the New Hampshire Republican primary, although he was back in uniform as NATO commander and had not stated that he would run. He carried the field with 50 percent of the vote to 38 percent for Taft and 7 percent for Harold Stassen. The next week he received almost as many write-in votes in the Minnesota Republican primary as favorite-son Harold Stassen, whose name was the only one on the ballot. Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower declared his availability for the presidency and returned to the United States in June to compete actively for the nomination.

Colin Powell's political appeal in the months leading up to his announcement that he would not seek political office in 1996 was strikingly similar to that of Eisenhower in the period that ensued in his candidacy. The polls showed him to be phenomenally popular. In an April 1995 national survey, 72 percent of all respondents stated a positive view of Powell and only 9 percent were critical of him. Republican front runner Bob Dole's positives were 15 points lower than Powell's, and his negatives three times higher. And Phil Gramm, Pat Buchanan, and Newt Gingrich all had higher negatives than positives.[4]

When asked in September 1995 how they would vote if Powell ran as an independent in a three-way race with President Clinton and Dole, Gallup Poll respondents divided evenly among the three men. Powell's backing was equally strong among Republicans and Democrats. When asked how they would vote if Powell ran as a Republican against Clinton, they gave him a 13 point edge. But Clinton ran ahead of Dole by 7 points.[5] Shades of 1952 when the polls showed that a variety of hypothetical Democratic candidates were likely to defeat the probable GOP nominee, Senator Robert A. Taft, at the polls; but none of them would come close to beating the popular Ike.

When Eisenhower stated his unavailability as a presidential candidate in 1948, he was roughly the same age as Powell was at the time of his 1995 announcement. Moreover, Eisenhower's 1948 statement that barring "overriding reasons . . . lifelong professional soldiers" should "abstain from seeking political office" had a more categorical ring than Powell's more circumscribed assertion that political life "requires a calling that I do not yet hear." The possibility that there will be a Powell candidacy at some later time adds interest in his memoir. But before asking what can be learned from *My American Journey* about how Powell would perform in the White House, it needs to be established that the book is not merely the work of a ghost writer.

It plainly is not. The book's narrative voice is very much that of Powell as it was heard in his televised interviews with journalists in the period when he was considering a candidacy and in his news conference following his announcement of noncandidacy. Powell's collaborator, Joseph E. Persico, reports that the general dictated the book's contents and much of its language into a tape recorder, and the two of them negotiated its structure and detailed wording. Persico's further

[4] Data provided by the Gallup Organization, Princeton, NJ.

[5] *USA Today*-CNN Poll, reported in *USA Today*, 27 September 1995.

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contribution appears to have been to persuade Powell to omit technical aspects of his military assignments and encourage him to express his feelings about his Vietnam combat experience.[6]

My American Journey is eminently readable. It is engagingly written, richly anecdotal, and free of pretention and self-importance. Powell reveals a keen eye for personal qualities of the individuals with whom he was associated, and he is disarmingly frank and often ironic about his thoughts and maneuvers as he negotiated his way through his military career. It is a book that scholars can read with profit, but that can be commended to lay readers who want a good read.

The journey chronicled by Powell is out of Horatio Alger. A young African-American man from the East Bronx who has no clear direction in his life graduates in 1957 from the City College of New York, where his only distinction has been in ROTC. He is commissioned as a second lieutenant, works hard, and proves to have late-blooming native ability. He rises through the officer ranks of the racially integrated post-World War II American Army to become a four-star general and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In that capacity he becomes nationally celebrated as the architect and principal spokesman of the 1991 victory of a United States-led coalition over the forces of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Powell's first field assignment was as a platoon leader in Germany in the late 1950s, where the mission of his unit was to resist any westward advance of the Soviet Army. Why the Soviets would *want* to advance, Powell notes in a wry aside, was "above my pay grade" to answer. There followed such career stepping stones as service as combat adviser in Vietnam; attendance in the course for advances infantry officers at Fort Benning, Georgia, from which he graduated near the top of his class; and admission to the Command and General Staff College, where he again distinguished himself.

Powell's immersion in the Washington community began when he was chosen for the White House Fellows Program in 1971. He steered his way to an internship in the Office of Management and Budget because he knew that "budgets are to organizations what blood is to the circulatory system" and "the OMB had its hand on every department's jugular." (p. 165) He went on in later years to serve as military aide to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in the Carter administration and as aide to Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the Reagan administration. He returned to the White House in 1987 to serve as deputy to Carlucci, who became national security adviser in the aftermath of the Iran-contra affair. When Carlucci stepped down, Powell became Reagan's final national security adviser. Then, after an interlude in the field, he returned to Washington to chair the JCS under Presidents Bush and Clinton.

[6] Francis X. Clines,"The Co-Author of Gen. Powell's Book is Given a Part as the Story Goes On," *New York Times*, 1 October 1995.

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The Colin Powell who emerges from the pages of his memoir reveals many qualities that would not be out of place in the Oval Office. He is intelligent, articulate, and ingratiating; a shrewd judge of character; and a knowledgeable and skilled Washington player. He also is unabashedly patriotic, free of doctrine, and deeply conscious of being African-American and to a lesser extent of his Jamaican heritage. There is further quality to which most reviewers of Powell's book refer and which was highlighted in his announcement that he would not run in 1996—caution. Related to his personal caution at a more intellectual level is the Powell Doctrine: his Clausewitzian conviction specifies that the American military should not be committed to battle without an explicitly defined political goal and the will to commit sufficient force to win. He also reveals in his final chapter that he holds broadly centrist domestic conviction on such issues as abortion, welfare legislation, and affirmative action.

Whether Powell's views and qualities qualify him for the presidency is in the eye of the beholder. There is no canonical list of desirable presidential traits. Certainly, he would not be out of his depth in an office in which the previous incumbents included Bill Clinton, George Bush, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and Gerald Ford. Again it is instructive to turn to the Eisenhower analogy. Eisenhower took office at a time when the Republican party had been captured by its right wing and the public was unmoved by its existing political leaders. He moved his party to the center and restored public confidence in the government and its chief executive. No president in the era of public opinion polls has had the consistent high level of public approval of Eisenhower. At the same time, as we now know, he was a skilled political operator, working behind the scenes to end the depredations of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, and exercising restraint in the use of military force in the international crises that punctuated his presidency.[7]

Like Eisenhower, Powell would exercise a moderating influence on the Republican party. He too would be likely to command sustained public support and to be an effective problem solver, often not publicizing his actions. That he is an African-American would gild the lily, providing an impetus to Americans to mend their racial divisions and sending a message throughout the world about the resiliency of American democracy. Whether he will ever bring these qualities to the presidency cannot be known. As he put it on 8 November 1995, "the future is in the future."

[7] Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; originally published in 1982).

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Book Reviews

A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy *by Stephen R. Weissman. New York, Basic Books, 1995. 253 pp. $26.00.*

In discussing the phenomena that we loosely call our separation of powers, it is difficult to convincingly advocate activism by any one of the three branches of the U.S. government while continuing to affirm neutrality about the likely policy consequences of such activism. Especially is this true when on the subjects the advocate cares about the branch of government was last activist more than a half-century ago (and then in ways that few venture to recall favorably) and when its own current disabilities dismay even the advocate. Typically, he or she feels driven to exegetical homilies about the Founding Fathers' original intent, or into formalistic criticism of institutional architectures, or into assertions about requirements of the ambient situations, or into exposés of the failings of the branch that is currently predominant—implying that nothing could be worse, or at least that fairness calls for invigorating the supine branch to levels of power where it could make its own mistakes.

The branch that Stephen Weissman seeks to promote in foreign affairs is Congress, while he confines himself to only hinting at his own liberal policy agenda. "I have written this book with a special vigilance [about] political bias" (p. xi)—a reason why he cross-checked his dozen years of participant observation as Africanist on the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff by studying Congress's behavior about other regions and with varying mixes of Democrats/Republicans in the presidency and Congress and by searching declassified documents and interviewing 130 informed persons. In all, he aims to "be interesting and useful to people of various political stripes, both today and in the future" (p. xii). And empirically and analytically he succeeds very well. But prescriptively he overreaches.

He avoids the arguments about original intent, institutional forms, and situational requirements; he relies almost exclusively on exposing blunders of the executive branch as it broadly holds the legislators, Gramsci-like, under its hegemonial sway for foreign affairs, encountering only sporadic resistance. Weissman's case-study narratives are absorbing, worthy of a wide audience. And his argument is powerfully stimulating as he arraigns Congress for its own complicity in its own defanging.

But the ultimate count in this indictment is lame. Weissman insists that Congress's own passivity in foreign affairs is not to be excused, even by the general apathy/contentment/resignation of the outer publics. He insists it is the duty of Congress itself to stir the public up—help mobilize them for participatory democracy in this field—by facilitating discord, especially vis-à-vis the executive. But Weissman fails to develop this point. To do so, I think he would need to affirm more than he does a romantic faith in participatory democracy or else to acknowledge that some huge publics, not just the narrow-interest villains of his

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narratives, have wide concerns and policy agendas that in fact are broadly compatible with the current degree of congressional deference in foreign affairs. And then he would have to identify the concerns and policy agendas, relating them to the deference, and evaluate them explicitly—exactly what he has shunned doing in his vigilance against his own possible bias. But his book could have been much more convincing if in the end he had relaxed that vigilance a bit.

Being pro-Congress in foreign affairs can be seen as a matter of degree. By prevalent standards I count myself in the congressional camp: the executive should not domineer with its stamp of "the national interest." But when that protestation comes from my perspective, it presumes self-restraint on the part of Congress. (The pros-and-cons of Congressional oversight committees on intelligence and covert operations are a prominent illustration of the problem.) Weissman, in contrast, aims to break down the inhibitions and deliberately foster more discord and, consistently, to incapacitate most covert action. The facts he displays throughout the book are immensely useful. But the argument he develops from his perspective remains incomplete and hence not quite satisfying from either standpoint.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

Presidential War Power *by Louis Fisher. Lawrence, The University Press of Kansas, 1995. 248 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

Among the first proposals to reach the floor of the Senate after the dust cleared from the 1994 midterm elections was Robert Dole's Peace Powers Act of 1995—a proposal to repeal the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and limit the use of American forces and funds in United Nations peacekeeping activities. Louis Fisher's thorough, dispassionate, and meticulously documented volume couldn't have come at a more appropriate moment. The debate over the proper allocation and distribution of war powers is one that inspires passionate debate, and Fisher has done a great service in presenting a clear, concise, articulate presentation of the facts and historical context before building his own argument for the restoration of constitutional checks and balances.

Like a well constructed lawyers brief, Fisher's book starts at the beginning, arguing that the Constitution was in part a response to concerns about the need for strength in government balanced by a fear of monarchial power. Though the Indian Wars and the Whiskey Rebellion may have convinced the Founders to centralize power, they did so only after constructing significant checks, separating the purse from the sword, and leaving with Congress the power to raise military forces and initiate military action.

With the constitutional framework in place, Fisher then marches the reader through the major landmarks of the war powers debate, ranging from the Quasi-War with France at the end of the eighteenth century, through the Mexican War of 1846, and on to the centralization of power during the world wars. Fisher then turns to more familiar territory, examining the Korean conflict and arguing that the United Nations charter in no way restructured the constitutional distribution of war powers. This issue is far from an historical curiosity, since it was the focus of much debate during the U.S. intervention in Kuwait and Iraq and is at the heart of the current debate over the American role in Bosnia.

Before examining covert intelligence oeprations and the Iran-contra affair, Fisher examines the debate over the War Powers Resolution of 1973, putting that experience into its

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proper historical context. Fisher and his publisher are particularly to be commended for including the actual text of a number of critical documents in this debate, including the 1973 resolution, in a series of appendices.

With the foundation in place, long-standing myths debunked, and the facts on the table, Fisher finally turns to his own analysis and prescriptions, arguing that Congress can (and should) reassert the legislature's constitutional role. "When Presidents overstep constitutional barriers or threaten to do so," Fisher argues, "Congress must respond with solid statutory checks, not floor speeches and 'sense of Congress' resolutions" (p. 205). Fisher notes that "too often Members make careless remarks that the President 'makes foreign policy,' is 'preeminent' in foreign affairs and that, as Commander in Chief, he may send troops wherever he likes" (p. 203). Fisher notes that "such comments undermine constitutional checks and feed executive arrogance" (p. 203), and his book is a powerful antidote to such claims. Fisher doesn't dwell on why members of a co-equal branch of government would make such "careless remarks" or what difference such remarks might make. But that exceeds the scope of this timely, tightly-written, and well documented contribution to a vital debate, a book that should be required reading on Capitol Hill and in the White House as well as in any number of classrooms.

GORDON SILVERSTEIN
Dartmouth College

Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era *by Barbara Sinclair. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 329 pp. 39.95.*

Barbara Sinclair has a number of ambitious goals in this book. She seeks to describe and analyze the role of Democratic leaders in the postreform House and to explain how strong party leadership could emerge and flourish in a weak party era. She understands, however, that the quality of empirical work depends on the quality of the conceptions that inform and guide it. Thus, she also seeks to provide a broad and eclectic theory of congressional leadership to frame analysis and empower explanation.

To realize these objectives, Sinclair makes two critical strategic choices. One is to modify but rely on the perspectives of a principal-agent approach. She, therefore, bases her analysis on the presumption that leaders respond to member expectations, while recognizing that these expectations involve collective as well as self-oriented needs and that they are shaped by contextual factors inside and outside the House. A second is to approach the study of congressional leadership as a study of the entire legislative process from the vantage point of party leadership. The bulk of the book is thus devoted to a detailed analysis of patterns of interaction among Democratic leaders and members at all stages of the legislative process in recent decades. Despite what the author argues, these choices are rooted as much in her desire to capture the postreform House in detail as in her regard for the importance of motivational and contextual factors in explanation. It is not surprising, then, that her study contributes more readily to an understanding of how party leaders and the House operated in one period of its history than to a more general understanding of leadership style and House structure and process.

To say this is not to diminish the substantial dimensions of Sinclair's achievement. In its scope and depth, her account of the House under Speakers Tip O'Neill, Jim Wright, and

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Tom Foley excels those now present in the literature. Her account is sensitive to the complexity of individual motivation, the problems of collective action, and the importance of contextual factors. Equally important, her account marries these sensitivities to a wealth of information regarding structure, issues, strategy, behavior, and personality. Applying a perceptive and disciplined mind to an impressive knowledge of the topic, the author provides a detailed and instructive account of the relations between majority leaders and members in the postreform House, as well as valuable evidence and insights on such matters as the blending of substance and politics in decision making, current patterns of relationships with lobbyists, and the emerging public role of the Speaker.

Nonetheless, Sinclair's strategic choices involve costs as well as benefits. Immersing the study of party leadership in the study of legislative process in a single period restricts orderly and rigorous treatment of the relationships and impacts of the host of internal and external contextual variables that exist. The result is to render explanation, whose underlying rationale is that outcomes derive from the impact of context on expectations, incomplete, even if plausible and appealing. For example, in other eras, increases in party homogeneity have led to hierarchy and elitism, not mediated negotiation and inclusiveness, whereas divided government has tempered rather than heightened partisanship. Yet, Sinclair's approach to context is not sufficiently specified and ordered theoretically to cast much light on how to understand or treat these differences. Comparison with the author's prior work on the postreform Senate, in which she also relies on the impact of context on expectations but correctly finds very different outcomes in power distribution, provides added evidence. Here again, Sinclair's framework of analysis is so broadly defined and so concretely applied that explanation in each case is highly particularized and dependent implicitly on conditions and relationships that are critical to results but left unrecognized and untreated.

The explanatory power of the principal-agent approach when applied as a broad presumption is marred by its ex post facto and tautological character. Whatever its ultimate potential and legislative settings, failure to deal with the ambiguous and volatile character of agents and principals and the varying and multifaceted dimensions of leadership discretion threaten to transform the proposition that leaders respond to member expectations into a self-fulfilling hypothesis. Ironically enough, in the author's formulation the explanatory power it does possess derives largely from its combination with contextual arguments and evidence. As a result, the approach per se contributes little to extending the scope of explanation. Rather, its presumptive validity and its shared confinement to a single period serve as much to cloak the difficulties that exist as to resolve them.

In concluding this review, however, the appropriate question to ask is not whether the author made the correct strategic choices, but whether the results justify the choices. Even if implicit, choice is unavoidable and necessarily limiting. In this case the answer is a clear and emphatic yes. Whatever the costs, the benefits are immense. Barbara Sinclair's detailed picture and insightful analysis of change and practice in leadership behavior will serve as a classic study of the postreform House for all present and future students of Congress.

JOSEPH COOPER
The Johns Hopkins University

The Losing Parties: Out-Party National Committees, 1956–1993 *by Philip A. Klinkner. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994. 271 pp. $30.00.*

When the Political Organizations and Parties Section of the American Political Science Association made its 1995 Emerging Scholar Award, the recognition quite properly went to Philip

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A. Klinkner for his analysis of out-party national committees. Without the constraints that the White House imposes on in-party national committees, the losing party's national committees have demonstrated a capacity for innovation that has had profound consequences for American politics. These responses to presidential election losses are described and assessed by Klinkner in detail and with sensitivity to the nuances of internal party politics.

Out-party responses are divided into three categories: policy, organizational, and procedural. Klinkner convincingly demonstrates that the Republican National Committee's (RNC) responses have been predominantly organizational, while the Democratic National Committee (DNC) has made mainly procedural responses. In seeking to explain each party's behavior pattern, Klinkner analyzes the impact of party circumstances in post-election periods. He finds, however, that conditions are not an adequate explanation for out-party behavior. The major forces dictating national committee responses to electoral defeat, Klinkner argues, are the unique political cultures of the two national party organizations. Although the discussion of the causes for these party cultures is a bit thinner than one might wish, the author has pointed out a fruitful and underdeveloped field for further inquiry.

There are several recurrent themes in the book in addition to the continuity of the parties' responses to defeat. One is the impact that the differences in resources played in the types of activities the two national committees initiate. Thus, the RNC's superior financial base enabled it to outdistance the DNC in organizational programming. Klinkner also demonstrates how the overwhelming concern among out-party leaders for party unity influenced their tendency to adopt organizational and procedural responses. Another theme is the extent to which neither party tends to view its electoral defeats as being caused by its policy orientation.

The longer-term consequences of the parties' respective responses to electoral defeat are assessed. For example, the DNC's procedural response to its 1968 defeat altered the power balance within the party while diminishing its capacity to strengthen its state affiliates; and the RNC's organizational response to the 1964 election did not provide the party's moderates with the means to reassert their former dominance.

Among the book's strongest sections is the account of the Democrats' exception to a pattern of predominantly procedural responses. The DNC's adoption of policy response after the 1956 Eisenhower landslide was due, Klinkner believes, to a unique set of circumstances. The ideological division between party liberals and conservatives mirrored the organizational division between the national and congressional parties. With liberals unable to rely upon the congressional party, which they did not control, they were forced to rely instead on the national committee, which they did control.

Another highlight of the book is the analysis of the RNC's organizational responses during the Ray Bliss (1965–1969) and Bill Brock (1977–1980) eras. In comparing the RNC's great organizational innovators, Klinkner provides often overlooked distinctions between these leaders. Bliss was not personally ambitious for himself or the RNC. At heart he was a state chairman and directed his efforts toward strengthening state and local parties. By contrast, Brock was ambitious and saw the potential for centralizing power in the RNC. Accordingly, he developed programs that were designed to enhance the power of the national committee and increase its leverage over the state parties. His success in these endeavors has transformed party politics.

The Losing Parties is filled with information and insights for understanding the nature of national party organizations, the process of institutional change, and the differences between the Republican and Democratic parties. The current condition of both parties also

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highlights the need for continued national committee research as these organizations expand their role.

JOHN F. BIBBY
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics *by John Mueller. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995. 221 pp. Paper, $16.00.*

In this provocative collection of essays (most of them revised versions of previously published work) John Mueller elaborates his belief that ideas are the real driving force of world politics. He also offers thought-provoking reinterpretations of twentieth-century history, defends his earlier claim that changing attitudes have made war obsolescent, and attempts to explain the growing popularity of democracy.

Mueller's point of departure is the end of the cold war. He sees the U.S.–Soviet rivalry not as an inevitable result of bipolarity but as the product of a clash of ideas. Its demise, therefore, "principally resulted from a change in those ideas, not from a major change in the distribution of capabilities" (p. 34). For Mueller, this episode demonstrates how ideas can transform world politics with little or no violence, leading him to suggest that we revise or retire the familiar concepts of power, anarchy, bipolar stability, and deterrence.

Subsequent chapters offer idiosyncratic interpretations of recent historical episodes. One essay argues that nuclear weapons had little to do with keeping the cold war peaceful (the fear of conventional war was sufficient); another explores the possibility that containment prolonged the cold war by preventing the Soviet Union from over-expanding and bankrupting itself sooner; and a third suggests that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a military inconvenience but not a disaster. Some readers will find these interpretations far-fetched, but Mueller has assembled each case with care, and his arguments are worth pondering.

The final two chapters refine Mueller's views on the obsolescence of war and the rise of democracy. Mueller attributes these trends to fundamental shifts in attitudes and ideas: war is obsolescent because it is increasingly seen as silly, immoral, and disgusting; and democracy is thriving because it allows natural inequalities to flourish, demands little from each citizen, and has amassed an admirable track record over the past century. He stresses the role of political entrepreneurs (such as antiwar activists) in bringing about these changes, but cautions that there is "no guarantee this process will be permanently successful" (pp. 152–53).

Overall, this collection is a delight to read and deserves a wide audience, though most readers will find plenty to disagree with as well. His optimism about the obsolescence of war seems excessive in light of the 1991 Gulf War and the protracted bloodletting in Bosnia, and it is worth remembering that the "quiet cataclysm" killed at least 75,000 people in the former Soviet Union and created perhaps a million refugees. And though he correctly reminds us that ideas are important, Mueller dismisses the role of power much too quickly. Marxism-Leninism was significant because Soviet power lay behind it; these ideas would have received little notice had Albania been their chief exponent. Interestingly, Mueller's own essay on the irrelevance of nuclear weapons concedes the continued importance of material capabilities by stressing the role of U.S. industrial and military strength in deterring a conventional war.

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Finally, his claim that ideas are important is difficult to falsify, because any political disagreement is in some sense a clash of ideas and any lowering of tensions can be interpreted as a reduction in the level of disagreement. But the real challenge is to explain why ideological conflicts wax and wane, and why some ideas triumph while others are abandoned. Mueller suggests that the key to this puzzle is the marketing of ideas by political entrepreneurs, but the explanation he provides is more of a preliminary sketch than a fully articulated theory.

These criticisms notwithstanding, this is an insightful and well written collection by a creative and wide-ranging scholar. One need not embrace all of Mueller's conclusions in order to be stimulated, provoked, and enlightened by this thoughtful, witty, and iconoclastic book.

STEPHEN M. WALT
University of Chicago

Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society Since 1914 *by Gabriel Kolko. New York, The New Press, 1994. 566 pp. $29.95.*

Historically, states have arisen largely from war and have spent much of the energy they command waging war. Despite prodigious expansion of states' nonmilitary activities since 1850 and concomitant containment of direct intervention by military men into national politics through much of the West, Gabriel Kolko rightly sees the seventy-five years beginning in 1914 as deeply marked by war. On a world scale the twentieth century has certainly produced more battle deaths and probably registered a higher per capita death rate through warfare than any previous hundred years of human history.

Repeatedly, elite statesmen who had less to lose in war than their fellow citizens threw unprepared and narrowly-led military forces into conflicts whose scope, duration, and consequences they systematically underestimated. No one, in Kolko's account, had a real interest in war, and no major power actually gained by going to war; with terrible twentieth-century technologies and immense armies in play, war became a quintessential negative-sum game. Without developing a clear explanation of the twentieth-century pattern or level of warfare, Kolko suggests that capitalism inevitably produced leaders who overestimated their capacity and succumbed to the illusion that they could solve political problems by using the enormous technical and organizational means of destruction that capitalism put at their disposal. War then became so consuming, he argues, that in the long run virtual victory (that is, ending a war without disaster) depended less on military strategy than on a national political and economic system's capacity for sustained effort. Left politicians who came to wartime power deployed no more foresight or effectiveness than the rest, concludes Kolko, with the consequence that capitalism gained breathing space and social democracies lost credit for their peacetime accomplishments.

Indirectly contradicting the recent spate of political-science literature that argues the unwillingness of democracies to fight each other, Kolko sees the warmaking propensity of capitalist states (whose leaders, he implies, have a greater tendency to underestimate war's costs than their noncapitalist fellows) as the principal origin of this century's devastation. In the long run, however, he also sees it as the fundamental stimulus to popular disillusion with capitalism, hence someday the author of its own destruction.

Not that Kolko holds up actual socialist regimes as vanished ideals; while claiming they generally fell into wars started by capitalist states and pointing out how regularly socialists

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seized power with popular support when capitalist control (interior or exterior) disintegrated, he portrays socialist leaders as unable to overcome the tension produced by their centralizing strategies in the fragmented economies and polities where they came to power. Socialists were no more adept in military strategy than their capitalist counterparts, and no more capable of avoiding war's enormous destructiveness. Stalin, he indicates, sold out the human promise of socialism in favor of the Soviet Union's national interest, building a system that did capitalists the immeasurable service of stabilizing Eastern Europe until the 1980s.

Taking the world's great powers as his chief objects of study, Kolko offers a four-part analysis: who started and ran wars, and how; the impact of World War I on European social life and politics; the impact of World War II on social life and politics in Europe and Asia; U.S. military activity and its impact, 1945–1991. Eschewing maps, illustrations, graphs, diagrams, and statistical tables entirely, he offers his story largely as a series of country-by-country narratives with national leaders as their principal actors and ordinary people their victims. He provides thoughtful summaries and comparisons of warmaking and wartime experience in Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, and Vietnam, with briefer looks at other parts of the world. The book ends with a stirring call to rethink socialism now that the fall of Eastern Europe's regimes has practically wiped the slate clean.

Kolko's organization of his narrative (and perhaps his failure to consult recent works on violent conflict such as Martin van Creveld's and Ted Gurr's) obscures some of the most important trends in warfare since World War II: the displacement of mass armies by irregular forces, on the one hand, and high-technology units, on the other; the expansion of ethnically-labeled conflict, politicide, and genocide; the shift from interstate to civil wars. Insufficient attention to studies of war's domestic consequences in the vein of Jay Winter, Gregory Hooks, and John Campbell likewise leads him to understate the durable reorganizations of production and social life wrought by wartime taxation, rationing, military procurement, and similar measures of extraction, distribution, or control. Because the book's bibliography falls off precipitously after about 1988, it reflects very little recent work on war and state power. We should not read Kolko, in any case, for up-to-the-minute historical detail or precise causal models, but for sweeping narrative, for grave reflection on the past's lessons, for grim reminders of how savagely and stupidly leaders of every stripe have pursued the chimera of national advancement through military might.

CHARLES TILLY
New School for Social Research

Governing the White House: From Hoover Through LBJ *by Charles E. Walcott and Karen M. Hult. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1995. 372 pp. Cloth $40.00; paper, $22.50.*

The popular and sometimes scholarly image of the presidency is that the structure of the presidential office is determined by the personality and style of the particular president. In this impressive book, Charles Walcott and Karen Hult bring considerable analytic insight to bear on the extent to which the popular impression is accurate. Recent scholarship has come to emphasize the strong influence of the environment (for example, Congress, executive branch departments and agencies, interest groups, etc.) in determining the growth and struc-

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ture of the presidential office. Their analysis is a sophisticated treatment of the interplay among environmental pressures, organizational dynamics, and personal choice factors in the development of White House structures.

After laying out their theoretical argument, they take up each of the "early mod- ern" presidencies (Herbert Hoover through Lyndon B. Johnson) and examine three types of functions carried out by each White House: outreach functions (congressional liaison, press relations, political appointments, executive branch relations, and constituency groups); policy processing functions (domestic and economic policy, national security policy, and specialized policy structures); and finally coordination and supervision functions (speech writing, scheduling, staff governance structures). The development of each of these functions is examined over each of the presidencies, and the relative weight of the causal variables (personal, organizational, and environmental) is analyzed.

Their research is based on presidential archives, memoirs, interviews, and presidential scholarship. They manage to compress an analysis of the development of each of the above functions within and across the seven presidencies at the same time that they advance their theoretical argument in a readable and concise format. The 90 pages of endnotes attest to the thoroughness of their scholarship and constitute an impressive set of sources for other scholars to utilize. Their analysis is theoretically rich and analytically sophisticated, and at the same time they capture a flavor of the personal and organizational dynamics of each of these presidencies.

They conclude that presidential choice has the least impact and that environmental factors have the greatest influence in the development of outreach functions. For example, despite Dwight Eisenhower's distaste for political patronage and preference to leave it to the party and departments, his White House developed a capacity to deal with patronage pressures and opportunities. Similarly, Eisenhower did not put forward a legislative agenda in his first year in office, but because of expectations from the Hill he did in the second and following years of his administration; he also established the Office of Legislative Liaison in the White house, now a permanent fixture.

The authors find that the dynamics of organizational growth have particularly influenced the growth of domestic policy structures. Growth and specialization become self-sustaining as staffers acquire their own aides to deal with increasing complexity and the growing responsibility of the federal government in different policy areas.

In contrast, personal presidential preference is the most important factor in the development of overall supervision and coordination of White House operations. The question of whether to use a chief-of-staff or a spokes-of-the-wheel approach to White House management falls into this category. It will be interesting to see if they come to the same conclusion in their future analyses of presidencies after Richard Nixon, during whose administration, they say, the size of White House Office "exploded" (p. viii). One might argue that after Nixon, a chief of staff was necessary, despite the personal preferences of presidents (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and arguably Bill Clinton) to operate with a spokes-of-the-wheel staff structure.

This book is impressive in its sweep of analysis through seven presidencies, and it is important for its subjection of White House organizational development to rigorous analysis. It will make fascinating reading for those who specialize in White House organization as well as for those scholars who are familiar with only part of the institutional presidency literature.

JAMES P. PFIFFNER
George Mason University

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Presidential Polls and the News Media *edited by Paul J. Lavrakas, Michael W. Traugott, and Peter V. Miller. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 278 pp. $65.00.*

Take note of the last item in the above heading. At that price, this is a serious book intended for serious readers—specifically, those with a professional interest in poll taking and poll reporting. Only professionals or the most dedicated political buffs will work their way through this collection of essays on the current state of affairs in presidential polls and what needs to be done to make them more useful to the political process.

The principal editors are specialists in communications at either Northwestern University or the University of Michigan. Other academic specialists and media poll directors also contribute to a volume largely based on poll experiences in the 1992 presidential race. A previous volume, published in 1991, dealt with the 1988 election and encouraged the authors to try again with the 1992 contest and to expand upon their observations. Those observations are aimed directly at the media, with the avowed purpose of changing and improving the way that presidential polls are presented to the public in print and over the airwaves.

The principal complaint about existing practices is an obvious one: most media reporting on poll results deals only with the horse race aspect of a campaign—who is leading, by how much, and whether that margin is widening or narrowing. For most of the practitioners represented in this work, that is a shallow reading—even a misreading perhaps—of what an expertly prepared and executed poll can reveal. In fact, says one of the authors, Richard Morin, director of polling for the *Washington Post*, the trouble with most recent efforts has been that they have been "data rich but analysis poor." The point Morin is emphasizing, and one repeated in other language by other experts, is that poll results carry a rich lode of information on the state of the electorate's mind at the time of the poll and how that thinking may play out in the subsequent election.

As an example, an entire chapter is devoted to a poll done by the *Washington Post* and ABC on the impact of Gennifer Flowers's accusations against Bill Clinton early in 1992. The results suggested a heavy blow was dealt to Clinton, but a closer, more sophisticated reading of the responses from 1,512 voters indicated most of the anti-Clinton respondents were already in the Republican camp. Among committed Democrats, the damage was significantly less than trumpeted in press reports on the poll.

What this situation illustrates is the need for expert sophisticated readings on poll results, and this is the basic thrust of another chapter done by Warren Mitofsky, long a CBS poll director, now a private consultant in the field. Mitofsky argues that every media institution engaged in serious, ongoing polling during election seasons should have in house a qualified professional to interpret all findings and help writers and editors shape the way those results are presented to the public.

For the would-be expert, this volume of essays will provide an interesting, if heavy-going tutorial.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power *by Colin S. Gray. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. 204 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $14.95.*

To those who may have worried that the end of the cold war could fundamentally change the national security challenges facing the United States or offer significant new opportunities,

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Colin Gray offers reassurance: as it plans for the next century, America can base its policies on essentially unchanging verities about the nature and uses of naval power. Even in today's apparently benign international circumstances, the United States needs to prepare for the next great-power conflict; in such a conflict, the application of naval power can create the strategic conditions for defeating a great land power. Despite massive changes in international and national political institutions and in global economic relationships, and despite the creation of weapons of mass destruction, the logic and grammar of naval war remain fundamentally constant from period to period and, indeed, have evolved only gradually, if at all, from the days of Athens to the present. As a consequence, the United States would be wise to base its post-cold war naval policies on lessons derived from the British experience between the 1640s and the 1940s.

In *The Navy in the Post-Cold War World*, the enormously prolific Gray has returned to familiar waters: sea power, he again argues, is a great enabler, permitting naval powers to protract conflicts, exhaust adversaries, and control the initiative. Scanning history for reoccurring patterns, Gray attempts to identify general insights into the fundamental nature of sea and land power and of the interaction between them.

The implicit foundation upon which Gray builds his case for the continued role of naval power in the post-cold war world is the presumption that, as he puts it, "Every war is different in its details, but war, *qua* war, is an activity apart and has a unity across time, technology, and opponents" (p. 24). Though his vision of war as a distinct and unchanging phenomenon is cognitively attractive, it is nonetheless a potentially problematic foundation, and it is intriguing that Gray has chosen to build on such dubious and ultimately constraining footings. The proposition that "war is an activity apart" has long been challenged, most notably by Carl von Clausewitz's speculations about a relationship between war and politics: Gray's analysis assumes away politics, precluding by assumption the possibility that the evolution of domestic and international political institutions might have a transformative impact on the character of war. Perhaps more importantly, though, the notion that war "has a unity across time, technology, and opponents" is probably defensible only within a narrowly defined historical window. The campaigns of Attila the Hun, Marlborough, "Hap" Arnold, and the remote highlanders of New Guinea all merit the term war, but they reveal distinctly different purposes, logics, and behaviors. As John Keegan argues effectively in his recent *History of Warfare*, war is a social activity that can take a range of forms and serve a variety of sociocultural needs. The notion that war can be understood and takes on meaning only within the context of particular cultural structures—and that this will affect the policies chosen by political actors—is assumed away in Gray's account.

Gray's search for historically transcendent principles explains this volume's emphasis on supporting historical illustrations. Though his use of history is more idiosyncratic than systematic, in Gray's hands history proves a deep well indeed. His account ranges broadly, at times comfortably skipping the distance from Salamis in 480 BC to the Falklands in 1982 (with layovers in the Punic, Napoleonic, and World Wars) in a single paragraph.

As one would expect from a scholar who was willing in 1980 to make the politically unpopular argument that meaningful victory in a nuclear war between the superpowers was possible, there is much in Gray's reading of world history that is stimulatingly provocative. Regrettably, however, in the present volume much of the force of Gray's assault on the liberal establishment is lost in the delivery: the account and arguments advanced are repetitious and disjointed. The work would have benefited enormously from the strong hand of a critical and demanding editor. While rewriting might have cost the book its intellectually playful stream-of-consciousness style, it would have imposed greater clarity on Gray's arguments

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and forced both the author and his readers to confront directly the more contentious aspects of his analysis.

Although the bulk of *The Navy in the Post-Cold War World* represents an effort to explicate general truths about sea power, in his penultimate chapter Gray does turn explicitly to the future. Interestingly, Gray—who never comfortably comes to grips with the implications of air power or of nuclear weapons, the two great military developments of the twentieth century—proves as at home in the twenty-first century as he is in the nineteenth. Space power, Gray cogently argues, will join land power and sea power as a key element in military planning and, like sea power, may come to be a significant "enabler."

Given the obvious political significance of the topic and Gray's emphasis on understanding naval power in its historic context, it is on first impression surprising that *The Navy in the Post-Cold War World* is neither a work of political science nor of history, eschewing the theoretical rigor and methodological self-consciousness of the one and the nuanced richness and emphasis on primary research of the other. This volume, however, belongs to an older, equally distinguished scholarly tradition of scholarly advocacy. Like Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose work Gray laments has been overly criticized, Gray advances a particular vision of war that yields a strong case for the continued importance of sea power.

EDWARD RHODES
Rutgers University

Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War *by Susan L. Woodward. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995. 536 pages. Cloth, $42.95; paper, $18.95.*

Several books have been written and released since Yugoslavia disintegrated violently and as war or civil war (depending on how leaders or analysts interpret the violence) raged in the newly independent states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A number of these books were written by journalists and overnight experts who have provided us with essentially good-versus-evil themes together with emotive black and white analysis of the Balkan tragedy. The Serbs are basically evil and are responsible for all the aggression, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, while the rest are good and incapable of doing wrong.

Susan Woodward has provided a refreshingly different scholarly book that has been extensively researched and documented. The book covers mainly the immediate origins of the collapse of the sovereign independent state of Yugoslavia, analyzing the domestic and international politics that led to its disintegration. The first two chapters consisting of just under fifty pages provide brief but critical historical and contemporary background to the problem. Thereafter, there is a detailed analysis of the sources and conduct of the war/civil war in the former Yugoslavia that is provided against the various international machinations and negotiations that sought to end the conflict but may have prolonged it.

The book was completed after Woodward had spent about a year working with UNPROFOR (UN Protection Forces in the former Yugoslavia) and as special adviser to the UN representative there, Yasushi Akashi. The combination of expertise and first hand experience as the conflict raged adds a strong realistic and sober touch to much of the analysis.

The book discusses Tito's delicate ethnic balancing system of Yugoslav stability and the steady erosion of this system following his death in 1980. Much of the book then discusses such basic issues as the reasons for the failure of democratization and the road to war,

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questions regarding the right to national self-determination, international new state recognition policy, and the causes and conduct of the war/civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Toward the end of the book, Woodward identifies some of the basic causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration, both domestic and international, and dispels other myths surrounding the state's demise. In one of her many enlightening passages, Woodward states that "the more important causes of such conflict are not old feuds but current rights and protections and the relation between such rights and protections and the territorially defined state. The most significant political development in former Yugoslavia was the equation of individual rights with national rights. . . ." When the demand for individual human rights are considered impossible to gain except through "demands for territorial autonomy and sovereign rights," and "the right to govern a particular territory," then the situation becomes "treacherous" (p. 339).

These are thoughtful and wise words. Indeed, if individual human rights can only be obtained through independence for would-be nations, then all multiethnic states may be faced with eventual disintegration and subject to the Yugoslavian trauma. Multiethnic states need to recognize that it is appropriate political institutions and processes that ensure individual and group rights. However, once Germany, Austria, and the Vatican had pushed for the national right of Slovenia and Croatia to separate from Yugoslavia, followed a year later by the U.S. push to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina from the remnant Yugoslavia, none of the nationalities in the new states wished to remain minorities. Thus, when Slovenian, Croatians, Muslims, and Macedonians chose not to be part of a Yugoslavia where the Serbs were only a pluralist majority of 36 percent, then it became inevitable that Serb minorities in the new states of Croatia and Bosnia would want to separate and remain part of a Greater Serbia of which they had been a part since the creation of the South Slav state in 1918. Historic memories of bloodshed during World War II aggravated the problem of majorities and minorities in the states that emerged out of the old Yugoslavia.

This is a solid and comprehensive book, easily one of the best that has been published on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia following the disintegration of the state in 1991. Woodward's observations and analyses will stand the test of time as the tragic events continue to unfold in the Balkans.

RAJU G. C. THOMAS
Marquette University

To Renew America *by Newt Gingrich. New York, HarperCollins, 1995, 260 pp. $24.00.*

Here is all the Newt that's fit to print (the unfit stuff is in his novel, *1945*), and the good news for all adherents of the New Thinking (or is that Newt-think?) is that the thirty minutes it takes to read this book is well worth it for anyone who wants to see where American politics is headed. (If you want the gist of the book in even less time, try the three page summary from *HarperCollins Publishers News*, or the five pages of excerpts from the publisher, and for those fans of Newt who don't know how to read, the publisher also offers an audio cassette.)

To renew America, it turns out, we must recognize the six challenges facing America, appreciate the five basic principles that form "the heart of our civilization" (pp. 33–4), understand that history consists of three waves, and follow eight steps we need to take to

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improve opportunities for the poor—and so on. This is a book of lists, and each chapter is organized around them.

Newt is an acute analyst of what ails America and lays out solutions for our problems in chapters that are on average 8.6 pages in length. He manages to dispose of the problem of illegal immigration in a four-page chapter (the government has to be strong enough to keep illegals out), and health care in ten pages (which suggests, among other things, that we can diagnose and medicate ourselves), and drug trafficking in six pages (tax drug users a percentage of their assets). The last proposal was a bit mind boggling, since I thought the Republicans believed that government had little or no right to an individual's property; but Newt has lots of ideas that don't fit into partisan categories.

Newt represents Marietta, Georgia, and is a Hawk, he tells us. But he hastens to add that he is a cheap one, who doesn't want to waste taxpayer dollars for unnecessary military frills. He has nothing to say about the B-2 bomber, however. He flies higher than any Hawk (or drug user) ever did. How can you not like a pol whose first bill after entering the House in the 1970s set out procedures to admit space colonies into the Union? Newt has a chapter (four pages) in which he sets out the "New Frontiers in Science, Space and the Oceans." He may have missed his true vocation as a sci-fi writer.

It is, unfortunately, impossible to take this book seriously on any level except as a tract for his brand of futuristic politics. Promoted by the author as a serious attempt to deal with national issues, this book is an affront to everyone who takes ideas seriously, to everyone who has written or worked on public policy (in either the conservative or the liberal camps), and to everyone who believes that an educated citizenry engaged in public affairs is essential to the functioning of American democracy.

This is actually a *biblia abiblia*, which is to say it has a cover, a binding, and words on the page, just like a real book; but it isn't a book at all. It is a collegiate bull session or an on-line chat session, which accounts for its charm. What it is missing is any factual basis for its assertions, any research to back up its discussions, any engagement with the world of educated discourse on politics. Only the hopelessly naive would expect source-notes or a bibliography (though there is an index).

The publication of this book is symptomatic of the sound-bite, talk-radio, information-highway, straight to the bottom-line world of media-politics we now live in. Gingrich, who bills himself as an historian, missed a real opportunity here to write a book about the making of the Republican congressional majority and his own day-by-day role in fashioning it. He could have discussed the way the party campaign was funded. He could have discussed Frank Luntz's polling efforts that underlay the "Contract with America," and included the gist of some of that pollsters memos. Such a book, based on what the Speaker really knows about, would have been authoritative, and it would have been a real contribution to the history of our time.

A Republican member of the House named John LeBoutillier used to drive Tip O'Neill crazy with campaign commercials that compared the Speaker to the federal budget: "fat, bloated and out of control." This book is thin and certainly not bloated—but it is also out of control all the same.

Caveat Lector: Gingrich, in his aborted first contract for this book, would have received an advance totaling 2,000 times as much as my recently negotiated contract with the same publisher. There was no way for me to get those numbers out of my mind while reading and reviewing this work.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

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The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War
by Steven R. Ratner. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 322 pp. $45.00.

The end of the cold war and the revival of the United Nations as an actor in the international security arena has brought a proliferation of new books and articles on international peacekeeping. Ratner's book is among the better group of these efforts because of its precision and insight. The book is divided into three sections, each of which makes a different contribution to our understanding of what is now called in the field "second-generation peacekeeping."

The first section of the book details the conceptual, legal, and political bases of the new mode of UN peacekeeping operations. The author does an excellent job in developing taxonomies of different characteristics and roles of new peacekeeping operations and the UN organs and personnel involved with their authorization and implementation. Particularly valuable are the descriptions of the roles of non-governmental organizations and UN special representatives, important actors that are generally ignored in most peacekeeping analyses. This is a nice extension of the literature—although not the theory of peacekeeping that some have called for, it does provide an analytical framework by which to assess this new brand of peacekeeping. One might occasionally question the degree to which current events drive the classifications (for example, second-generation peacekeeping does not inherently have to be concerned disproportionately with internal conflict), but the analysis is generally sharp, organized, and well written.

The second section of the book traces the history of new peacekeeping, looking at important antecedents and precedents from the League of Nations through the United Nations. A brief review of early second generation operations (1989–1991) is also presented. A case could be made for having this section precede the first one, for the reader gets the sense of going in reverse before moving ahead to the analysis in the third section. Although much of the history here will be familiar to most international relations scholars, the author does review a number of events and UN actions in the peace and security area that many analysts incorrectly ignore as unrelated to peacekeeping.

The final section of the book is a case study of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which assisted the country in implementing a peaceful end to civil war and supervised democratic elections. The choice of the Cambodian case is generally a good one, not only because of the author's intimate knowledge of the case gained while he was a State Department official, but also because UNTAC performed all three roles characteristic of new peacekeeping: administrator, mediator, and guarantor of peace agreements. Nevertheless, because the parties to the Cambodian conflict signed a peace accord, UNTAC had a much easier time in peacekeeping than in more chaotic and hostile environments such as Somalia and Bosnia; thus generalizations drawn from the UNTAC must be accepted with caution. The analysis and description of the UNTAC are detailed and insightful and one of a small handful of good studies of this operation.

One of the concluding chapters provides some of the clearest policy-relevant suggestions in the literature. There are general guidelines (conflicts must be amenable to UN intervention, and the UN must have the appropriate capability to deal with the given conflict) as well as very detailed suggestions on how the United Nations can enhance its peacekeeping capacity (integrating human rights awareness into its peacekeeping operations). Although this book does not fill the theoretical void in the peacekeeping literature, it does provide the framework for such a contribution, and it does represent the best conceptual and descriptive treatment available of second generation peacekeeping.

PAUL F. DIEHL
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In Washington But Not Of It: The Prophetic Politics of Religious Lobbyists *by Daniel J. B. Hofrenning. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1995. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

Religious lobbyists are a blip on the radar screen of organized advocacy in Washington, constituting less than 1 percent of the interest group universe and commanding fewer material resources than nearly any large corporation standing alone. Yet Daniel J. B. Hofrenning manages to persuade us that this very small segment of Washington is worthy of sustained study.

The book begins with a brief history of religious lobbying and a theoretical chapter that provides a framework for subsequent empirical analysis. Based on depth interviews with representatives of thirty-two diverse religious organizations, Hofrenning then profiles the groups in terms of resources, theological orientation, political leanings, and organizational structure. There follow three key chapters that examine the world view of religious lobbyists, their tactical and strategic preferences, and the all-important question of leader-member cohesion. In these chapters, the author consistently compares his sample of religious lobbyists and organizations to the broader universe of Washington interest groups as revealed by recent scholarship. He reports both the statistical patterns in his data and the illuminating words of the lobbyists. The book concludes with recollections on the implications of the findings for the nature of national political life.

The core argument is aptly conveyed by the title. Religious lobbyists are a breed apart. As individuals, they tend to be recruited from outside the governmental networks that supply representatives for secular interests. More importantly, religious lobbyists draw upon their religious traditions to play a strikingly different role from most Washington representatives. As "prophetic lobbyists," they seek nothing less than the wholesale transformation of American society in the image of the Kingdom on Earth. Rejecting incremental goals and involvement with the minutiae of crafting legislation, they focus on changing the agenda of national politics. This entails deemphasizing insider strategies that depend upon access to governmental elites in favor of outsider techniques such as rallying public opinion, mounting public protests, and stimulating grassroots lobbying by church members and sympathizers. Despite their reputation as generals without armies, it turns out that religious lobbyists are usually close to the views in the pews, especially if one factors in issue salience.

The cost of the prophetic strategy is political marginalization. Despite their standing as representatives of the single most common form of voluntary organizational affiliation in the United States, religious lobbyists seldom have much legislative clout as that quality is normally understood in Washington. This does not mean they are impotent. Rather, in an argument that recalls Allen Hertzke's *Representing God in Washington* and Sylvia Tesh's 1984 article in this journal, Hofrenning maintains that religious lobbyists bring an important dimension to Washington: "Bringing previously quiescent citizens into the process, they make politics more democratic. Challenging elite perspectives, they make politics more participatory. Representing important values, they also serve as an antidote to political debates that sidestep moral significance. Finally, their position on the margins of American politics gives them a distinctive vantage point that can produce illuminating new perspectives on the critical problems that face the United States" (p. 183).

Aside from readability and the sheer fascination of the topic, the book is particularly noteworthy for the fine way it integrates the subject with ongoing theoretical debates in the discipline. In accounting for the behavior of religious lobbyists, Hofrenning draws upon recent developments in group theory and modifies that literature, including the larger pluralist

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perspectives in which it is embedded, based on his findings. If I taught a course on interest groups or legislative politics, I would seriously consider this book to augment the somewhat bloodless accounts of groups that dominate the interest group universe. The author also displays sufficient understanding of religious traditions to make intelligent distinctions between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish lobbying. The books' weaknesses are mostly sins of omission. First, there is a possibility that the outsider status of religious lobbyists is not inherent in role definition, as Hofrenning suggests, but derives from temporal context effects and limited resources. Most data were collected in the late 1980s, when the presidency had been under almost continuous Republican control. How much of the perceived marginality of the predominantly left-wing religious lobbyists stemmed from the inhospitable political climate toward "peace and social justice" during that period? To what extent do religious lobbyists choose their prophetic mantle and to what extent it is thrust upon them by lack of material resources? Second, the book would have been enriched by a case study of religious lobbying on a particular issue, something with the flavor of Michael Pertschuk's *Giant Killers*. Such an account might have conveyed the style and substance of religious advocacy in Washington and helped illuminate the influence wielded by such groups.

Daniel Hofrenning has written a fine book that should appeal both to students of interest group scholars and the burgeoning community of scholars exploring the linkage between religion and politics.

KENNETH WALD
University of Florida, Gainesville

Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States *by F. Gregory Gause III. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 237 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Gause seeks to go beyond conventional wisdom in America on six states of the Gulf—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. It is his position that these states can only be understood in the context of their domestic realities, which differ from common assumptions of traditional societies and weak, fragile regimes. To show how politics occurs, he devotes chapters to Islam and tribalism, oil, representation and participation, foreign and defense policies, challenges to the regimes, and, finally, American policy toward these states. The central theme of the book revolves around "the tension generated by the institutionalization and growth of the state, the concomitant political demands that process creates within society, and the government's reactions to those demands . . ." (p. 4). Now at the University of Vermont, this work was undertaken when Gause was a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. The analysis is drawn from a series of interviews by the author, translations of documents, and utilization of secondary work.

The straightforward nature of the text makes this a good book to entice students into further studies of politics of the Middle East. The writing is clear, informal, and direct. With its lack of jargon, the book is accessible to a wide audience. In addition, Gause provides a good deal of empirical information about the states on the Arabian peninsula.

The book is offered as a series of observations intended to educate readers. Gause focuses primarily on what the states share in common. The result, however, is that some very interesting questions are left unanswered. He assumes that each of the six states under inquiry

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are rentier in nature and suggests that this profoundly affects politics. If so, further discussion is often welcomed. Does the variable extent of state oil wealth and reserves explain political differences? In turn, what accounts for the similarity of politics within this variability?

Observers often disagree on the extent of discontent in the peninsula; Gause tends to both acknowledge potential sources of discontent and to downplay their current significance. He acknowledges dissatisfaction in these states in the past few years, but suggests that it is "loyal opposition—perhaps the word opposition is even stretching the point" (p. 118). It is also suggested that the ruling families run the risk of setting themselves apart from their societies by taking on airs socially or by getting more than their fair share of oil revenues. In my view, this has likely occurred. Gause acknowledges that sentiments of popular dissatisfaction are present in the Gulf but suggests they are not now widespread. In the end, Gause remains hopeful and cautiously optimistic about the potential for stability and evolutionary development. He reiterates that the resources of the regimes are substantial.

As for American policy toward the Gulf states, Gause demonstrates the ongoing tension between the dual U.S. goals of regime stability and political development. Once established, he concludes his work with suggestions that U.S. policy makers encourage political participation and build relationships with the organizations of civil society in the peninsula and approach the issues of democracy and human rights with caution, subtlety, and tact.

In sum, this volume presents a wide-ranging, yet concise analysis of the subject. This book is recommended for integration into the undergraduate classroom and as a supplement to any library on the Middle East.

GWENN OKRUHLIK
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville

Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State
by Lester M. Salamon. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 310 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $16.95.

For over a decade, Lester Salamon has focused his research on what other scholars have ignored—the nonprofit sector in America. *Partners in Public Service* is a compilation of some new work along with updated versions of his earlier works. Grounding his discussion in the theoretical perspectives on the nonprofit sector, Salamon examines the dynamic behind the growth of the sector during the last fifty years, its retrenchment in the last decade and a half, and the sector's new direction for the future.

Demonstrating that the large number of nonprofits today is not the result of an increase in private charitable support, as many mistakenly believe, but rather an extension of the great growth of the welfare state before the 1980s, Salamon explains how the nonprofit sector functions as a third party government. And it is the growth of this third party government that contradicts the belief that government's increased role in the welfare state has diminished and weakened the nonprofit sector. The opposite, in fact, is true. A union between the public and private sector has greatly evolved, and it is this relationship that has fostered the great expansion of the nonprofit world. In the end, it was the federal government that found itself very dependent upon the voluntary sector to execute its mandates.

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But Salamon notes that there is an overwhelming ignorance about the breadth and depth of this partnership. One view attributes the partnership with actively distorting the sector's goals, making it subservient to government and threatening its independence. By extension, another view categorizes the partnership as simply a vehicle for government to indirectly control functions and services that were once private. In fact, Salamon lends credence to these views by devoting a good portion of the book to demonstrating just how large and intertwined the relationship has become—truly greater than most would imagine.

The Reagan administration sought to reverse this partnership trend by declaring that the voluntary sector ought to be allowed to do what it does best and believed this could only be achieved by "getting government off its back." This same policy of government retrenchment and rhetoric of nonprofit independence was continued through the Bush administration's "1000 Points of Light" initiative.

Salamon illustrates that both these administrations misunderstood the interdependence of government and the nonprofit; and more importantly no one focused on the link between government budgetary decisions and the viability of the nonprofit sector. This misunderstanding not only held true for the many nonprofits who supported the Reagan administration's position of less government, but has also held true for the Clinton administration and the new Republican Congress's "Contract with America."

Unknowingly, they have instituted the dismantling and weakening of "important components of the existing government-nonprofit partnership and set in motion forces likely to make the sector more commercial instead" (p. 10). It is here that Salamon speaks to the future of the voluntary sector. With less government funding to support the increasing demand for services in such diversified areas as the arts, education, and social services, this historically complimentary and charitable sector will have to take on a more business-minded and market-oriented method of operation. In other words, the "for-profitization" of this formerly nonprofit field could be inevitable. Arguing that this strategy will be the only way for many agencies to survive, Salamon predicts that fees for services and a multitude of other commercial methods will be applied. He also predicts a major expansion of for-profit involvement in normally traditional nonprofit areas, warning that we may be forcing the end of the voluntary sector and the elimination of the access to services and care by the disadvantaged.

In the end, Salamon argues that the severance of this long developing public-private partnership is ill-advised, since it has worked remarkably well in the United States. Many foreign countries, both developed and developing, have been forming nonprofit organizations and building the sector, based on the America third party model to replace their less efficient government operated welfare state systems.

It is ironic that at a time when our nation is abandoning a partnership that many believe has failed, so many other nations have recognized its successes and are rushing to adopt it. *Partners in Public Service* is an excellent work that should be must reading for all public officials who claim to support better and efficient government in America, and practitioners in the nonprofit sector who will bear the brunt of a failed partnership. Salamon clearly demonstrates that third party government is the way.

RALPH DA COSTA NUNEZ
Columbia University

The Federal Courts, Politics, and the Rule of Law *by John C. Hughes. New York, HarperCollins, 1995. 210 pp. Paper, $17.25.*

There is much to admire in Hughes's slender book on law and the federal courts. The practical aim of this enterprise is a comprehensive monograph suitable for a political science course that

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considers issues involving law and courts. Hughes admits that his monograph lies somewhere "betwixt and between" standard courses in constitutional law and "law and courts." Yet the success with which he weaves together theoretical debates about judicial decision making with political and normative analyses of the federal court system provides a persuasive case for a tailored course that addresses precisely the set of questions that are raised and considered in the book.

These questions include in sequence litigation and politics, the federal court system (including selection and tenure on the lower federal bench and the U. S. Supreme Court), the elements of a lawsuit, the structure of legal norms, and constitutional review. The thrust of Hughes's normative argument is sensible: "The appropriate question for debate is not whether courts ought to make policy, for they must, but rather what kind of policy ought courts be making" (p. 205). Throughout the book, Hughes properly insists that theories of legal decision making that purport to counterpoise law with politics, and to suppose that legal interpretation is a process of constraining judges by limiting their role to the uncovering of clear legislative purpose or of plain textual meaning, will fail as persuasive accounts of the judicial role. Rather, we must constantly return to the essential question of what sort of policy-making role should federal courts exercise in a democratic republic.

A number of key jurisprudential currents make their appearances in Hughes's book. One is Critical Legal Studies (CLS), a movement in legal academia that curiously preoccupies contemporary political scientists, even while it is all but moribund in contemporary legal scholarship. While Hughes somewhat overstates the degree to which CLS is responsible for the claim that legal interpretation requires the exercise of discretion and even political judgment, his discussion of the CLS and CLS-inspired revisionist theories of law (including, for example, law and feminism) is accessible and insightful. So, too, is his discussion of contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation in the book's last chapter. His detailed discussion, complete with pertinent discussions of the recent literature, of restrained, creative, and representation-reinforcing constitutional review is clear and instructive.

One important jurisprudential current that does not feature at all in Hughes's account is law and economics. Hughes might have added to his account by a discussion of rational choice perspectives on legal norms and judicial decision making.

As far as his discussion of the federal court system is concerned, all will be more or less content with the breadth and erudition of Hughes's treatment. One element missing, however, is a thorough consideration of the structure of decision making in the lower federal courts. The chapter on the structure of the lawsuit recounts successfully an important literature on litigation and dispute settlement. But there is scant attention to the processes of decision making within the sprawling federal judiciary. Key structural issues include the impact of the federal sentencing guidelines, the division of responsibilities among appellate and district judges within circuits, the significance of local court rules, and doctrinal devices, such as the law of the circuit doctrine, which serve to cabin the influence of particular parts of the federal appellate system. I would qualify this call for more institutional detail, however. Perhaps, after all, such close attention to the structure of the lower federal courts would try the patience of students in an introductory course on federal law and courts.

DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ
University of California, Berkeley

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The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and Human Rights *by Myron Weiner. New York, HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995. Paper, $17.25.*

Myron Weiner has written what is easily the best textbook to date on the magnitude and consequence of population movements across frontiers. Not simply an overview, his comprehensive and multifaceted analysis of the migration crisis highlights and clarifies critical theoretical issues at the center of national and international politics, such as citizenship, the resilience of sovereignty, and the impact of the global economy. Weiner also addresses ethical and philosophical concerns that underlie debates over migration and refugee policies. He particularly underscores the moral contradiction in the behavior of Western liberal democracies, which advocate the fundamental right to emigrate and at the same time continue to guard the sanctified right of sovereign states to control their boundaries. Throughout, one feels Weiner's mastery of every element of his subject.

In an extraordinary session on involuntary migration held at the Salzburg Seminar in July 1995, migration practitioners and scholars presented conflicting data that raise questions as to whether the so-called crisis of migration is unprecedented and due to the increase in the volume of population flows or simply the product of perception—the manifestation of Western anxieties over Third World invasion. Weiner pays serious attention to such fears in discussing traditionally hospitable countries. Although his sympathy lies with the migrant and the refugee, he does not rush to condemn reluctant receivers as irrational, xenophobic, or paranoid. In fact, he incorporates perceptions and fears in framing his questions.

One of Weiner's most important contributions is to redirect the discussion on migrants and refugees from economics to politics. Indeed, the tendency of political economists and neo-Marxists to focus on transnational developments as the key determinants of population movements often obscures the fact that political actors throughout the world—in Africa, South Asia, Europe, and the Americas—are still the overpowering elements in generating and controlling population flows. Weiner debunks the notion that "the world economy and global communications are such powerful forces for international migration that states are essentially powerless to control who enters" (p. 199). He shows that sovereignty and control over boundaries still reside primarily with governments, with the exception of failed-states. According to Weiner, what sometimes seems to be a states's inability to regulate its frontiers is usually the consequence of the host society's struggle to define the notions of identity and purpose. This is particularly the case for liberal democracies, which face the challenge of multiculturalism and are questioning the limits of their generosity toward migrants and refugees. These challenges are evident in the debates in Europe of the rising tide of Muslim migrants and in the United States over controlling the flows from Mexico, Cuba, or Haiti. For countries that pay less attention to human rights, expelling migrants is less of a problem, as demonstrated by the speedy eviction of Palestinians from Kuwait after the Persian Gulf War or by India's rapid removal of millions of Bangladeshi refugees from its camps.

To accentuate the political motivations and consequences of population movements, Weiner uses the security/stability framework. In numerous examples he demonstrates how migrants may effect the creation, breakdown, or recomposition of states, and how they may challenge the nature of regimes and societies. He examines the problem of ethnic balance inside host countries, evaluates the cultural threats to their societies, and underscores the threat posed to the state when stormed by heavily armed refugee movements. Pakistan, for example, which extended its hospitality to millions of Afghans fleeing Soviet occupation and eventually became a base for mujahidin's counterattacks, has been inflicted with a "klashnikov culture" and suffered a large increase in addiction when it became a conduit for drug smug-

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gling. Indeed, at times even assimilated migratory populations may create tensions between host and home countries when they are mobilized as active diasporas. The power of ethnic lobbies in the United States is a case in point. Because of the direct cost relating to their absorption, immigrants and refugees may often be perceived as a burden on the host economy, especially when migrants compete with other groups for unskilled jobs or business. Yet when the ideology of a state is fused with the idea of absorbing refugees, regardless of the cost, as in the case of Israel's posture toward diasporic Jews, the receiving country may perceive even a large wave as manna from heaven.

YOSSI SHAIN
Tel Aviv University

Making Environmental Policy *by Daniel J. Fiorino. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995. 269 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $15.00.*

Daniel Fiorino, a long-time participant in and observer of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has written an excellent description of environmental policy making at the federal level that is essential reading for any serious scholar. He begins by comparing environmental policy in the United States with Dr. Suess's The Lorax, "the story of a prospering ecosystem ruined by unbridled industrial development" (p. 1). He uses the analogy to introduce the concepts that will be addressed in his book: politics, science, ethics, economics, psychology, law, and sociology.

Fiorino lists the institutional challenges faced by EPA: setting a realistic environmental policy agenda; maintaining democratic values; using social resources efficiently; adapting institutions to protect the environment; measuring and evaluating progress.

Fiorino places environmental policy making within the policy formulation models of bounded rationality and incrementalism. He states that "Our goal . . . should be a more realizable one: to achieve a bounded rationality in environmental policy making" (p. 15). He spends two chapters discussing the roles of institutions in the policy-making process. In the first chapter he focuses on the EPA. He describes each major piece of environmental legislation as it was originally enacted and as it was reauthorized. He also includes a summary table of the statutory framework. He makes three blanket observations on the statutory setting: changes in environmental laws over time have been incremental, environmental laws have become more and more prescriptive, and the statutory framework reflects an ambivalence, if not hostility, toward economics.

Fiorino next examines EPA as the focus for policy making. He stresses the importance of understanding the regulatory process: "to know its regulatory process is to know much about EPA itself" (p. 48). He then discusses the many other institutions that have an effect on environmental policy: Congress, the Office of Management and Budget and the executive branch, other federal agencies, nongovernmental forces, and citizens. Most of the focus, however, is on the federal Environmental Protection Agency.

The book then examines risk and economic analysis. It is very important to acknowledge the uncertainty involved in risk assessment. Fiorino observes: risk assessment cannot be isolated as a purely technical, value-free side of society; government risk assessments deal with uncertainty by making cautious assumptions and overestimating potential risks; and because of this uncertainty, risk assessment is better used as a rough guide for setting priorities and less as an exact rule for decision making.

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Economic analysis involves estimating the costs and benefits associated with a particular action. Fiorino begins by defining costs, benefits, and discounting. He concludes his discussion of analyses by raising several questions: Can environmental questions affect the cancer rate? Does cost-benefit analysis undervalue ecological resources? Should a dollar value be assigned to human life? He looks at these questions in terms of both risk and economic analyses and acknowledges the limits of analyses.

The book then turns to the setting of environmental policy agendas and developing policy strategies. It does a good job of posing basic questions such as: "What do policy makers do when they determine that something is a problem" (p. 168)? Fiorino answers with a few brief examples of how policy makers have responded to problems on the current agenda. He concludes by noting that the way we define problems influences how we design strategies and what instruments we choose and that in designing strategies, we make choices.

In the final chapter, Fiorino discusses the concept of sustainable development. "Many of the trends discussed below – the move toward integration, the greater emphasis on preventing pollution, the changes in ways of conducting economic analysis – reflect this growing concern for sustainability" (p. 205). He concludes the book by presenting both an optimistic vision and a pessimistic vision of our environmental future.

The great value of this book is its sophisticated treatment of the fundamental issues involved in making federal environmental policy. Anyone seeking to understand the history of environmental policy making in the United States and its current status will find this work invaluable. The book is largely descriptive, and while some scholars may find that to be a criticism, I find its unbiased description refreshing and unencumbered by the typical ideological baggage this issue seems to generate.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

Between Melting Pot and Mosaic: African Americans and Puerto Ricans in the New York Political Economy *by Andres Torres. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1995. 244 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

This book courageously explores important themes regarding the causes of and possible remedies for racial and ethnic inequality in New York City. Torres's work is ambitious. He uses census data from 1960, 1970, and 1980 to analyze the relative contributions of race, ethnicity, gender, economic structure, education, labor market experience, and discrimination on labor market outcomes. In so doing, he offers a sustained critique of individualist explanations for urban inequality, arguing instead that such outcomes are strongly affected by the relative ability of groups to organize to pursue their interests through political action. Finally, he underscores the depths of Puerto Rican poverty and shows that blacks made more progress between 1960 and 1980. The willingness to say that blacks are not the most oppressed group, to acknowledge that "people of color" are as much divided by ethnic differences as they are united by subordination, and to call for coalition-building across racial boundaries are all courageous, at least in certain circles.

Torres begins with a central paradox: why are Puerto Ricans poorer than blacks in New York City, even though they do not experience the same degree of racial discrimination? His answer falls in three parts: Puerto Ricans arrived more recently and in a shorter burst of

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arrival, thus making absorption into the economic niches that received them more problematic. Puerto Ricans were also more concentrated in industries and occupations (particularly in garment manufacturing) that were destined for shrinkage and profound restructuring; and Puerto Ricans were far less able to enter government employment, which Torres attributes to their political disorganization. As a result, after controlling for education and labor market experience, Puerto Ricans fared poorly and indeed tended to be extruded out of the labor market, while blacks did relatively well, especially black women entering clerical and professional jobs. Puerto Ricans thus fit William J. Wilson's deindustrialization hypothesis better than blacks in New York City.

But Torres cautions that lessons drawn from the 1960–1980 time period may not apply to the early 1990s, because economic restructuring is now threatening all racial groups and immigration has made New York's ethnic make-up even more complex. He concludes by looking at the similarities and differences between Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, on the one hand, and native born African-Americans and West Indians on the other. Just as tensions between blacks and Puerto Ricans have hampered their efforts to work together, he argues, differences between native born and immigrant blacks and Latinos, together with the tendency of white employers to play one against the other, make the need for a new kind of multiracial and multiethnic dialogue all the more compelling.

The research agenda with which Torres concludes merits close attention. One component is to examine whether and when political empowerment leads to greater well-being for subordinate groups. As believers in democracy, we want to believe this connection exists, but it has not been proven on the basis of Torres's evidence. Were blacks really so politically influential after the 1960s? What difference did the David Dinkins mayoralty make? Can a coalition between liberal whites, blacks, and Latinos, whether native or foreign born, really be made durable? Another research goal is to better understand the structural determinants of group inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, it is possible, even probable, that we have witnessed some basic changes from the 1960–1980 period that Torres explores. We must pay more attention not only to what is happening in the labor market, but why so many people are outside of it. For himself as well as the rest of us, then, Andres Torres has posed an incisive intellectual and political challenge.

JOHN MOLLENKOPF
City University of New York, Graduate Center

The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964–1994 *by Stanley Hoffmann. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 326 pp. Cloth, $69.95; paper, $19.95.*

This book is a collection of essays on Europe's predicament and prospects, written by Stanley Hoffmann over a thirty-year period and originally published in such places as *Daedalus, Foreign Affairs*, and the *New York Review of Books*. Hoffmann's introduction is a review of the essays themselves: he points out that they reflect a long-time preoccupation with the trials and travails of European integration and with the inevitably strained relationship between Western Europe (now all of Europe) and the United States. Hoffmann also identifies three themes that recur in the book and that have hampered the development and analysis of European integration: the absence of a clear *projet* or vision (a fatal weakness of the European Community/Union); the European Community/European Union's (EC/EU) inability to go

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beyond economic integration and develop a common foreign and (ultimately) defense policy; and, at a theoretical level, the limits of realism as a key to understanding international relations.

The meaning of the book's title quickly becomes apparent. Sisyphus is one of Hoffmann's favorite myths, or at least one that he likes to use to help describe developments in contemporary Europe. Thus the maintenance of prosperity and the perpetuation of the Common Agricultural Policy are Sisyphean tasks. But the myth's most frequent invocation in these essays refers to the impossibility of European unity and the unattainableness of a "European Europe." Indeed, the book is mainly about the limits of European integration; hence the connotation of the title.

Apart from the lack of a coherent and appealing *projet*, in Hoffmann's view the main obstacles to European unity were and are the resilience of the nation state (he argues convincingly that European integration has tended to strengthen, rather than weaken, the nation state); the persistence of national identities and diversities; and the divergence of EU member state interests, especially in response to outside pressure and crises. The United States may have supported Jean Monnet's endeavors and seemingly championed European integration, but Hoffmann identifies U.S. ambivalence (for economic and, especially, strategic reasons) as having been a major drawback to the EC's development. In view of this prognosis, the bulk of the book (Part Two of three parts) should perhaps have been entitled "European (Dis)unity in the Cold War," rather than "European Unity in the Cold War."

Part Three of the book consists of six essays written between 1989 and 1993 covering the European Community's revival after the Single European Act, the European Union's retreat after the Maastricht Treaty, and of course, the cold war's end. The latest essay, "Europe's Identity Crisis Revisited," was written in 1994 but forms the second of only two essays in Part One of the book. It is a companion piece to a lengthy essay, "Europe's Identity Crisis," originally published in 1964. Although written thirty years apart, these essays demonstrate that many of Europe's problems and preoccupations remain remarkably unchanged.

The entire collection is full of fascinating insights into contemporary European politics and society, and exhibits Hoffmann's extraordinary analytical abilities, articulateness, and erudition. Hoffmann and Westview Press have done a great service by putting these pieces together and especially by resurrecting some of the older, less accessible essays.

DESMOND DINAN
George Mason University

Farmers' and Farm Workers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture *by Patrick H. Mooney and Theo J. Majka. New York, Twayne Publishers, 1995. 260 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $14.95.*

This is a useful book because of two features. First, it demonstrates well how agrarian protest has been an essential and continuing part of U.S. politics. Second, and tied intimately to protest's enduring nature, the authors illustrate repeatedly how American agriculture has never been fair to all who practiced it. In that sense, the book adds volatility to the images of those who tend to see U.S. agriculture as only a pastoral, if somewhat businesslike, lifestyle.

The analysis is historical in nature, with the intent of extracting central lessons over time from both farmer insurrections against government policy and farm-worker protests.

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While the authors differentiate between farm and farm-worker events, they find the commonalties to be the most revealing in the insights given about U.S. agriculture. Specifically, comparing the two longitudinally demonstrates how that particular agriculture has always been split between the haves and have-nots by a capitalist economy. Mooney devotes four chapters to farmer mobilization, and Majka follows with three chapters on farm workers. The chapters on farmers focus on one emergent organization after another, reflecting the repetitive appearance of these groups. In contrast, the farm-worker chapters are more integrative, because they cover groups that have greater continuity and interaction over a much shorter time, essentially since the Depression of the 1930s. Both presentations are equally effective and do their jobs, as the authors' joint conclusion shows.

The authors are two respected rural sociologists who, prior to this effort, have made longtime attempts to understand these two types of agricultural groups. Both are readily identified with their topics and, more generally, political sociology. Not surprisingly, they employ a sociological reference in developing the book's theory. To that end, they employ what they explain as mobilization and political process theories. While some fieldwork went into this project, most of it is based on secondary sources.

The major emphasis in theory building is on the importance of ideology and how ideological splits bifurcated the agricultural sector. A secondary emphasis is on the importance of group strategies, their successes and failures. That material, brought together as it is, is a valuable contribution to our collective knowledge of interest theory. The book demonstrates that groups, not just beliefs, matter.

The analysis, however, does have its problems. The major one is inattention to the extensive number of variables at work in mobilizing politically. The needed attention to internal groups factors, such as leaders and the resources of supporters, is lacking. Very little thought is given to characteristics of policy makers and their relationships with protesters. Policy makers, in fact, are dismissed as all of the same ilk, captured by an economic system. Readers thus get some of the politics, but far from all. Political scientists, in particular, will ask why so much relevant literature is excluded from theory building and the use of mobilization theory. Historians, to only a lesser extent, will feel similarly neglected.

The predominantly sociological focus leads to a second criticism. The book assumes too much. It never becomes clear if this book is really about social movements. Or is it about interest groups? The authors never distinguish, but the latter seems to be the case, since we learn precious little about the grassroots supporters of groups. Even the assumption that these supporters, especially of the most vociferous groups, were have-not farmers is never substantiated and, more importantly, open to serious question.

Assuming too much, and perhaps identifying too strongly with their subjects of analysis, is the third problem. Mooney and Majka make clear at the onset that their sympathies are with the have-nots. Throughout the book they prove it. The result is a quite implicit Marxist analysis that should have been identified up front as such. It also is a result that ignores several vital economic factors that fail to correspond to the authors' views. There is much more to the story than we get in this nice but disappointing volume.

WILLIAM P. BROWNE
Central Michigan University

Hard Right: The New White Power in South Africa *by Johann van Rooyen. London, I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994. 236 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $17.95.*

This book examines an aspect of political life among the white, Afrikaans-speaking people of South Africa. Known as Afrikaners, they number approximately 3 million, or 60 percent

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of the white population and 7.5 percent of the total South African population of some 40 million. The specific focus of this study is Afrikaner ethnonationalism, a political movement that engages the energies of nearly 2 million souls. They are identified in this work as the "hard right," although that catchy appellation is about as helpful as "hard left," which is often used to identify a segment of the Labour party in Britain. In other words, the hard right in this study includes many flexible persons, with reference to whom Nelson Mandela said, "the more we talk . . . the closer we get to one another" (p. 170).

Invaluable as a chronicle of conflicts and their resolutions within the Afrikaner ethnonationalist movement, this work should also be studied for the paradoxical observations that may be gleaned from its content. For example, P. W. Botha, prime minister from 1978 to 1989, ruled repressively during successive declarations of emergency, while he also aggrandized the power of his security establishment. Yet his authoritarian manner and appearance of political rigidity obscured the intensity of a raging conflict between his own pragmatic wing of the ruling National party and the die-hard defenders of apartheid. His receptivity to change, involving the abandonment of apartheid in principle and partially in practice, prompted the die-hards to bolt the National party in 1982 and form the neo-apartheid Conservative party, upon which organization this study is principally focused.

The emergence of the Conservative party as the official parliamentary opposition, following its electoral surge in 1987, was widely misrepresented by the media as a shift to the right. To the contrary, as Van Rooyen observes, the center of white politics had shifted decisively to the left. Subsequently, by late 1990, the Conservative party itself abandoned the crucial presumption of apartheid that whites would establish the territorial pattern of the country as well as the relationship of constituent states to one another. Henceforth, Conservatives would ask for white control of a relatively small white homeland, which policy came to be known as "sacrificial partition." Eventually, conciliatory whites with impeccable ethnonationalist credentials, led by Constand Viljoen, a retired general and former commander-in-chief of the South African Defense Force, settled on the goal of a *volkstaat* (people's state) to preserve Afrikaner traditions within South Africa. The legitimation of this goal by means of an amendment to the interim constitution, prior to the first nonracial election of April 1994, ensured the electoral participation of rightists under the banner of Viljoen's newly-formed Freedom Front, which garnered 2.2 percent of the total vote—27 percent of all votes cast by Afrikaners according to Van Rooyen's calculation published elsewhere.

Finally, we learn from this study that the core of the white right, that is, the Conservative party, was always less racist than nationalist. Its racism was a dependent variable because its exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism was always the more fundamental. Relatively moderate Conservatives were inclined to negotiate with Africans, at first with leaders of the African Homelands, eventually with the African National Congress. The exclusivist African political organizations are strikingly similar to Van Rooyen's hard rightists. The Pan Africanist Congress and the Azanian People's Organization are frequently misperceived as exponents of left-wing racism. In reality, most of their members are neither more nor less racist than most of the people discussed in this book. Like members of the Conservative party and its satellites, they too support variant forms of ethnonationalism. Hence their policies and politics have similarly rightist postures and reactionary tendencies. Although Van Rooyen does not reach this comparative conclusion on ethnonationalism in South Africa, it is an unmistakable inference to be drawn from his valuable work.

RICHARD L. SKLAR
University of California at Los Angeles

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Improving Poor People: The Welfare State, the "Underclass," and Urban Schools as History *by Michael B. Katz. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 179 pp. $24.95.*

Many historians like to wag their fingers and warn that failure to understand our past will doom our efforts to shape the future. Far fewer of them are willing to do the hard work required to extract meaningful lessons and articulate them in terms that speak directly to the issues of the day. Michael B. Katz is one of the few. Katz is highly regarded for his careful studies of the evolution of public education and social welfare in the United States. Those studies have highlighted important themes with definite, but sometimes indirect, relevance to contemporary debates. Rather than present new research, this latest book adopts a less scholarly—more personal, reflective, and discursive—style, in order to distill those themes and speculate more openly about the implications for public policy.

The first two chapters argue that historians and other social analysts carelessly have promulgated ideas and vocabulary that obscure the real nature of institutions and the way they intersect with ordinary peoples' lives. Chapter One follows the development of charitable and voluntary agencies and their gradual transformation into our "semi" welfare state. Historians have been overly reliant on the self-congratulatory claims of the early social reformers and philanthropists, he says, and have thereby reinforced the myth that voluntarism stands as an alternative to government as a means of solving social problems. But the public and private spheres have never been entirely distinct, says Katz; their boundaries have been blurred, contested, overlapping, and continually in flux. The charitable reformers and their nonprofit organizations were not, as conventional wisdom would have it, forcefully displaced by an imperialistic public social welfare bureaucracy. Rather they played key roles in laying the foundation for our current system. And, while the expansion of the state was in some ways smooth and natural, the precise shape was not predetermined; alternative and viable models existed, but did not take hold.

Chapter Two examines the concept of the underclass. Katz sees a critical difference between the situation of today's poor and their predecessors who, he feels, suffered their status in the "context of hope." The underclass term, and the associated focus on cultural attributes and personal failings of the poor, distracts attention from the broad economic and institutional transformations that account for this difference.

Chapter Three turns to the issue of education. Katz suggests that U.S. public schools have followed a more bureaucratic path than social welfare efforts. While acknowledging that bureaucratization was associated with some definite improvements, Katz does not abandon the sensitivity to the debilitating effects of top-down, bureaucratic institutions that characterizes his earlier writings. What is new and important here is his enthusiastic embrace of Chicago's ongoing experiment in school decentralization and democracy. Some will find his declaration that Chicago's reform "transcends . . . historic constraints on change" (p. 112) far too incautious and premature. But his willingness to wander out on this limb helps to give flesh to his broad theme that better and viable institutional arrangements can be shaped to address social needs while retaining democratic principles.

Chapter Four, the final chapter, centers on three turn-of-the-century New York City families as they battled with poverty and the often ham-handed efforts of relief workers to help them. Their stories, coupled with Katz' recollections of his personal experience as a graduate student working for a summer in a settlement house in a low-income neighborhood, underscore the basic competence and vitality that he believes characterize many of the poor who are forced into passive roles by circumstance and by the institutions they confront.

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Each of these chapters sandwiches historical accounts between personal vignettes and reflections on contemporary policy debates. Those who know Katz's work will find both the evidence and the arguments to be familiar, and some may find the author's intrusion into the work too self-conscious or contrived. But for citizens and policy makers, the book provides valuable and definitive evidence that history can be relevant. And for scholars still struggling to integrate personal belief, civic responsibility, and professional integrity, this book provides some encouragement and direction.

JEFFREY R. HENIG
George Washington University

The Price of Federalism *by Paul E. Peterson, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995. 239 pp. Cloth, $36.95; paper, $15.95.*

This is an important and provocative book that deserves serious attention from all students of American government and public policy. The author has combined the theoretical use of his earlier work with contemporary models of legislative behavior in an effort to advance an integrated theory of modern federalism. His theory building is augmented by probing empirical analysis, focused not only on the national government but states and cities as well.

The author builds his analysis around competing theoretical perspectives on federalism and a classification of governmental functions as either developmental or redistributive. Functional theory is derived from public finance models prescribing public sector organization, while legislative theory is constructed from modern rational choice models of legislative behavior. Legislative theory suggests that electoral incentives drive modern representatives to maximize the credit-claiming opportunities offered by developmental programs and to shun less popular redistributive programs. But according to the predominantly normative functional theory, most developmental activities will be provided more efficiently by state and local governments, while redistribution belongs at the national level.

Throughout the remainder of the book, Peterson attempts to test these and other propositions that flow from his competing models. Various chapters trace the evolution of the federal system, the causes of variation in state spending, the distributional effects of federal grants, and federal aid to cities. Among his key conclusions, Peterson finds that since the 1960s functional assignments in the federal system have increasingly mirrored the prescriptions of functional theory, with the national government concentrating increasingly on redistribution and subnational governments on development. Although states vary in their level of public expenditures, they all share a reluctance to become "welfare magnets." Peterson warns of a competitive "race to the bottom" if federal welfare entitlements are converted into block grants (p. 128).

This effort to link immediate policy concerns with contemporary social science theory is one of the book's most valuable contributions. Although portions of the book can seem a little timebound, the most troubling issues involve areas of imprecision. Readers will go for pages seeking a definition of the "price of federalism," for example. More importantly, while the distinction between functional and legislative theory is original and insightful, critical assertions about each theory go unreferenced or seem arbitrary.

Empirically, the core of the book rests upon the author's classification of expenditures into developmental and redistributive. Here, the devil is in the details, but would-be exorcists

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will search in vain for any detailed explanation of the programs assigned to each category. Except for federal aid programs, we are given only the most general guidance, and some of that is unconvincing. ALL government pensions should be considered redistributive (p. 64)? Should the same be said of General Revenue Sharing (p. 201)? Do health, safety, and environmental regulations fit into this framework? Since Theodore Lowi's work in the 1960s, most scholars have treated regulation as a distinctive policy type. With all the recent focus on federal mandates, that still seems plausible today. Treating regulation as an instrument of either development or redistribution, as Peterson does, may work in some cases (special education) but not in others (pollution control).

Despite such stipulations, this book offers many insights and deserves careful reading. Its approach and methodology make it ideal for use in graduate classes, and the questions it provokes could generate valuable new research. Might its findings be altered by reclassifying spending data? What would happen if other policy instruments—like the hundreds of billions of dollars of tax expenditures—were added to the mix? How does one reconcile Peterson's models with the federal government's overwhelming focus on developmental programs in the nineteenth century? Generating a host of exciting research questions is something this book does remarkably well—not bad for a book about federalism.

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN
George Mason University

A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West *by Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 193 pages. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $15.95.*

The volatility of this topic is evident in Americans' surprise that the Oklahoma City bombing was NOT the work of Middle Easterners. This volume is a thought provoking contribution for students and instructors who ponder whether a struggle between Islam and the West is the next major focus of international politics.

The authors' contribution is twofold. Their systematic consideration of a host of dimensions of this issue underscores how international relations have become different from the geopolitics of an earlier era. The old we/they, neatly wrapped into state loyalties and arrayed as a contest among sovereign states, accentuated state boundary issues. This volume depicts a quite different we/they, in complex ways affected by Muslim migration to Europe and America, nonstate actors, economic relationships, questions of cultural authenticity, weapons proliferation, oil production, and numerous facets of governance in the Muslim world. The volume is a fascinating statement of how international we/they relations in the late twentieth century can be very different from the pattern bequeathed by the cold war.

The second contribution is what the authors say about the notion of a global struggle between Islam and the West. They assess historical outlooks of each side toward the other, dilemmas each poses for the other, and a set of other dimensions, illuminating complexities that are crucial aspects of the topic. Their position is that a broad collision is unlikely. The authors note that Islamism is fueled by dissatisfaction with oppressive, inept governments in the Muslim world, and the concept of holy war is directed primarily at internal reform, Muslin against Muslim rather than Muslim against non-Muslim. They also note that the fault lines of the Muslim world differ markedly in various regions.

The authors' subtheme, that "gross mishandling of political relationships on both sides can intensify the ideological element . . . or even lead to a transient ideological consolidation

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of numerous Muslim states" (p. 163), is provocative. Related concerns include an increasing tendency to use West/Islam as shorthand for North/South; the dangers of repressing Islamist movements in the Muslim world; the important ramifications of the Muslim immigrant experience in the West for intra-Islamic debates; and exploitation by politicians.

The authors cogently argue that Islam per se is not the issue. Islam is conducive to various interpretations, and numerous factors affect cohesion around Islamist leaderships in the Muslim world. The authors are clearly worried about Islamist political forces coming to power as part of massive social revolutions. They also worry that, no matter what kind of governments exist in the region, oil dependency is not disappearing and Middle East states will soon have missiles that can reach European cities.

There are shortcomings. The word "psychological" appears in the chapter title on Muslim outlooks, not the chapter title on Western outlooks. Second, different parts of the discussion construe the extent of the Muslim world in different ways. Much of the discussion pertains directly to the Middle East, home to less than a third of the world's Muslims. The authors offer very insightful comments about Central Asia, the Caucusus, and the Balkans. They occasionally refer to South and Southeast Asia, where the largest Muslim populations are found. That Libyan, Saudi, and Iranian efforts have had modest impact on Indonesia emphasizes the question, largely unexplored, of how and to what extent the vast Muslim populations in Southeast Asia resonate to the Middle East. Extensive attention to the Middle East and its adjacent regions is, however, what most Westerners expect from this topic. The authors' argument may be more persuasive to readers because they have made it on those terms.

MARTIN W. SAMPSON III
University of Minnesota

The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy *by David Mayers. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 336 pp. $35.00.*

In this extremely ambitious book, Mayers seeks not only to analyze the role of ambassadors in American policy toward the Soviet Union, but also to evaluate the performance of American envoys to tsarist Russia from 1780 to 1917. Mayers's wide-ranging research included examination of the personal papers of numerous American diplomats, interviews with several recent ambassadors that enhance his discussion of the contemporary era, and utilization of published Soviet memoirs and secondary sources (though not documents in recently opened Russian archives). Unfortunately, the broad stretch of Mayers's work causes his analyses of some complicated issues to be very brief, and many of his ideas are not clearly developed or fully substantiated.

At the outset, Mayers announces that his book "argues for the primacy of diplomacy" (pp. 3–4), maintains that mediocre or poor ambassadors caused serious injury to the United States, and asserts that "ambassadorial diplomacy was crucial in determining national success" at four key moments. However, Mayers subsequently acknowledges that many ambassadors were not even informed about U.S. policy, much less closely consulted by officials in Washington. He further recognizes that even the worst ambassadors did little damage, that the "main inadequacies" were actually in the White House (p. 86), and that breakthroughs in U.S.–Soviet relations "owed little to the ambassadors in Moscow" (p. 238).

Mayers's four models of ambassadorial influence are: Averell Harriman, whose "notable successes" featured persuading Winston Churchill to drop an agreement to divide Eastern

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Europe into spheres of influence and blocking Soviet participation in administering occupied Japan; George Kennan, though his "Long Telegram" of 1946 was "overstated" and emotional (p. 161) and his 1952 ambassadorship ended in disaster; Llewellyn Thompson, who was neglected as ambassador in Moscow, but brilliantly advised the ExCom on handling the Cuban Missile Crisis; and Jack Matlock, who, Mayers suggests, single-handedly "devised the [Reagan] administration's strategy for negotiating with the USSR" (p. 246) while working at the National Security Council and offered shrewd advice from Moscow, though he had difficulty persuading George Bush or Brent Scowcroft that the cold war was over. These four short case studies are not entirely convincing, and they do not reveal a consistent standard of evaluation. While Mayers praises Harriman and Kennan, who spurred the adoption of confrontational policies, he later defines ambassadorial success as meaning "the mediation of Soviet–U.S. estrangement," the furthering of mutual understanding, and the avoidance of war (p. 254–5). In the end, Mayers still wishes that ambassadors with intellectual imagination and sophistication guided American policy, yet he appears to agree with Walter Laqueur that intellectuals are mistaken as often as ordinary mortals, and he concludes that the evidence is equivocal on whether diplomacy is better served by professionals than by amateurs.

Mayers's positions also seem contradictory at a number of other points, particularly on the issue of morality and foreign policy. Although he notes, for example, that the U.S. abrogation of the commercial treaty with Russia in 1911 predictably failed to reform tsarist human rights practices, he later cites it as a positive model of "indignation" (p. 106). In another case, Mayers argues that in the early 1930s U.S. leaders should have raised the issue of the "holocaust" in Ukraine with Soviet authorities, and if they rejected famine relief proposals Washington should have withheld diplomatic recognition, "in keeping with the spirit of U.S. political values" (p. 104–5). Yet Mayers insists that his proposed course does not amount to endorsing the "moralistic strain," which he criticizes as one of the "objectionable" features of U.S. foreign policy (p. 279, n.41).

Mayers had a good idea for a book. Covering both the tsarist and Soviet periods allows him to note some interesting parallels in the views and experiences of American envoys in the two eras. However, Mayers's approach limits his perspective. An excessive focus on individual personalities leads Mayers toward a great man theory of history. He explains, for example, that Soviet socialism was overthrown because Stalin's successors "lacked the audacity of their predecessors" (p. 210). The personalization of issues also causes Mayers to neglect the social and cultural dimensions of American responses to tsarist and Soviet Russia. Mayers's study might have been more illuminating if he had treated ministers and ambassadors less as architects of U.S. policy and more as representatives of American society in its encounter with Russia over two centuries.

DAVID S. FOGLESONG
Rutgers University

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, State Formation and Collapse in the International System *by Barnett R. Rubin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 378 pp. $35.00.*

According to Rubin's account, state formation in Afghanistan began under Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1881–1901) with weapons and cash from the British, who wished to stabilize the northwest frontier of India. The state he built was expanded several times since 1955

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with revenue from foreign aid used for paying its bureaucracy and army, and it was maintained with massive Soviet military and economic aid until its complete collapse at the end of the cold war with the fall of Mohammad Najibullah in 1992. The Afghan state was thus a weak "rentier state." The use of the notion of rentier state for Afghanistan, a poor country that is not oil-producing, is at first surprising. It, however, becomes clear that the central factor in Rubin's account of the formation and collapse of the Afghan state is one that is probably disappearing with the end of the cold war: foreign aid as "location rent." Hence the importance of the international system, which Rubin makes responsible both for the unification of Afghanistan under Pashtun domination (1882-1978) and the subsequent fragmentation of Afghanistan into networks of local power armed to the teeth, "a devastated country with neither national institutions nor national identity" (p. 266).

In his account of the so-called Sawr (April) Revolution, Rubin states that "a rentier state produced rentier revolutionaries" (p. 81). The Marxist intelligentsia that had briefly collaborated with Daoud Khan after the coup of 1973 and took over with Soviet help in April 1978 "was the social group most dependent on the Afghan state and most integrated into the international system" (p. 84). This revolution from above failed miserably as the autonomous but weak rentier state had few means to control society other than its army, which disintegrated in the face of sporadic revolts throughout the country. With these spontaneous local revolts of 1978-1979, various excluded provincial and ethnic groupings on the periphery of the fragmented society, which, unlike the rentier revolutionaries in Kabul, were not integrated into the state or international system rose against an illegitimate regime. Once the fragile rentier state broke down, however, these emerging regional-ethnic power networks and centers developed international ties through the administration of military and financial aid in Pakistan. Ethnic and tribal political forces became realigned with emerging regional centers of power, where strongmen began recruiting uprooted young men into their armies and opium mullahs and warlord controlled roads and made fortunes in contraband trade. Meanwhile, Pakistan, worried about the possible impact of ethnic, especially Pashtun, nationalism on its own northwestern population, recognized seven Islamic groups for receiving aid. Rubin takes us through the labyrinth of the formation, coordination, negotiations, and rivalries among the mujahidin groups and describes the mosaic of regional and ethnic powers that have emerged after the collapse of the central state and absorption of its dissolved army in 1992.

Perhaps the one fact that is not adequately accounted for is the survival of the Najibullah government for three years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Rubin describes Najibullah's abandonment of Marxism and all attempts at social transformation and his embracing of Islam. He points out that Soviet aid continued, and the Russians continued to print money for Najibullah to the end. None of this, however, amounts to an explanation of the surprising fact of Najibullah's survival.

No short review can do justice to Rubin's monumental effort in collecting masses of solid evidence and organizing them with great analytical rigor into a comprehensive, richly detailed, and yet very readable account written with great verve and compassion. In short, this is the book on Afghanistan for the educated public. Nor could the students of comparative politics ask for a more subtle and theoretically sophisticated account of state-building, revolution, and civil war with historical depth and in the context of the international system.

SAID AMIR ARJOMAND
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Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management *by Christopher McMahon. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 1994. 307 pp. $35.00.*

The main question of Christopher McMahon's book is whether the theory used to justify democracy in government can serve to justify democracy in the private sector. The short answer is that it is possible to justify democratic authority in both spheres, although the rationale for democratic authority in nongovernmental organizations is less compelling.

McMahon distinguishes between directive power and legitimate authority. The latter concerns the right to direct others to do something within certain limits. He adopts the normative thesis of the "priority of the right or authority to directive power." Legitimate authority is exercised in society for several reasons, including expertise, morality, promises to obey in a principle-agent relationship, and coordination.

McMahon makes a distinction between principle-agent authority and coordination and expertise authority. He argues that for the latter types of authority, a person who complies better achieves the "directive-independent" benefits that apply to her than under the former kind of authority. Coordination and expertise authority operates in the self-interest of the members of the group responding to the authoritative directive.

Choosing among coordination authorities for citizens who have contrary preferences forms the core choice problem of government. Democratic procedures offer a potentially important means for solving this problem but do not alone justify democracy. McMahon argues that either dictatorial or democratic coordination authority can be legitimate.

To justify democracy, McMahon departs from his focus on legitimacy and turns to two broadly accepted issues of morality: welfare maximization and fairness. He discusses how majority rule best assures welfare maximization but leads to the suppression of minorities. To protect minority rights, government must impose limits on majority rule through constitutional protection that guarantees fairness. A republican form of constitutional democracy best satisfies the moral requirements of society.

In the second part of the book, McMahon transfers these arguments about authority—the primacy of coordination, the normative preference for the legitimate exercise of authority in the interests of those subjected to its directives, and the moral imperatives of organizational action—to the corporate and nonprofit settings. McMahon offers an elegant argument that authority in the private sector should be exercised more democratically than it is now to better enable employees in private organizations to achieve moral purposes through their work.

The book's strengths are also its weaknesses. The space devoted to explaining democratic and other forms of authority in government provides a rich foundation for addressing democracy in corporations. But readers interested in management will not find much of direct focus on corporations until page 170. McMahon's breadth of knowledge about political philosophy, game theory, rational choice, morality, and organization theory offers a unique integration of these perspectives. Yet attempting to incorporate so many different perspectives in one book leads to a very complex and wide-ranging narrative.

The book fails to cite critical resources in specific subjects. On the game theoretic structure of management decision making, for example, no mention is made of Gary Miller's excellent work on game theory and management. No citation is made of Alfred Chandler's classic on how coordination problems led to modern managerial structures, Robert Dahl's work on authority, or any of Charles Lindblom's works on democracy and market authority. The book also has no discussion of the cost of effort as a factor in solving coordination

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problems in corporations, although there is some discussion of transaction costs in society and government.

But these limitations are small in a book that sets out on a journey to determine the appropriate exercise of democratic authority in government and the private sector. While the journey is challenging, the book reaches the destination.

JACK H. KNOTT
Michigan State University

International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 *by Craig N. Murphy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 337 pp. Cloth $39.95; paper, $17.95.*

Since the end of the cold war, issues of international organization have assumed center stage in the study of international relations. This has been the result of a "crisis of multilateralism," in Robert W. Cox's phrase, marked by an increasing disjuncture between global practices and structures and the way they are institutionalized. Debates concerning possible new roles for the United Nations Security Council or how to institutionalize economic policy coordination in a world of globalization are but two examples. Craig Murphy's book is an innovative and timely contribution to these debates, adding a much needed historical perspective.

The book locates successive generations of international organizations in the context of historically constituted world orders. These organizations, originating with the emergence of industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century, have both shaped and been shaped by the intersection of patterns of interstate relations, particular forms of political economy, and dominant political ideas in different eras. Murphy's approach stands in contrast to the dominant liberal institutionalist understanding of world organizations, which is characterized by a linear theory of history, a state-centric ontology, and a preoccupation with interstate bargaining. This work is thus an important contribution to an emerging, although in the United States heterodox, literature in international relations that seeks to revive the historicism of classical realism while adding social depth by seeing world organizations as linked to the organization and social relations of production.

Murphy does this by using the Gramscian concepts of "historic bloc" and "hegemony" to show how world order in each period actually consists of a structure of accumulation with specific organizational forms, a particular configuration of power centered around coalitions of social forces within and across countries, and a core of dominant ideas. The international organizations of each world order can only be explained in relation to the dialectical process whereby the internal contradictions of one order give rise to the forging of another. World organizations, it is argued, are created in periods of crisis and have helped solidify new world orders by promoting industrial expansion through regulation of leading new communications technologies from the International Telegraph Union's promotion of telegraph infrastructure in 1865 to Intelstat's promotion of a satellite-based global telecommunications system in 1964. World organizations have also propagated liberal internationalist ideology and helped regulate contradictions within countries—the role of the International Labor Organization in regulating the work place—and between them, as in the United Nation's role in development assistance.

Despite employing a Gramscian framework, this book is imbued with an affection for the liberal internationalist project. Murphy confronts the current crisis of multilateralism

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optimistically by boldly advocating a global ecological Keynesianism with its own set of world institutions capable of promoting new, more ecologically sustainable technologies and regulating the contradictions precipitated by the more orthodox liberalism of the past two decades. He challenges the liberal fundamentalism that sees free exchange as a panacea by theorizing that capitalism possesses historically contingent institutions and is inherently conflict-ridden, in contrast to its more conventional portrayal as an undifferentiated international economy. It is here the Gramscian and Keynesian elements in the work are in tension. Antonio Gramsci's historical method is ultimately tied to a project that is hostile to capitalism, whereas John Maynard Keynes sought to modify some of capitalism's more blatant contradictions. A vision that reconciles the two can only be achieved by at least partially deradicalizing Gramsci. Nevertheless, this is an important and original work that is multidisciplinary in the best sense of that tradition. It should challenge researchers and students alike.

MITCHELL BERNARD
York University, Ontario

How Russia Became a Market Economy *By Anders Aslund. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1995. 378 pp. $16.95.*

"Money is money," Aslund writes, "in Russia, too" (p. 220). He argues that radical reform does work, when implemented, and that none of the allegedly unique properties of Russia prevents the operation of market forces if they are given free rein. The key elements of radical reform are tight fiscal and monetary policies, comprehensive deregulation of the economy, and privatization. Unfortunately, the Russian reformers gave these elements uneven attention. Privatization has seen dramatic success, but liberalization of the economy has been slow, and macroeconomic policy has waxed and waned in response to the fortunes of key reformers. The result has been a more painful and prolonged transition than was necessary. Nevertheless, a market economy has emerged. The conclusions that other countries should draw from the Russian experience are that radical reform works and that indecision increases its social costs.

Aslund argues convincingly that many of the Russian economy's problems are due to circumstances beyond the reformers' control. The economy was in a state of crisis when economic reform was launched in January 1992. Production was falling, the federal budget deficit was burgeoning, and a huge quantity of forced savings ensured a burst of inflation once prices were liberalized. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance trade had already collapsed, and trade among the former Soviet republics soon followed suit. Most of the decline in gross domestic product was caused by these factors, rather than by macroeconomic shock therapy. In fact, Aslund argues, monetary policy was not stringent enough to produce structural adjustment, much less economic collapse.

Aslund is less convincing when he attempts to move beyond policy advice "to analyze events and their causes" (p. 1). Although he cogently explains why enterprises resisted liberalization in order to extract rents from the state, he has more trouble explaining the variation in policies across industries. He leans heavily on Mansur Olson's theory of collective action, but this only generates anomalies. Why were the numerous state farms so much more influential than the coal mines, and why were both more effective lobbies than the heavily concentrated military industries? Aslund resorts to an apparently ad hoc collection of vari-

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ables. A more fruitful starting point might be to compare the competitiveness of firms in these sectors and their opportunities for exit.

A more serious problem is that Aslund uses personalities as his basic unit of analysis: the pattern of outcomes across policy areas is contingent upon the leadership and character of the ministers in Boris Yeltsin's cabinet. Thus, for example, he argues that macroeconomic policy was more inconsistent than the privatization program, because "[Yegor] Gaidar failed and compromised rather than tak[ing] a firm stand on principles, while Anatoly Chubais displayed great political will" (p. 297). This does not really explain anything.

Finally, Aslund fails to take the political constraints facing the reformers seriously, and consequently treats every setback for reform as a mistake. He emphasizes the great freedom of technocratic elites during the period of "extraordinary politics" following a democratic breakthrough and then is puzzled to find these elites making compromises on all sides. The mistake appears to lie in assuming that policy is autonomous during the honeymoon. Indeed, one of the reformers' first political defeats came as early as November 1991—before the reform program had even been launched—when Gaidar failed to wrest control of the Central Bank of Russia from the Supreme Soviet. Perhaps the lesson the reformers should draw is that politics is politics in Russia too.

RANDALL STONE
University of Rochester

The Politicizing Presidency: The White House Personnel Office, 1948–1994 *by Thomas J. Weko, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1995. 226 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $17.95.*

Has there been a growth in presidential centralization vis à vis the departments of the executive branch? Has there been a growing politicization of the appointments process to executive branch positions? If so, why have such strategies arisen? And to what extent are they successful? Thomas Weko's very fine and eminently readable book addresses these questions and demonstrates that there are simultaneously simple and complex answers.

In particular, Weko seeks to test whether there is some sort of ineluctable drive on the part of presidents to control the forces around them by centralizing and politicizing the selection of discretionary personnel in the executive branch. Or, alternatively, do presidents operate differently? Weko finds evidence for both but argues that the two interpretations do not carry equal weight. Instead, presidential variation is nested within the larger forces leading presidents to centralize and politicize.

The evidence on behalf of growing centralization is more compelling than that on behalf of growing politicization however. Weko shows that despite occasional recessions, the White House personnel office has grown and, above all, has come to exercise greater control over appointments to the executive branch. That has certainly created tensions between the caretakers of the presidential political coalition in the White House and the needs of department secretaries for experienced and competent personnel to help govern their departments. Such tensions were always present but were manifested in earlier times (Truman and Eisenhower, for example) as conflicts between party organizations, members of Congress, and the departments. As party organizations floundered and more personalized presidential campaign organizations took their place, personnel operations became centralized in the White House to do the political vetting previously done through the parties.

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Beyond the changing nature of parties and presidential campaign organizations, the growth in personnel centralization is traced by Weko largely to the growing salience of executive branch operations generated by a more extensive and probing news media and to the growth, diffusion, and fragmentation of policy networks and political interest groups. The need to control is induced by the centrifugal character of political organization of both a formal and an informal nature. Not every president feels equally compelled to attend to this need, Weko argues. He also argues, though, that presidents who have failed to generate a personnel strategy find themselves powerfully weakened in one of the important resources they need to sustain their interests. Among such examples of failure are the early Nixon and Carter presidencies. Each president found himself struggling to assert his priorities against those of executive appointees who were nominally acting on behalf of the presidential administration.

The centralization of personnel choice, nevertheless, is not an unmixed blessing. Department secretaries whose degrees of freedom have been constrained by the White House find ways to circumvent appointees imposed upon them by building up their own staffs, thus providing, ironically, a competing logic of centralization. Furthermore, presidents may well find demands of a political nature placed on them by their own personnel organizations to be far in excess of what the parties or members of Congress could manage in years past. Political blocs within the presidential coalition may gain influence, therefore, at the expense of a president's discretionary power to govern. Only rarely (Reagan) does a presidential administration possess the assets of cohesion within the president's party and personal network and a vision as to what it wishes to achieve in power that it can use the personnel system as a governing tool. Without these assets, centralized politicization can bring constraint as much as influence.

The great strength of Weko's book is that it is clearheaded without being simpleminded. It demonstrates how all aggrandizing moves beget countermoves among the system's players. It shows also how the logic of the system and the exogenous trends interact to create greater inducements toward White House centralization, while noting that not all presidents see or understand that logic in precisely the same ways. Despite being the author's first book, it is for now the last word on the presidential appointment process.

BERT A. ROCKMAN
University of Pittsburgh

One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict *by Russell Hardin. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 288 pp. $24.95.*

This volume, which is dedicated to the late James Coleman, is at one level an attempt to apply rational choice theory to the area of group conflicts, and a rebuttal of the pretension of currently fashionable communitarian theory models of desirable forms of collective behavior. In contrast to those analysts who attribute group conflict to irrational sources, Hardin argues that self-interest is a powerful incentive at the roots of collective violence. With examples ranging from Bosnia and Rwanda, from vendetta to ethnic violence, the author attempts to uncover the self-interested motivations that underlie the logic of social conflict. He stresses the characteristics that make for group success in instances of collective conflict.

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He argues that while sometimes beneficial, such conflicts lead most of the time to perverse results. The identifications that lead to group commitments may in many instances gain primacy over universalistic criteria largely because of the incentives provided by self-interested motivations.

In communitarian political thought, individual community members are supposed to act according to the standards of the community. But this means that "individual responsibility is therefore replaced by license" (p. 218). In defense of one's community anything goes, and murder can be committed with a good conscience. Individuals act in terms of the logic of exclusion and communitarian loyalties, "but all too often only at the cost of degradation of self and others," (p. 231).

While I find Hardin's defense of universalistic norms as against the particularistic norms national, regional or religious, most convincing, I find his case histories of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and so on much less persuasive. After all, the roots of group conflict may be religious in one case and ethnic in another; they may result from rivalry of opposing gang leaders or of religious fanatics. To make sense of them requires more than pointing to the victory of particularistic motivations over universal ones. Why did ethnic conflicts suddenly erupt in the former Yugoslavia after half a century of relative harmony between its constituent nationalities?

The author contends that we would all be better off if we cultivated our own gardens and keep our distance from groups or individuals who try to lure us by claiming that collective goals deserve primacy over individual goals and aspirations, but he better not try to preach this to Bosnians or Tutsis.

"Despite the occasional good that it may do, group-solipsist ethnic assertion is one of the great disasters of modern civilization" (p. 214), but neither rational choice analysis nor appeals to rediscover a lost *Gemeinschaft* (community) are likely to cure a condition where "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity" (p. 139). What we urgently need is a Utopian vision that moves beyond the poles of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (community and society). Hardin has provided some useful and pertinent foundation stones for such a vision but we still wait for the master builder.

LEWIS COSER
Boston College

Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains *edited by Robert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom. London, Sage Publications, 1995. 261 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper $21.95.*

This is an interesting collection of essays exploring common property issues that have local and international dimensions. The famous "tragedy of the commons" problem is essentially a quasi-public good where it is costly to exclude those who will not cooperate in contributing to the socially desired outcome. But it is also rivalry in consuming the good (or not consuming it; it is a "bad"). Hence the standard commons tale of overexploitation of a finite resource.

Solutions to the commons problem may be ranged on a continuum from the purely institutional (the state claims a property right over the commons and rations its usage) to the purely private (allocate property rights to private individuals and allow externalities to

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be bargained away). The essays in this book focus mainly on solutions at the former end of the spectrum. The libertarian reader might wonder whether institutional solutions to the commons problem are really so effective at reducing transaction costs (as claimed in the book's introduction), or whether they might (as economists like William Niskanen would argue) merely introduce another layer of rent-seeking distortions to the commons and become endogenous to the problem.

One of the most attractive features of this volume is that most of the contributors focus on some of the less often discussed aspects of the commons. Heterogeneity of skills and tastes is discussed in most of the papers, attempting to grapple with the question of whether heterogeneity helps or hinders the evolution of cooperative agreements to preserve the commons. While the traditional view (see the Gary Libecap essay on oil fields, orange marketing and fishing) is that heterogeneity hinders cooperation, Lisa Martin and Ronald Mitchell argue that heterogeneity can help. Martin also links heterogeneity to the institutional choice of decision rules for solutions. It struck this reviewer that much of this discussion harks back to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's Nobel Prize winning *Calculus of Consent* (1962), with its defense of majority rule as the optimal procedure under conditions of heterogeneity of voter preferences over outcomes.

Two lesser themes in the book are laboratory experiments and the effects of small numbers. Ostrom's essay examines irrigation projects in Nepal, using them to illustrate her argument (following on her 1990 book, *Governing the Commons*) that norms of reciprocity may evolve to solve the commons problem if the number of exploiters is not too large. Finally, Steven Hackett's experiments suggest the importance of face-to-face communication in reaching negotiated solutions, consistent with Ostrom's emphasis on small numbers.

Although these essays perhaps do not break new ground theoretically, they are an excellent starting point for anyone who wishes to be up to date on the major discussion points on local and global commons issues.

JOHN CONYBEARE
University of Iowa

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary *edited by Bruno Simma. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 1258 pp. $220.00.*

Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis, Volume 3: The Death of Mao (1976) to the Fall of Hua Kuo-feng (1980) *edited by James T. Myers, Jurgen Domes, and Milton D. Yeh. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1995. 522 pp. $69.95.*

Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 4th ed. *by Walter J. Oleszek. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996. 373 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $24.95.*

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Current American Government–Fall 1995. *Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 148 pp. $17.95.*

Essential Papers on Zionism *edited by Jehuda Reinharz and Anita Shapira. New York, New York University Press, 1995. 750 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $25.00.*

The Government and Politics of India *by Ramesh Takur. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 395 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

A Guide to the Carl Albert Center Congressional Archives *by the The Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma, 1995. 113 pp. $5.00.*

The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women's Human Rights *by the Human Rights Women's Rights Project. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 458 pp. $15.00.*

"In a Perilous Hour," The Public Address of John F. Kennedy *by Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos. Westport, CT., Greenwood Press, 1995. 240 pp. $59.95.*

John F. Kennedy: A Bibliography *compiled by James N. Giglio. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1995. 456 pp. $75.00.*

Real Life Dictionary of The Law: Taking the Mystery Out of Legal Language *by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen Thompson Hill. Los Angeles, General Publishing Group, 1995. 479 pp. $19.95.*

Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C. for Peace and International Security Studies *by Robert W. Janes. Washington, DC, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995. 407 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $25.95.*

State Government: CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities, 1995–1996 *by Thad L. Beyle. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 253 pp. $21.95.*

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The United Nations and The Advancement of Women, 1945–1995, with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Blue Book Series Volume VI *by the United Nations. New York, United Nations Publications, 1995. 689 pp. $29.95.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Sanya Popović, in her review of my book *Genocide in Bosnia* PSQ 110 (Fall 1995), merits a response on at least some points. Opting with arbitrary self-assurance for a low number of deaths in Bosnia—the 20–30,000 figure guessed at by George Kenney, based on incomplete Red Cross estimates—would be comforting to Popović and, indeed, to all of us, but seems unrealistic. While no one can know for sure yet, the official spokesman for the Yugoslav Army, Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinović, in May 1995 gave the number of dead in the former Yugoslavia as 280,000. If one deducts 10–15,000 for Croatia, one is still left with a rather larger total of victims for Bosnia, with the vast majority being Muslims. That even more did not die was only due to a fortuitous combination of unexpected self-defense and the massive provision of outside aid, not for a lack of trying.

Likewise, for the number of refugees. The total *is* over two million. To resolve Popović's painful exercise in arithmetic to prove that this exceeds the total Muslim population, I did not say anywhere in the book that the refugees consisted solely of Muslims, and it is no less tragic a phenomenon for that. Although Muslims account for the single largest bloc (with many having taken refuge in the cities that have become "safe zones") there are, of course, also Croats, Gypsies, and Serbs. Many of the latter have "voted with their feet," leaving Bosnia because they were unconvinced they should fight for what they considered simple territorial expansion. They continue to be hounded by the Bosnian Serb and Belgrade civilian and military authorities, who estimate the number at 120–150,000 and who openly call these Serbs "traitors," refer to them sarcastically as the "Belgrade Corps" of their army, and often drag them from cinemas or public transport and return them to the front by force.

As for other issues raised by the reviewer, readers can judge for themselves on their accuracy, based on reading the book.

NORMAN CIGAR

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Index to Volume 110

Articles

ABRAMSON, PAUL R.	Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot	349
ALDRICH, JOHN H.	see Abramson, Paul R.	
BAUN, MICHAEL J.	The Maastricht Treaty As High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration	605
BERMEO, NANCY	Classification and Consolidation: Some Lessons from the Greek Dictatorship	435
COCHRAN, DAVID CARROLL	Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of Irish Americans	587
COSTIGLIOLA, FRANK	Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult	105
DURANT, ROBERT F.	The Democratic Deficit in America	25
FOX, ANNETTE BAKER	Environment and Trade: The Nafta Case	49
GILBOA, EYTAN	The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for U.S. Military Intervention in the Post Cold War Era	539
GILIOMEE, HERMANN	Democratization in South Africa	83
GREENSTEIN, FRED I.	Colin Powell's *American Journey* and the Eisenhower Precedent: A Review Essay	625
GROTH, ALEXANDER J.	Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity	69
HALE, JON F.	The Making of the New Democrats	207
HART, JOHN	President Clinton and The Politics of Symbolism: Cutting the White House Staff	385
JACOBS, LAWRENCE R.	Presidential Manipulation of Polls and Public Opinion: The Nixon Administration and the Pollsters	519
LADD, EVERETT CARLL	The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Realignment Continues	1
LEBOW, RICHARD NED	Deterrence and the Cold War	157
LEPGOLD, JOSEPH	Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis	369
LIND, MICHAEL	Prescriptions for a New National Democracy	563
MCKEOWN, TIMOTHY	see Lepgold, Joseph	
MENDELSON, WALLACE	Ninth Amendment Rights and Wrongs—A Note on Noninterpretism	405
NASR, S. V. R.	Democracy and Islamic Revivalism	261

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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OLLAPALLY, DEEPA	Third World Nationalism and the United States after the Cold War	417
ORNSTEIN, NORMAN J.	The 1995 Congress: The First Hundred Days and Beyond	183
PAOLINO, PHIL	see Abramson, Paul R.	
ROHDE, DAVID W.	see Abramson, Paul R.	
ROTHCHILD, DONALD	see Groth, Alexander J.	
SCHENKENBERG, AMY L.	see Ornstein, Norman J.	
SHAPIRO, ROBERT Y.	see Jacobs, Lawrence R.	
SOBEL, RICHARD	Contra Aid Fundamentals: Exploring the Intricacies and the Issues	287
STEIN, JANICE GROSS	see Lebow, Richard Ned	
STOCKTON, PAUL	Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold War Military	233
TUCKER, NANCY BERNKOPF	China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire	501
VAN DE VELDE, JAMES R.	Opinion: The Enola Gay Saved Lives	453

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Books Reviewed

Abramson, Jeffrey, We the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy
G. Thomas Munsterman 339

Albert, Steve, The Case Against the General: Manuel Noriega and the Politics of American Justice
Deborah L. Norden 146

Amberg, Stephen, The Union Inspiration in American Politics: The Autoworkers and the Making of a Liberal Industrial Order
Jennifer Klein 475

Arens, Moshe, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis Between the U.S. and Israel
James Lee Ray 465

Aslund, Anders, How Russia Became a Market Economy
Randall Stone 666

Avant, Deborah D., Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars
Barry R. Posen 319

Bessette, Joseph M., The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government
Eileen L. McDonagh 331

Betts, Richard, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences
Deborah D. Avant 481

Betz, Hans-Georg, Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe
William E. Scheuerman 142

Blasius, Mark, Gay and Lesbian Politics: Sexuality and the Emergence of a New Ethics
Robert W. Bailey 345

Brysk, Alison, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratization
Michael Shifter 496

Burrell, Barbara C., A Woman's Place is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in the Feminist Era
Roberta S. Sigel 152

Cigar, Norman, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"
Sanya Popović 485

Cline, William R., International Economic Policy in the 1990
Arvid Lukauskas 498

Colburn, Forrest D., The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries
Jeff Goodwin 490

Denitch, Bogdan, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia
Warren Zimmerman 134

Diamond, Larry and **Plattner, Mark F.,** eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy
Hyun Sook Kim 333

Dilulio, John J. and **Nathan, Richard P.,** eds., Making Health Reform Work: The View from the States
Laurel Hixon Illston 488

Downs, George W., ed., Collective Security beyond the Cold War
Dan Lindley 336

Drake, David F., Reforming the Health Care Market: An Interpretive Economic History
Anne Lenhard Reisinger 328

Drew, Elizabeth, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency
Fred I. Greenstein 127

Dubofsky, Melvyn, The State and Labor in Modern America
Stephen Amberg 473

Elliott, Lorraine M., International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic
Christopher C. Joyner 330

Ellis, Richard J., Presidential Lightning Rods: The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Michael A. Genovese 136

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Maranto, Robert, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency: Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration — PATRICK J. WOLF 340

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Sinclair, Barbara, Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era — Joseph Cooper — 633

Sisk, Timothy D., Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract — Anthony W. Marx — 493

Smith, Tony America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century — John M. Owen — 139

Sowell, Thomas, Race and Culture: A World View — Elliott P. Skinner — 131

Steinmo, Sven, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British, and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State — Paul Pierson — 469

Suskind, Lawrence E., Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements — Matthew Alan Cahn — 342

Thompson, Fred and **Jones, L. R.,** Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal — Peter J. Roman — 482

Torres, Andres, Between Melting Pot and Mosaic: African Americans and Puerto Ricans in the New York Political Economy — John Mollenkopf — 653

Van Rooyen, Johann, Hard Right: The New White Power in South Africa — Richard L. Sklar — 656

Vestal, James, Planning for Change — Robert Dekle — 140

Walcott, Charles E. and **Hult, Karen M.,** Governing the White House: From Hoover Through LBJ — James P. Pfiffner — 638

Walker, David B., The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching toward Washington — Frank J. Sorauf — 480

Wallace, William, Regional Integration: The West European Experience — Helen Milner — 483

Weinberg, Leonard, The Transformation of Italian Communism — Joseph LaPalombara — 321

Weiner, Joshua M., Ilston, Laurel Hixon, and **Hanley, Raymond J.,** Sharing the Burden: Strategies for Public and Private Long-Term Care Insurance — Richard P. Nathan — 329

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Wood, B. Dan and **Waterman, Richard W.,** Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy — Francis E. Rourke — 476

Woodward, Bob, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton Whitehouse — Donald F. Kettl — 126

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Wou, Odoric Y. K., Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan — Kenneth Pomeranz — 492

Zernicke, Paul Haskell, Pitching the Presidency: How Presidents Depict the Office — Kathy B. Smith — 472

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

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

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